Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 139,139
• Citation: 494 A.2d 200,303 Md. 397
• Parties: Anna Lee KEYS v. CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 397

303 Md. 397

494 A.2d 200

Anna Lee KEYS v. CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION et al.

No. 139, Sept. Term, 1984.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 28, 1985.

Alex S. Katzenberg, III, Baltimore (Gee M. Cohen and Cohen, Snyder, McClellan, Eisenberg & Katzenberg, P.A., Baltimore, on brief), for appellant

Patricia M. Flannery, Baltimore (Frank J. Vecella and Anderson, Coe & King, Baltimore, on brief), for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, JJ. and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr. (Retired, Specially Assigned), Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

McAULIFFE, Judge.

In November of 1981 Appellant suffered the attachment of her wages by a writ of garnishment issued to enforce payment of a judgment she had fully satisfied more than four years before. For this indignity and alleged damage to her reputation and credit she brought suit against the creditor and its attorney, and we must now determine whether her proof was sufficient to establish a prima facie case in each of the four causes of action sued upon.

In 1971 Chrysler Credit Corporation, represented by N. Frank Lanocha, Esquire, obtained a judgment against Anna On August 25, 1981 Lanocha filed in the same case a request for writ of attachment of Appellant's wages, stating as a part of his request that the sum of $2,068.61 was currently due on the judgment. The writ ¹ was issued on November 12, and served on Appellant's employer, Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, several days later. On November 18, Appellant was advised of the attachment by Ray Culbertson, her supervisor. According to Appellant she was working in a large room with approximately 40 other employees, some of whom she supervised, when Mr. Culbertson approached her desk and in a normal conversational voice informed her that her wages for the week ending November 14th had been attached by Chrysler. Appellant testified that a number of co-employees were in very close proximity to her when her supervisor advised her of the attachment, and that some of them On the same day Appellant called Lanocha and told him the judgment had been paid in 1977. Lanocha responded that his records did not indicate payment, but that "he would check into it." Appellant contacted her attorney, G.M. Cohen, on the following day, and on November 20, Cohen called Lanocha to demand that the error be corrected. Later that same day Lanocha called another of Appellant's attorneys, a Mr. Katzenberg, to acknowledge his error and to advise that he would act immediately to effect a reimbursement of the attached wages.

                Lee Keys and her husband in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City.   During the period 1972-74 Chrysler levied upon the real property of the Keys, and caused to be issued the writ of fieri facias for personal property as well as five garnishments against Appellant's wages, all apparently without success.   In October of 1977 the Keys sold their home, and the outstanding balance of Chrysler's judgment, including attorney's fees and costs, was paid in full from the proceeds of sale.   Payment was made by the settlement attorney directly to Chrysler, and there is no indication that Lanocha was involved.   However, on November 16, 1977 a document captioned "Order of Satisfaction" and signed by Lanocha as attorney for Chrysler was filed in the action, directing the clerk to enter the judgment "satisfied."   On the same day the clerk of the District Court made an entry on the docket of "Agreed and Settled."
                stopped working when they heard what he was saying to her
                

Appellant's wages for the week ending November 21, were also affected by the continuing garnishment, and she was advised of this by Mr. Culbertson on November 25, apparently in the same manner as before. A co-worker testified she had overheard Mr. Culbertson telling Appellant of the effect of the attachment on November 25, and that she had observed Appellant to be upset and crying a short time thereafter. Later the same day Appellant's employer authorized release of the attached wages to her, pursuant to a notice of dismissal of the attachment that had been forwarded by Lanocha and apparently received by the employer on November 24th. Appellant received the wages that had been attached within several days of November 25th.

