Keys v. W. Cnty. Mall CMBS, LLC
| Decision Date | 17 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13CV1790 TIA,4:13CV1790 TIA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | MARIE ANN KEYS, Plaintiff, v. WEST COUNTY MALL CMBS, LLC, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant West County Mall CMBS, LLC's ("West County Mall") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14). Also pending is Defendant West County Mall's Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 16). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Upon consideration of the motions and responses thereto, the undersigned will grant the motion to dismiss and deny the motion for sanctions.
On May 11, 2013, Plaintiff Marie Ann Keys, and African American woman, drove to the West County Shopping Mall ("mall"). (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 13) While driving around the parking lot looking for a place to park, she spotted a vehicle backing out of a parking spot. (Id. at ¶ 11) At the same time, Janet Butzinger and her son Christopher Luebbers were waiting to park in the same parking space. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Luebbers got out of his vehicle and tried to save the spot by jumping in front of Plaintiff's moving vehicle as she began driving into the parking space. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16) Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Luebbers eventually removed himself from the spot, and Plaintiff parked her vehicle. (Id. at ¶18)
According to the First Amended Complaint, Ms. Butzinger and Mr. Luebbers were angry that they did not get the parking spot, so they filed a police report falsely claiming that Plaintiff ran over Mr. Luebbers' foot and then left the scene of an accident. (Id. at ¶ 21) The Des Peres Police arrested Plaintiff and transported her to the police station for booking. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-27) Before leaving the station, Plaintiff signed a "Notice of Ban" prohibiting her from entering mall property for one year. (Id. at ¶ 28)
On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint in federal court, alleging that Defendant West County Mall violated her constitutional rights. Count I asserts that Defendant is liable under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy theory for banning her from the mall on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-44) Count II alleges that Defendant conspired with others to deprive her of her rights to equal protection and equal privileges and immunities under the law on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Id. at ¶¶ 46-49)
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on December 20, 2013, asserting that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel bar Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges that arose from the parking lot incident. (Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 4-5, ECF No. 14) Alternatively, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in both counts of the complaint. (Id. at ¶ 6) Plaintiff responds that her complaint does not question the validity of the arrest but that Defendants "trespassed" Plaintiff from the mall for a period of one year based on her race. (Pl's Response in Opp. 1-4, ECF No. 20) Further, Plaintiff maintains that she has stated a claim upon which reliefcan be granted in Counts I and II of her First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 5-7)
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the complaint fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007) (). While the Court cautioned that the holding does not require a heightened fact pleading of specifics, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. In other words, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Id. This standard simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the claim. Id. at 556.
Courts must liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the factual allegations as true. See Id. at 555; see also Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (). Further a court should not dismiss the complaint simply because the court is doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, "[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Further, courts "'arenot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court can "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. Id.
In general, courts must ignore materials that are outside the pleadings. Kulovic v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 4:10-CV-2058 CAS, 2011 WL 1483374, at *2 (E.D. Mo. April 19, 2011) (citations omitted). However, in addressing a motion to dismiss, courts "may consider documents attached to the complaint and matters of public and administrative record referenced in the complaint." Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Defendant first argues that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel bar Plaintiff's claims against Defendant mall. However, Defendant's argument is premised on the notion that Plaintiff's claims stem from whether the arrest was lawful and not whether the mall ban was discriminatory. Plaintiff clarifies in her response in opposition that her suit pertains to the post-arrest mall ban, not the arrest itself. In light of Plaintiff's position, Defendant focuses on its argument that Plaintiff's "discrimination theories are bare assertions devoid of factual support." (Def.'s Reply 2, ECF No. 21) Thus, the Court will focus on whether Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pleads "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant systematically and without due processbans African American invitees from the mall for longer periods of time than similarly situated white invitees, in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also asserts that Defendant uses the CBL Ban against Plaintiff and other African Americans based on impermissible racial discrimination.
Defendant argues that Count I of Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege that African Americans are disproportionately affected by the mall ban following an arrest and fails to allege facts supporting her claim that Defendant implements the mall ban in a discriminatory manner. Instead, Defendant asserts that the mall ban was due to Plaintiff's arrest and not her race. Defendant claims that Plaintiff's lawsuit is merely a fishing expedition.
In order to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff "must establish that (1) defendant[] acted under color of state law and (2) defendant['s] wrongful conduct deprived [her] of a constitutionally protected right." Soltan v. Accor North Am., Inc., No. 09-1412(DSD/SRN), 2010 WL 187477, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 11, 2010) (citation omitted). "[T]he under-color-of-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)) (internal quotation omitted). However, "where a private party defendant performs an act ordinarily performed by private parties and it triggers action by state officials, the defendant's actions are committed 'under color of' state law if the conduct qualifies as state action under the fourteenth amendment." Roudybush v. Zabel, 813 F.2d 173, 176 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Thus, a claim against a private party defendant may be actionable under § 1983 where the defendant's conduct is "fairly attributable" to the state. Soltan, 2010 WL 187477, at *2 (citing Roudybush, 813 F.2d at 176). Further, a plaintiff mustshow that the private party defendant had an unconstitutional policy or custom that inflicted an injury actionable under § 1983. Griffin v. Walgreen Co., No. 4:09CV1724 DDN, 2010 WL 4975532, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2010) (citing Smith v. Insley's Inc., 499 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled any facts demonstrating that Defendant West County Mall was acting under the color of state law or that Defendant instituted an unconstitutional policy. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that she has stated a claim in that Defendant conspired with the Des Peres Department of Public Safety to deprive her of her constitutional rights by banning her from the mall based on her race. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has...
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