Khan v. City of Lodi
| Decision Date | 30 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:23-cv-00566-DAD-KJN |
| Parties | SHAKIR KHAN, et al, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LODI, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING(Doc. No. 3)
This matter came before the court on March 29, 2023, for a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order filed on behalf of plaintiff Shakir Khan, plaintiff Umer Hayat plaintiff Adnan Bilal, plaintiff Saad Khan, plaintiff Bushra Shaheen, plaintiff Nasar Khan, plaintiff Mir A Khan plaintiff Somiya Bibi, plaintiff Muhammad Asif, plaintiff Safdar Khan, and plaintiff Muhammad Bilal Khan on March 24 2023 (collectively, “plaintiffs”). (Doc. No. 3.) Attorney Allen Sawyer appeared by video for plaintiffs. Attorney Marguerite Mary Leoni appeared by video on behalf of defendants. At the hearing, the court denied the motion. This written order provides more detailed reasons for the denial of the motion than those provided on the record at the hearing.
On March 24, 2023, plaintiffs filed this putative class action against defendant Mikey Hothi (“defendant Hothi”)-the mayor of the City of Lodi-and defendant City Council of the City of Lodi (“defendant City Council”) (collectively, “defendants”) seeking to enjoin defendants from: (1) preventing plaintiff Shakir Khan from exercising the powers and duties of his office as the member of the Lodi city council representing council district 4; (2) accepting applications for or appointing a new city council member to replace plaintiff Shakir Khan; and (3) scheduling or holding any special election to fill the council seat for Lodi city council district 4. (Doc. No. 3 at 11.) Although it is somewhat unclear from the face of the complaint, plaintiffs appear to assert the following two causes of action: (1) a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiffs' voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Doc. No. 1 at 7); and (2) a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S Constitution's Due Process Clause (id. at 8). On March 24, 2023, plaintiffs filed the pending motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 3.)[1] On March 28, 2023, defendants filed their opposition thereto. (Doc. No. 10.)[2]
In their complaint (Doc. No. 1), plaintiffs allege the following. Plaintiff Shakir Khan was elected as a city council member for the City of Lodi council district 4 in San Joaquin County, California. (Id. at ¶ 6.) On February 16, San Joaquin County Sherriffs Office officers arrested plaintiff Shakir Khan on election fraud charges. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The officers took him to county jail and refused to permit him to take his hearing aids. (Id.)
At the jail, the officers took plaintiff Shakir Khan to an interrogation room where defendant Hothi awaited. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Allegedly, defendant Hothi was acting on behalf of plaintiff Shakir Khan's political opponents and as an agent of the police and prosecution but pretended to be there to give plaintiff Shakir Khan advice. (Id. at ¶ 15.) At their meeting, plaintiff Shakir Khan told defendant Hothi that he wanted to talk to his wife, his family, and his attorney, but that he had not been allowed to. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18.)
Defendant Hothi told plaintiff Shakir Khan that the whole incident was appearing on national news and that the best course of action would be for him to resign from the city council. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendant Hothi also said that he had talked to various of plaintiff Shakir Khan's supporters, and they wanted him to resign. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Then, defendant Hothi wrote out the resignation document (id. at ¶ 25), which stated: (Doc. No. 1-1 at 14.)[3] Both defendant Hothi and plaintiff Shakir Khan signed the document below this text. (Id.; Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 25.) After his discussion with defendant Hothi, plaintiff Shakir Khan was told he could have a telephone call. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 27.) At that point, he phoned his attorney and then called defendant Hothi to inform him that he was not resigning from his position. (Id. at ¶ 28.)
On March 7, 2023, defendant City Council held a special session, excluding plaintiff Shakir Khan, to decide whether to fill the seat for district 4 by a special election in November of 2023, or to have the council appoint another resident of district 4 to become the council member for the council district. (Id. at ¶ 30.) The four council members in attendance voted either 3 to 1, or 3 to 0 to have the city council appoint a new city council member. (Id.) Defendant City Council subsequently set a date to consider applications to replace plaintiff Shakir Khan and possibly vote to appoint a new member to the council to represent district 4. (Id.) According to a statement filed by plaintiffs on March 27, 2023 (Doc. No. 9), and a supplement filed by defendants on March 28, 2023 (Doc. No. 11), defendant City Council was scheduled to meet at 7 p.m. on March 28, 2023, at which time defendant City Council may appoint one of the applicants to fill plaintiff Shakir Khan's council seat.
The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.'” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.'”); Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 1134-35 (citation omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney Enters., Inc. v VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims or, at the very least, that “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that plaintiffs have neither shown a likelihood of success on the merits nor raised serious questions going to the merits of their claims.
As their first cause of action, plaintiffs bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendants for the deprivation of their voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.[4] Plaintiffs allege that removing plaintiff Shakir Khan from city council constitutes a violation of equal protection to Lodi city council district 4 voters. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 47.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege that district 4 voters are being deprived of their right of representation by their elected representative, while the voters of the other four council districts are not. (Id. at ¶ 49.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV § 1. A plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection based on race or another suspect classification “must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.” Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff's protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)). In the alternative, where the acts in question do not involve a protected class, a plaintiff can establish a “class of one” claim by alleging he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly...
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