Appellant brought this action against Chrysler and Lanocha, including one count of defamation against Chrysler and two counts each of malicious use of process, abuse of process, and conversion against Chrysler and Lanocha. Following the presentation of Appellant's evidence at a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Judge David G. Mitchell granted motions for judgment on behalf of the defendants on all counts. A timely appeal was taken to the Court of Special Appeals and we granted certiorari, 302 Md. 192, 486 A.2d 205 (1985) on our own motion before consideration of the case by that court. We will consider the

contentions of the parties as to each of the several causes of action involved.

I DEFAMATION

Appellant's action against Chrysler alleges that the writ of attachment defamed her because it included a false statement that she owed an outstanding judgment. This, she reasons, suggested a refusal or failure to pay her honest debts and therefore reflected adversely on her credit or character. Furthermore, she contends Chrysler is liable for the republication of this untruth by her employer.

Because we agree with the trial judge's determination that statements contained in the writ were protected by an absolute privilege against an action for defamation we affirm the entry of a judgment for Chrysler on this count, and we do not reach the question of whether a statement that a person has not paid or refuses to pay a lawful debt would be defamatory under the facts of this case. ² For the same reason, and for the additional reason that the question was not raised by the parties, we do not decide whether the issuance of a writ may constitute the original publication of a libel and subject the requesting party to liability for defamation. ³

At least since 1888, when this Court decided Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 A. 500 (1888) and Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888), we have recognized the existence of an absolute privilege for defamatory statements uttered in the course of a trial or contained in Appellant suggests the privilege should not apply because the litigation had ended on November 16, 1977 with the filing of the praecipe signed by Lanocha and directing the Clerk of the District Court to enter the judgment "satisfied." She cites in support of that contention Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141 (N.Y.1828) wherein suit had been brought for defamation following defendant's statement that plaintiff had been involved in bovine bestiality, i.e., "connexion with the defendant's cow." The plaintiff had been charged with a crime against nature, but had been acquitted of the charge. Because the statement upon which the action was based was made after the hearing and acquittal, it was held to be outside the scope of the privilege.

                pleadings, affidavits or other documents directly related to the case.   This privilege operates in favor of the judge, as well as the witnesses, counsel, and parties to the litigation.   Our interpretation of the privilege has consistently been broad and comprehensive in recognition of the sound policy announced in  Bartlett, supra, 69 Md. at 226:  to foster "the free and unfettered administration of justice."   We accepted the minority or "English" rule which afforded the absolute privilege to witnesses and parties without the necessity of demonstrating the relevance of the statement to the pending litigation.   See Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 402 A.2d 897 (1979).   In  Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980) we approved the application of an absolute privilege to a defamatory statement published in a document prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding, even though not filed in the proceeding.   And, in  Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981) we said that the absolute privilege may be extended to witnesses testifying in certain types of administrative proceedings.   We do not here retreat from the broad view we have taken of the necessary scope and effect of this important privilege
                

We conclude that Burlingame has no application to the facts of this case. Here, the alleged defamatory communication That is not to say that the rendition of a verdict or the entry of a judgment forever terminates the privilege. Quite to the contrary, if a post trial motion is filed, and affidavits are received or testimony is taken with respect thereto, the privilege would apply to the pleadings, affidavits and testimony. Similarly, an attachment issued to enforce a final judgment may precipitate extensive additional proceedings involving the original parties as well as a garnishee, and those proceedings will enjoy the protection of the privilege even though occurring in a case in which the judgment had become final. Even when a judgment has been entered satisfied, and more than 30 days has passed, additional proceedings will be required if a motion to strike or to withdraw the order of satisfaction is filed, alleging fraud, mistake or irregularity.

                was made in and as a part of a District Court action.   In Burlingame, the statement was not made as a part of the case, but was an editorial comment offered after the conclusion of the trial
                

In the case before us, the litigation was resuscitated by the filing of a request for the issuance of a writ of attachment which included a statement by Chrysler's attorney that the judgment had not been paid and that $2,068.61 was still due to Chrysler. As it turns out, this statement was in error, and the judgment had in fact been paid, but neither error contained in the statement that revived the...