Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. v. PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CASUALTY …

• Decision Date: 03 May 2001
• Citation: 777 A.2d 84
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: KEYSTONE AERIAL SURVEYS, INC., Appellant, (at 2307) v. PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Appellee. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., Appellant, v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, Appellee, v. Marisol Campbell, Vanessa Campbell and Melva Campbell, Individually and as natural mother and next friend of Penelope Campbell and Nakita Campbell, Minors, Appellants. (at 2469)

777 A.2d 84

KEYSTONE AERIAL SURVEYS, INC., Appellant, (at 2307) v. PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., Appellant, v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, Appellee, v. Marisol Campbell, Vanessa Campbell and Melva Campbell, Individually and as natural mother and next friend of Penelope Campbell and Nakita Campbell, Minors, Appellants. (at 2469)

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 28, 2001.

Filed May 3, 2001.

Reargument Denied July 10, 2001.

John K. Weston, Philadelphia, for Keystone Aerial Surveys.

Rand P. Nolen, Houston, TX, for Campbell.

Lise Luborsky, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Property and Casualty, appellee.

Before Del SOLE, P.J., EAKIN and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

LALLY-GREEN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellants, Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. (Keystone), et al., appeal from the order dated June 27, 2000, granting summary judgment to Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (PIGA). In this case of first impression, we are asked to interpret § 991.1803(b)(1)(i)(B) of the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act).¹ Appellants argue that this section allows each of five plaintiffs in an underlying wrongful death case to recover $300,000 from PIGA. In contrast, PIGA argues that this section caps the recovery for all five plaintiffs to $300,000 in the aggregate. The trial court found in favor of PIGA. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 The facts and procedural history of the case are as follows.² Thomas Campbell, a Texas resident, was a passenger in an airplane which crashed near Battle Mountain, Nevada, on May 28, 1994. Mr. Campbell's wife and four surviving children (collectively, the Campbells) are all residents of Texas. Keystone, a Pennsylvania corporation, owned, maintained, operated, and controlled the airplane.

¶ 3 In September 1994, the Campbells filed a complaint against Keystone in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.³ The complaint set forth claims for: (1) wrongful death and survival under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, Tex. Civ. P. Rev.Code § 71.001 et seq.; (2) negligence; (3) gross negligence; and (4) in the alternative, a workers' compensation claim under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq.⁴

¶ 4 Keystone was insured by American Eagle Insurance Company (American Eagle). The policy at issue was an aircraft insurance policy, which generally covered damage to aircraft and to passengers in the event of an accident. See, PIGA's Answer to Keystone's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C1. During the course of the Texas lawsuit, American Eagle was declared insolvent. PIGA, an insurance guaranty corporation, took the place of the insolvent insurance company pursuant to 40 P.S. § 991.1803. Keystone and the Campbells settled the case for a total of $1,500,000; i.e., $300,000 to each of the five surviving Campbells. This settlement was reflected in a final judgment issued by the United States District Court on October 15, 1998. The judgment reads, in relevant part, as follows:

FINAL JUDGMENT

The parties announced to the Court that pursuant to the terms and limitations of the Settlement, Compromise and Release Agreement between the parties, the Plaintiffs herein should receive from Defendant, Keystone, the aggregate sum of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($1,500,000.00).

The Court, having heard and considered the evidence and argument of counsel concerning the dollar amount and the limitations on collection of same, and having considered the report of the Guardian Ad Litem [of Penelope Campbell and Nakita Campbell], is of the opinion and finds that the Settlement, Compromise and Release Agreement is fair and reasonable and should be adopted as the judgment of the Court....

