Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty. Mun. Waste Mgmt. Auth.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 262 C.D. 2016,262 C.D. 2016 |
| Citation | 148 A.3d 915 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
| Parties | Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. and Solid Waste Services, Inc. d/b/a J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Appellants v. Monroe County Municipal Waste Management Authority |
Jeffrey Belardi, Scranton, for appellant Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc.
William F. Fox, Jr., Audubon, for appellants Solid Waste Services, Inc. and J.P. Mascaro & Sons.
James A. Doherty, Scranton, for appellee.
BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
The current issue in this declaratory judgment action involving waste disposal contracts implicates venue. Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Keystone) and Solid Waste Services, Inc., d/b/a J.P. Mascaro & Sons (Mascaro) (collectively, Appellants), ask whether the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) erred in sustaining the preliminary objection of the Monroe County Municipal Waste Management Authority (the Authority) and transferring the action to the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. In so doing, the trial court concluded there was no enlargement of venue under Pa. R.C.P. No. 2103(b). Upon review, we affirm.
Although this case has a significant and convoluted background, most of it is not relevant to the current controversy. SeePa. Waste Indus. Ass'n v. Monroe Cnty. Mun. Waste Mgmt. Auth., 80 A.3d 546 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc); Monroe Cnty. Mun. Waste Mgmt. Auth. v. Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc., (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 239 M.D. 2015, filed Aug. 7, 2015) (single judge op.). The underlying action may ultimately determine the legal status of the Authority's delayed Act 1011 Plan revision, and whether a request for proposal issued by the Authority during a period of ambiguous validity interferes with long-term waste disposal contracts between Appellants. However, all that is before the Court currently is venue for a declaratory relief action. More specifically, the present issue is whether Appellants may sue the Authority in a county other than the county where it is located, Monroe County.
Appellants filed an action in the trial court alleging the Authority's request for proposal (RFP) and resulting waste disposal contracts violate the noninterference provisions of Section 506 of Act 101, 53 P.S. § 4000.506. More specifically, Appellants allege the Authority's May 2012 RFP, seeking entities to administer the disposal of trash generated in Monroe County, violates landfill disposal contracts entered into between Appellants in 1984 and renewed in 1988, 1996 and 2008.
Thereafter, the Authority filed a preliminary objection as to venue in Lackawanna County. After argument, the trial court sustained the preliminary objection and transferred the action to Monroe County. This appeal followed.2
Appellants argue the trial court erred in concluding venue for the action lies in Monroe County. Appellants assert it is a fundamental principle that a plaintiff's choice of venue is entitled to weighty consideration. Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 589 Pa. 516, 909 A.2d 1272 (2006).
Since the Authority is a political subdivision as defined by Pa. R.C.P. No. 76, venue is controlled by Pa. R.C.P. No. 2103(b). That Rule provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Except when the Commonwealth is the plaintiff or when otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, an action against a political subdivision may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located.
Pa. R.C.P. No. 2103(b) (emphasis added). Citing Ward v. Lower Southampton Township, 531 Pa. 532, 614 A.2d 235 (1992), Appellants assert that the highlighted language of the Rule allows legislative enactments to expand venue for an action against a political subdivision.
Appellants further assert Section 5607(d)(2) of the Municipal Authorities Act is an example of such venue expansion. Section 5607(d)(2) of the Municipal Authorities Act provides in part that a municipal authority may “sue and be sued ... in all courts.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(2). Appellants argue several trial court decisions hold that the language of Section 5607(d)(2) expands the venue limitation contained in Pa. R.C.P. No. 2103(b).3
Also, Appellants argue that tenets of statutory construction support this conclusion. They contend the language of Section 5607(d)(2) of the Municipal Authorities Act is simple, direct, clear and unambiguous, and the Court need not look beyond the plain meaning “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b) ; Appellants' Br. at 13.
