Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, Civ. A. No. C-1499.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
Writing for the CourtWILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit
Citation368 F. Supp. 207
PartiesWilfred KEYES et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al., Defendants.
Decision Date11 December 1973
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. C-1499.

368 F. Supp. 207

Wilfred KEYES et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C-1499.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

December 11, 1973.


368 F. Supp. 208

Holland & Hart, by Gordon G. Greiner and Robert T. Connery, Denver, Colo., and James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Wood, Ris & Hames, by William K. Ris, and Henry, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton, by Thomas E. Creighton, Benjamin L. Craig and Michael H. Jackson, Denver, Colo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

This case was previously tried in 1969-70. There has been a succession of hearings and finally a trial. The various opinions show the course of the proceedings. These appear in 303 F.Supp. 279 (D.C.Colo.1969) (the preliminary injunction); 303 F.Supp. 289 (D.C.Colo. 1969) (supplemental findings in the preliminary injunction matter); 313 F. Supp. 61 (D.C.Colo.1970) (judgment entered for plaintiffs on the first claim and in favor of defendants on all but one count of the second claim; this was trial on the merits); 313 F.Supp. 90 (D.C.Colo.1970) (opinion issued on the remedy on May 21, 1970). Final judgment was entered immediately following the issuance of the last opinion. Implementation orders were subsequently entered, the final one having been entered in May 1971. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case to this court for further proceedings, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548; a hearing has now been held in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate.

The essential and significant holding of the Supreme Court defined anew de jure segregation, ruling that the finding of intentionally segregative School Board action in the Park Hill section of Denver created a prima facie case of segregative purpose or design on the part of the Board of Education and shifted the burden of proof to the School Board to prove that other segregated schools within the system did not become so as a result of intentional action having for its purpose the creation of conditions of segregation. The primarily embattled part of the case at each level was the conduct of the School Board in the Park Hill area and the immediately adjacent sectors. The Supreme Court reexamined the facts and approved the conclusion that conduct here during the 1960's constituted de jure segregation.1

The Supreme Court regarded as error the requiring of plaintiffs in a school case such as the one at bar to offer proof that the segregation in each and every instance and in each and every school was the product of official action. Proof of de jure segregation in one area "creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities * * *," and continuing the Court further said:

And shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is true even if it is determined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently of each other because, even in that situation, there is high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in other areas of the system. We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate.

413 U.S. at 207, 93 S.Ct. at 2697.

368 F. Supp. 209

In its mandate the Supreme Court directed the following:

In summary, the District Court on remand, first, will afford respondent School Board the opportunity to prove its contention that the Park Hill area is a separate, identifiable and unrelated section of
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6 practice notes
  • Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, Civ. A. No. C-1499 (69-M-1499).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
    • September 12, 1995
    ...In accordance with the evidence presented and with the mandate given to us by the Supreme Court, we so conclude. Keyes VIII, 368 F.Supp. 207, 210 In 1974, Judge Doyle ordered a city-wide desegregation plan. Even that plan was found to be inadequate by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1......
  • Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., Nos. 74-1349
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • September 16, 1975
    ...No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548. After extensive hearings the trial court entered its judgment, 368 F.Supp. 207. All parties appeal with typical inflexibility of position, understandably, perhaps, because of the great complexity of the problem and the inevi......
  • Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., Nos. 85-2814
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • January 30, 1990
    ...93 S.Ct. 3033, 37 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1973), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed. 548 (1973) (Keyes VII ), on remand, 368 F.Supp. 207 (D.Colo.1973) (Keyes VIII ) and 380 F.Supp. 673 (D.Colo.1974) (Keyes IX ), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir.1975) (K......
  • Keyes v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, DENVER, COLO., Civ. A. No. C-1499.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
    • August 25, 1977
    ...the trial judge concluded that the DPS was an unlawful dual system and thereby was in violation of the United States Constitution. D.C., 368 F.Supp. 207. After finding unacceptable the desegregation plans submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants, the trial court appointed its own expert,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 cases
  • Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, Civ. A. No. C-1499 (69-M-1499).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
    • September 12, 1995
    ...In accordance with the evidence presented and with the mandate given to us by the Supreme Court, we so conclude. Keyes VIII, 368 F.Supp. 207, 210 In 1974, Judge Doyle ordered a city-wide desegregation plan. Even that plan was found to be inadequate by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1......
  • Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., Nos. 74-1349
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • September 16, 1975
    ...No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548. After extensive hearings the trial court entered its judgment, 368 F.Supp. 207. All parties appeal with typical inflexibility of position, understandably, perhaps, because of the great complexity of the problem and the inevi......
  • Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., Nos. 85-2814
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • January 30, 1990
    ...93 S.Ct. 3033, 37 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1973), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed. 548 (1973) (Keyes VII ), on remand, 368 F.Supp. 207 (D.Colo.1973) (Keyes VIII ) and 380 F.Supp. 673 (D.Colo.1974) (Keyes IX ), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir.1975) (K......
  • Keyes v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, DENVER, COLO., Civ. A. No. C-1499.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
    • August 25, 1977
    ...the trial judge concluded that the DPS was an unlawful dual system and thereby was in violation of the United States Constitution. D.C., 368 F.Supp. 207. After finding unacceptable the desegregation plans submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants, the trial court appointed its own expert,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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