The Court further finds that the gross recovery of the Plaintiffs' settlement should be apportioned in the following manner if funds aggregating to $1,500,000.00 are actually received which the Court finds to be fair and reasonable:

1. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (300,000.00) to be paid to Melva Campbell in her individual capacity;

2. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (300,000.00) to be paid to Marisol Campbell;

3. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (300,000.00) to be paid to Vanessa Campbell;

4. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (300,000.00) to be paid to Melva Campbell as Next Friend of Penelope Campbell or as directed by the Guardian Ad Litem, Darlene Payne Smith, in a manner that is in the best interests of the minor; and

5. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (300,000.00) to be paid to Melva Campbell as Next Friend of Nakita Campbell or as directed by the Guardian Ad Litem, Darlene Payne Smith, in a manner that is in the best interests of the minor.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDICATED, AND DECREED that Defendant Keystone be discharged from all liability to Plaintiffs by reason of the incident described in the pleadings on file herein....

This is a final judgment and any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

¶ 5 An initialed, handwritten addendum to the order reads as follows:

It is recognized by the Court that at the time this lawsuit was filed Keystone had $5 million in insurance coverage with American Eagle Insurance Company which was declared insolvent and placed into receivership on 12/8/99. At this time, the only primary insurance coverage available to Keystone was through the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association ("PIGA"). PIGA claims to have only $300,000 in coverage while Keystone and plaintiffs believe there is $1,500,000 in coverage. At mediation, plaintiffs offered to settle this case within PIGA's policy limits. This offer was made on 10/6/98. As a result of PIGA's failure to recognize policy limits of $1,500,000 and their failure to settle the case for policy limits, Keystone was forced to enter into the settlement to protect its assets.

¶ 6 On April 14, 1999, Keystone filed a declaratory judgment action against PIGA.⁵ Specifically, Keystone sought an order declaring that under § 991.1803(b)(1)(i)(B) of the Act, each of the Campbells was a separate "claimant" and, therefore, PIGA was required to pay five separate claims of $300,000, for a total of $1,500,000. PIGA took the position that it is liable only for $300,000 in the aggregate. The Campbells intervened in this action.

¶ 7 On July 22, 1999, PIGA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court granted PIGA's motion in an order dated June 27, 2000. The order states, inter alia, that "any amount payable by [PIGA] is limited to a maximum of $300,000." Keystone and the Campbells filed appeals, which have been consolidated.

¶ 8 Appellants raise one issue on appeal:

Does 40 P.S. § 991.1803(b)(1)(i)(B) provide for only a single claim for wrongful death and survival beneficiaries regardless of the number of potential claimants or beneficiaries?

Appellants' Brief at 2.

¶ 9 We first address whether the instant appeal is interlocutory. The trial court has suggested that the instant appeal is interlocutory and should be quashed because: (1) it did not dispose of all claims and all parties; (2) it was not expressly determined to be a final order; (3) it "was not a determination of finality"; and (4) "hotly disputed issues of offset" against the $300,000 maximum are still outstanding. Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/2000, at 2.

¶ 10 We do not agree that the appeal is interlocutory. Under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2), "any order that is expressly defined as a final order by statute" is a final, appealable order. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813, 817 n. 6 (2000). Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532, any order declaring the "rights, status, and other legal relations" of the parties is expressly designated as a final order. Id. at 817. The trial court's order declared the legal relations of the parties by stating that PIGA's obligation to Appellants was limited to an aggregate maximum of $300,000 under the Act. Indeed, this order granted summary judgment to PIGA on the only issue presented by Keystone in its declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, the court's order was final and appealable. See, id. at 818.

¶ 11 We now turn to the merits of the case. As noted above, Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action. "[T]he purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal rights, status and other relations." Juban v. Schermer, 751 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Pa.Super.2000) (citation omitted). Under the Declaratory Judgments Act, the trial court is empowered to declare the rights and obligations of the parties, even if no other relief is sought. Id. Ordinary summary judgment procedures are applicable to declaratory judgment actions. See, Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 746 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa.Super.1999).

¶ 12 Our standard of review for this appeal from the grant of summary judgment for PIGA in this declaratory judgment action is well settled.

In examining this matter, as with all summary judgment cases, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Finally, we stress that summary judgment will be granted only in those cases which are clear and free from doubt. Our scope of review is plenary.

Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 13 The Act reads, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 991.1803.

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