Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Commission
| Decision Date | 18 July 1961 |
| Parties | KEYSTONE RACEWAY CORPORATION, Appellant, v. STATE HARNESS RACING COMMISSION, a Departmental Commission within the Department of Agriculture for the State of Pennsylvania, and Martin E. Cusick, Commissioner, Edward J. Kane, Commissioner, Lawrence B. Sheppard, Commissioner, and Hon. W. L. Henning, Secretary of Agriculture, and Liberty Bell Racing Association, a Pennsylvania Corporation. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Howard Gittis, Raymond J. Bradley, Thomas D. McBride McBride, von Moschzisker & Bradley, Philadelphia, John T Macartney, Oliver, Macartney & Collins, Media, for appellant.
Harry L. Rossi, Dept. of Agriculture, Philadelphia, Anne X. Alpern Atty. Gen., for appellees State Harness Racing Commission and Dept. Of Agriculture.
Francis W. Sullivan, Philadelphia, for Liberty Bell Racing Assn.
Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.
This appeal in the nature of a special certiorari to bring before us for review the procedure pursued by the State Harness Racing Commission, raises Several very important, highly technical and in some respects unusual questions concerning administrative law and procedure and the Constitutionality of certain actions of the Commission.
The present controversy arises out of the grant of a license to Liberty Bell Racing Association, one of the appellees herein, by the State Harness Racing Commission under the provisions of the Act of December 22, 1959, P.L. 1978, 4 P.S. § 301 et seq. Section 1 of this Act created within the State Department of Agriculture a departmental administrative commission known as the State Harness Racing Commission. The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was authorized to and did appoint the three members of that Commission. The Commission has been given broad supervisory and regulatory powers over all harness racing in the State at which pari-mutuel betting is permitted or conducted and, subject to provisions not presently relevant, is authorized to license no more than four corporations in any one year to conduct harness racing at tracks where pari-mutuel betting will take place.
Pursuant to § 7 of the aforementioned Act the present appellants and 12 other corporations, including Liberty Bell Racing Association, filed with the Commission a notice of intention to apply for a license. Thereafter, each applicant was separately and informally interviewed by the Executive Secretary of the Commission. The Commission's counsel was also present at 12 of the 13 interviews while the chairman of the Commission was present at 9 of them. The remaining two members of the Commission attended none of the interviews. However, phonographic recordings were made of the interviews. These interviews were held before 'Part I of the Application [for a license]' was filed by any of the applicants and had been characterized by the Commission as intended to give the applicants some knowledge of the information which would be required in completing applications for a license.
On December 15, 1960, 'Part I of the Application' was forwarded to each applicant, and a copy of 'Administrative Rule #1' was sent to each applicant on January 12, 1961. Completed applications were then filed with the Commission by all applicants [1] on or before January 30, 1961. Thereafter, before the Commission's meeting on April 5, 1961, all the Commissioners listened to the phonographic recordings of the above mentioned interviews and reviewed (a) the notices of intention to apply for a track license, (b) Part I of the Application, and (c) the investigation reports prepared by the State Police of all persons involved in the management of the various proposed tracks.
On April 5, 1961, pursuant to a notice dated March 23, 1961, the Commission held a scheduled meeting. At this meeting the Commission by a 2-1 vote granted Liberty Bell Racing Association one of the four licenses subject to certain conditions. [2] By the same vote further action on the other applications was deferred. Counsel for seven of the other applicants, including appellant, were present at the meeting and were allowed to briefly state their contentions that granting a license to Liberty Bell Racing Association was premature and that a full hearing should be held. These contentions and arguments were rejected by the Commission. The meeting was then adjourned.
Liberty Bell Racing Association is the only applicant for a license in Philadelphia County. Appellant Keystone is one of four applicants which seek to construct a racing track and facilities in Delaware County. However, in considering this appeal, it is important to note that both Liberty Bell Racing Association and Keystone Raceway Corporation (appellant) propose to construct race tracks at locations within a 20 air mile radius of Philadelpohia's City Hall and each is approximately equidistant from City Hall, one north and the other southwest.
Appellant contends that the Commission committed basic and fundamental error by granting the license to Liberty Bell (a) without any hearing at which appellant and others applying and competing for a license could offer evidence and examine and cross-examine the applicants for a license and their witnesses, and (b) without making any findings of fact to support its award of the license. Appellant further contends that the grant of a license to Liberty Bell Racing Association was a denial of due process.
Before we consider the contentions of the appellant, we are met by the Commission's motion to quash the appeal. Two questions are immediately raised by this motion. The first question is whether an appeal in the nature of a certiorari will lie, and (secondly) if so, does the present appllant have standing to appeal.
In the last quarter of a century, independent regulatory administrative agencies, boards and commissions have mushroomed in ever increasing numbers at all levels of government-federal, state and local. Many of them have been given by Congress or a Legislature broad general powers to consider and dispose of matters of great public of private importance, although their precise duties and functions and in particular their limitations are often loosely or ill defined, and the law with respect thereto is not well settled.
Regardless of the admirable purpose for which these agencies are usually established, it is a matter of frequent complaint and common knowledge that the agencies at times act arbitrarily, or capriciously, and unintentionally ignore or violate rights which are ordained or guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitution, or established by law. For these reasons it is imperative that a checkrein be kept upon them.
If an appeal is prohibited by an Act, or the decision of the Agency is stated to be final or conclusive, the law is well settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the nature of a narrow certiorari and this Court will review only (1) the question of jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings before the Agency; (3) questions of excess in exercise of powers; and (4) constitutional questions: Cf. DeVito v. Civil Service Commission, 404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161 (); Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86.
Where, however as here, a statute is silent as to the right of appeal, or does not provide that the decision of the Agency shall be final or conclusive, or otherwise non-appealable, an appeal--if certiorari lies and if the appellant has a status to appeal thereunder--is allowed in the nature of a broad certiorari, in which event we review the testimony and the evidence and the entire record. Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown, Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A.2d 246; Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86, supra; Cumberland Valley Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Myers, 1959, 396 Pa. 331, 340, 153 A.2d 466; Philadelphia Saving Fund Society v. Banking Board, 1955, 383 Pa. 253, 256, 118 A.2d 561; Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 1954, 378 Pa. 311, 316-317, 106 A.2d 416.
Moreover, for an appeal by certiorari to lie the Order or action of the agency, board or commission must be judicial in nature and final. Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown, Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A.2d 246, supra; Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416, supra.
In the instant case § 18 of the Act, supra, provides:
'* * * The action of the commission in refusing to grant a license or in revoking or suspending a license shall be reviewable by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County as provided in the act of June 4, 1945 (P.L. 1388), known as the 'Administrative Agency Law'.' However, where the Commission grants a license the Act neither provides for nor prohibits an appeal. It is therefore clear that if the grant of a license is judicial in nature, an appeal in the nature of a broad certiorari will lie. Unfortunately, the act is so loosely drawn [3] that this question and the related question of whether appellant has a standing to appeal are exceptionally difficult to answer. However, in view of the result we reach in this case, we need not and do not decide the question of whether the grant of a license is judicial or administrative in nature.
The application of the law to the facts in this case presents a very close question. In Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown, Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, at page 472, 165 A.2d 246, at page 249, supra, where an appeal by a protesting small loans company was quashed, we shated the test in the following language:
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