Keystone Guild, Inc. v. Pappas

• Decision Date: 22 March 1960
• Citation: 159 A.2d 681,399 Pa. 46
• Parties: KEYSTONE GUILD, INC. v. M. George PAPPAS and World Scope Encyclopedia Corporation, Appellants. Appeal of WORLD SCOPE ENCYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION. Appeal of M. George PAPPAS.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 681

159 A.2d 681

399 Pa. 46

KEYSTONE GUILD, INC. v. M. George PAPPAS and World Scope Encyclopedia Corporation Appellants Appeal of WORLD SCOPE ENCYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION Appeal of M. George PAPPAS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 22, 1960.

Rehearing Denied May 2, 1960.

David N. Feldman, Edward I. Weisberg, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Folz, Bard, Kamsler, Goodis & Greenfield, Edward Greer, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK, and EAGEN, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

These are appeals from the grant of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County enjoining the appellant M. George Pappas from engaging in the business of selling encyclopedias by means of house-to-house canvass within a 150 mile area surrounding and including the city of Pittsburgh and restraining the appellant World Scope Encyclopedia Corp., from employing Pappas' services for this purpose.

On August 30, 1957, Pappas entered into an agreement for the sale of his business--selling encyclopedias by means of house-to-house canvass--to Keystone Guild, Inc., the appellee. This agreement contained a restrictive covenant which provided that the seller, Pappas, agreed not to engage 'directly or indirectly' in any manner in 'house-to-house retail selling or canvassing' for a period of ten years. Prior to the aforementioned date, Pappas had been engaged in the business of selling encyclopedias by means of house-to-house canvass in the same area in which Keystone Guild, Inc., conducted a similar business.

On September 18, 1959, Keystone Guild, Inc., filed a bill in equity against the appellants in which it was alleged that the restrictive covenant had been breached by Pappas and that the said breach was induced by the corporate appellant. On the same day the court below granted a rule to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Appellants filed preliminary objections to the complaint on October 5, 1959. On October 9, 1959, the return day of the rule, a hearing was held on the motion for a preliminary injunction. The motion was granted and a decree entered. These appeals followed.

The scope of appellate review in this type of proceeding is well settled. 'Our uniform rule is that, on an appeal from a decree which refuses, grants or continues a preliminary injunction, we will look only to see if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below and we will not further consider the merits of the case or pass upon the reasons for or against such action, unless it is plan that no such grounds existed or that the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable.' Herman v. Dixon, 393 Pa. 33, 141 A.2d 576, 577; Williams v. Bridy, 391 Pa. 1, 136 A.2d 832; Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 123 A.2d 626; Cohen v. A. M. Byers, Co., 363 Pa. 618, 70 A.2d 837; Murray v. Hill, 359 Pa. 540, 59 A.2d 877.

As we stated in Hicks v. American Natural Gas Co., 207 Pa. 570, 57 A. 55, 65 L.R.A. 209, 'It is somewhat embarrassing to an appellate court to discuss the reasons for or against a preliminary decree, because generally in such an issue we are not in full possession of the case either as to the law or testimony; hence our almost invariable rule is to simply affirm the decree,...