Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, Civ. A. No. C-1499.
| Citation | 368 F. Supp. 207 |
| Decision Date | 11 December 1973 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C-1499. |
| Parties | Wilfred KEYES et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Holland & Hart, by Gordon G. Greiner and Robert T. Connery, Denver, Colo., and James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Wood, Ris & Hames, by William K. Ris, and Henry, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton, by Thomas E. Creighton, Benjamin L. Craig and Michael H. Jackson, Denver, Colo., for defendants.
This case was previously tried in 1969-70. There has been a succession of hearings and finally a trial. The various opinions show the course of the proceedings. These appear in 303 F.Supp. 279 (D.C.Colo.1969) (the preliminary injunction); 303 F.Supp. 289 (D.C.Colo. 1969) (); 313 F. Supp. 61 (D.C.Colo.1970) (); 313 F.Supp. 90 (D.C.Colo.1970) (). Final judgment was entered immediately following the issuance of the last opinion. Implementation orders were subsequently entered, the final one having been entered in May 1971. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case to this court for further proceedings, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548; a hearing has now been held in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate.
The essential and significant holding of the Supreme Court defined anew de jure segregation, ruling that the finding of intentionally segregative School Board action in the Park Hill section of Denver created a prima facie case of segregative purpose or design on the part of the Board of Education and shifted the burden of proof to the School Board to prove that other segregated schools within the system did not become so as a result of intentional action having for its purpose the creation of conditions of segregation. The primarily embattled part of the case at each level was the conduct of the School Board in the Park Hill area and the immediately adjacent sectors. The Supreme Court reexamined the facts and approved the conclusion that conduct here during the 1960's constituted de jure segregation.1
The Supreme Court regarded as error the requiring of plaintiffs in a school case such as the one at bar to offer proof that the segregation in each and every instance and in each and every school was the product of official action. Proof of de jure segregation in one area and continuing the Court further said:
And shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is true even if it is determined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently of each other because, even in that situation, there is high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in other areas of the system. We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate.
413 U.S. at 207, 93 S.Ct. at 2697.
In its mandate the Supreme Court directed the following:
In summary, the District Court on remand, first, will afford respondent School Board the opportunity to prove its contention that the Park Hill area is a separate, identifiable and unrelated section of the school district that should be treated as isolated from the rest of the district. If respondent School Board fails to prove that contention, the District Court, second, will determine whether respondent School Board's conduct over almost a decade after 1960 in carrying out a policy of deliberate racial segregation in the Park Hill schools constitutes the entire school system a dual school system. If the District Court determines that the Denver school system is a dual school system, respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system "root and branch." Green v. County School Board, supra, 391 U.S. 430 at 438, 88 S.Ct. 1689 at 1694, 20 L.Ed.2d 716.
413 U.S. at 213, 93 S.Ct. at 2700.
The Supreme Court then went on to say that if it was determined by a consideration of issues one and two just mentioned that the school system was not a dual school system, this court should afford the School Board an opportunity to rebut petitioner's prima facie case of intentional segregation in the core city schools raised by the finding of intentional segregation in the Park Hill schools. The Court said that the Board would have the burden of proving that its policies with respect to school site location, school size, school renovation and additions, school attendance zones, standard assignment and transfer objections, mobile classroom units, transportation of students, assignment of faculty and staff, considered together and premised on the Board's so-called neighborhood school concept, either were not for the purpose of creating or maintaining segregation or, in the alternative, were not factors in causing segregation in the segregated schools.
We have heard evidence bearing on issues one and two quoted above.2 In view of the conclusion which we reach it is...
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Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., Nos. 74-1349
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Keyes v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, DENVER, COLO.
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Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, Civ. A. No. C-1499 (69-M-1499).
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William E. Doyle
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