Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators
Decision Date | 12 September 1995 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C-1499 (69-M-1499). |
Citation | 902 F. Supp. 1274 |
Parties | Wilfred KEYES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONGRESS OF HISPANIC EDUCATORS, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al., Defendants, and The State of Colorado ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Defendant-Intervenor. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Gordon G. Greiner, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO, Norman Chachkin, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Albert H. Kauffman, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, TX, Peter Roos, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Intervenors.
Michael H. Jackson, Semple & Jackson, Denver, CO, Phil C. Neal, Neal Gerber & Eisenberg, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
William E. Thro, Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Intervenor.
Pursuant to the following detailed findings of fact and the guidance of recent United States Supreme Court opinions, it is now determined that defendant School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, ("District") has complied in good faith with the desegregation decrees entered in this case and that the vestiges of past discrimination by the defendant have been eliminated to the extent practicable. The defendant's second motion to terminate jurisdiction is granted and full authority is restored to the District's Board of Education for governance of Denver's schools under applicable laws of the State of Colorado and the United States. This civil action is, therefore, closed with a final order of dismissal. The allegations of failure to comply with the Language Rights Consent Decree of August 17, 1984, made by plaintiff-intervenor Congress of Hispanic Educators, are removed from this civil action and will be dealt with as a separate and independent proceeding designated as Civil Action No. 95-M-2313, with its own jurisdictional base under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, codified in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 and particularly §§ 1703(f) and 1708.
The District filed its second motion to terminate jurisdiction on January 31, 1992. The pre-trial statements included challenges to the constitutionality of Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution, commonly called the "Busing Clause." Upon receipt of notice, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b), the Attorney General of the State of Colorado moved to intervene as a defendant on a cross-claim and counterclaim for declaratory judgment affirming the validity of that provision. The motion to intervene was granted. The plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors and defendant District seek a judgment declaring the Busing Clause to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. They contend that this state restriction adversely affects the District's ability to implement Resolutions 2233 and 2314, as set out in a stipulation of facts filed July 29, 1994. By adopting those resolutions, the District's Board of Education has resolved to make future changes in the current pupil assignment plan only through specified procedures after termination of this court's jurisdiction. A decision on the Busing Clause issue is necessary to guide the District upon termination of this court's jurisdiction.
In relevant part, Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution provides:
No sectarian tenets or doctrines shall ever be taught in the public school, nor shall any distinction or classification of pupils be made on account of race or color, nor shall any pupil be assigned or transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of achieving racial balance.
On its face this language prohibits the use of race or color as a basis for treating students differently and precludes the adoption of "racial balance" as the goal in making pupil assignments. As explained hereafter, the Busing Clause is not inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
From 1960 to 1969, the District's Board of Education pursued a deliberate policy of racial segregation in Denver's schools. The Board actively attempted to contain what was then called the "Negro" population by keeping black families out of the Park Hill area, a residential neighborhood east of Colorado Boulevard. As a result, segregation in Denver schools was de jure, meaning that it was created by the deliberate acts of the governing authority. Some Board members tried to reverse these discriminatory practices, but their efforts to integrate some of the schools were repudiated in a school board election in May, 1969. This lawsuit began in June, 1969, when the original plaintiffs, children in the Denver Public Schools, challenged the constitutionality of the Board's discriminatory acts. The case has had a long history, and has been the subject of many court opinions.1
The District's obligation in this case has always been to remove the effects of its own past discriminatory policies. No school district has responsibility under the Constitution to eradicate the effects of racial discrimination by other agencies of government or in the larger community. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738-45, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3124, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). The United States Constitution does not burden public education with remedying all of the disadvantages experienced by racial or ethnic groups in this nation's history. There is hope that education will enlighten and energize societal efforts to relieve and redress injustice and unfairness, but the courts have neither the competence nor the power to compel public schools to make that effort.
Determining whether the District has fulfilled its constitutional obligation requires revisiting earlier decisions in this case to recall the particular discriminatory conduct that caused court intervention. The case was originally assigned to Judge William E. Doyle, who discussed the history of the District's discriminatory policies in the following passage, taken from an early Keyes opinion:
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