Finally, Appellants argue the trial court's reliance on United States (U.S.) Cold Storage Corp. v. City of Philadelphia and General State Authority, 427 Pa. 624, 235 A.2d 422 (1967), was misplaced. In U.S. Cold Storage, the General State Authority of the Commonwealth and the City of Philadelphia were defendants, and it therefore involved a different venue rule, Pa. R.C.P. No. 1006(c) (). Because the current matter only involves one defendant, Appellants assert U.S. Cold Storage is not applicable.
In contrast, the Authority asserts this Court's holding in Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 37, 539 A.2d 515 (1988), controls. In Jones, this Court addressed Section 333 of the Judiciary Act Repealer Act (JARA) Continuation Act of 1980.4 The Court concluded that according to that provision, venue for any case in which a political subdivision is a defendant is the home county of the political subdivision, regardless of the number of defendants. Thus, the Authority asserts Jones confirms that venue for Appellants' action rests solely in Monroe County, the Authority's home county.
The Authority further argues that trial court cases relied on by Appellants for the proposition that an action can be brought against a political subdivision outside its home county are not binding on this Court. Indeed, this proposition was addressed by other trial courts, which rejected it. City of Phila. v. Tinicum Twp., No. 1988 Nov. Term 1991 (C.P. Phila., May 27, 1992), 1992 WL 1071415, rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Delaware Cnty. v. City of Phila., 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 167, 620 A.2d 666 (1993).
Related to this argument, the Authority asserts the trial court's reliance on U.S. Cold Storage was appropriate.
In their reply brief, Appellants argue venue is not controlled by Section 333 of the JARA Continuation Act because this is a declaratory judgment matter, not a tort action for injury to a person or property implicating governmental immunity. In other words, Appellants argue the venue provisions of Section 333 of JARA only apply to tort actions under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542 () and not to actions sounding in contract.
Appellants assert Pace Construction Managers, Inc. v. Muncy School District, 911 A.2d 585 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), supports this conclusion. In Pace Construction, this Court held the venue provisions of Section 333 of JARA are limited to tort actions and do not apply to actions which sound in contract, like the current declaratory judgment suit.
In a note to its brief, the Authority asserts that the facts in Pace Construction are distinguishable, and it argues the facts in the current action are more in line with those in Jones. Appellee's Br. at 22 n.4. The Authority asserts the holding in Pace Construction confirms the existence of a split of authority on this matter.
The parties to this action concede the Authority's status as a political subdivision under the Municipal Authorities Act and for purposes of Monroe County's Act 101 Plan. SeePa. R.C.P. No. 76 ; see also Appellee's Br. at 18; Appellants' Br. at 12.
Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1006(b), and in conjunction with Pa. R.C.P. No. 2103(b), actions against political subdivisions may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located, “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly ....”
Section 5607(d)(2) of the Municipal Authorities Act, 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(2), states:
53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(2).
It is a fundamental principle of law that a plaintiff's choice of venue is entitled to weighty consideration. Zappala. Appellants' choice of venue for their declaratory judgment action was Lackawanna County, the county in which both Appellants are situate.
The trial court relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Cold Storage. That case involved an equity action in Philadelphia to restrain alleged anti-competitive actions by a Commonwealth authority and the City of Philadelphia. The Commonwealth authority contested venue in Philadelphia, arguing that it could only be sued in Dauphin County, where it was located. Significant for current purposes, the Supreme Court agreed. In doing so, the Court rejected an argument that language in the General State Authority Act5 permitting Commonwealth authorities to be sued in all courts relaxed venue restrictions for the authority. Ultimately, the Court relied on recently-enacted Pa. R.C.P. No. 1006(c) to determine appropriate venue for the two defendants. While not exactly on point, this decision is persuasive as to venue for authorities and as to statutory language allowing authorities to be sued in all courts.
Appellants rely in part on Ward. That case involved a tort action for personal injury in Philadelphia against a Bucks County municipality for failure to provide sufficient traffic signals at an intersection in Bucks County...
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...determination of whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Monroe County Municipal Waste Management Authority , 148 A.3d 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). As to an error of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of re......