Keyes v. Churchward.

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.
• Citation: Keyes v. Churchward., 135 Conn. 115, 61 A.2d 668 (Conn. 1948)
• Decision Date: 30 June 1948
• Parties: KEYES v. CHURCHWARD.

135 Conn. 115

61 A.2d 668

KEYES

v.CHURCHWARD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 30, 1948.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; O'Sullivan, Judge.

Action by Frank Keyes against Jack Churchward for alienation of the affections of plaintiff's wife. From a judgment rendered on a jury's verdict for plaintiff after filing of a remittitur, defendant appeals.

No error.

Robert J. Woodruff, of New Haven (Arthur Klein, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas F. Keyes, Jr., of New Haven, Joseph M. Brandon, of New Haven (David E. FitzGerald, Jr., of New Haven, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

DICKENSON, Judge.

In this action for alienation of affections, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $25,000, the defendant moved to set it aside as contrary to the law and evidence and excessive, the trial court ordered it set aside unless the plaintiff filed a remittitur of $7500, and the plaintiff filed the remittitur. The defendant has appealed on the sole ground that the verdict, so reduced, is still excessive.

The jury could have found the following facts: The plaintiff and his wife were married August 30, 1942, after a courtship of five years. They lived together, with her parents, until December 22, 1942. During that time the plaintiff was a letter carrier and his wife was employed in secretarial work. Their relations were congenial. On November 14, 1942, Mrs. Keyes commenced working for the Churchward Company, a business owned and operated by the defendant. On December 22, 1942, the plaintiff was inducted into the United States army and was in the service in this country until December, 1943. During that time the plaintiff and his wife corresponded, conversed over the telephone, and saw each other on a few occasions. In December, 1943, he went overseas, where he remained for about two years. During that time they corresponded frequently. He returned to this country in December, 1945, was discharged from the army on December 14, 1945, and rejoined his wife, who was living with her parents. He remained with her until they quarreled on December 30, 1945, and he left the next day. While the plaintiff was in the service, his wife had progressed from a position where she received about $30 a week to that of treasurer of the Churchward Company, receiving more than $7500 a year. She was personally attractive, and the jury could have found that she was a very capable and efficient business woman. The plaintiff, after he left her, saw her in the company of the defendant on various occasions. The plaintiff's affection for his wife had continued from the time he married her through his years in the service and upon his return, and in some degree to the time of trial of this action. She was then twenty-six years of age and he thirty-three. The alienation of her affections by the defendant is not disputed. It affected the plaintiff's health. When he saw them together his ‘nerves would go to pieces.’

The gist of an action for alienation of affections is the loss of consortium, a property right growing out of the marriage relation which includes the exclusive right to the services of the spouse. By such services is meant not so much earned wages as assistance and helpfulness in the relations of conjugal life according to the station of the parties. In addition, there is the exclusive right in each to the society, companionship and conjugal affection of the other. To damages for the loss of these rights may be added recovery for mental anguish and injured feelings. Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 561, 111 A. 869. Damages may include future as well as past suffering; Palladino v. Nardi, 133 Conn. 659, 664, 54 A.2d 265; and are measured by the extent of the loss incurred, as far as money can measure it. Maggay v. Nikitko, 117 Conn. 206, 209, 167 A. 816. They are incapable of precise measurement. Valentine v. Pollak, supra, 95 Conn. 558. For that reason, considerable latitude is allowed a jury by the courts in estimating damages. 27 Am.Jur. 142; see also ...