Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp.

Citation780 F. Supp. 1077
Decision Date15 January 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-451.,91-451.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesJagdish R. KHANDELWAL, Plaintiff, v. COMPUADD CORPORATION, Defendant.

Vickey Ann Verwey, David R. Simonsen, Jr., Richmond, Va., for plaintiff.

Thamer Eugene Temple, III, McSweeney, Burtch & Crump, Richmond, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Every federal court in the United States is now faced with the problem this motion presents. For the reasons outlined below, this motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jagdish R. Khandelwal worked for Compuadd between November 14, 1989, and January 5, 1991, when Compuadd discharged him. Mr. Khandelwal filed his complaint in this case on August 15, 1991, alleging that Compuadd discriminated against and discharged him because of his national origin (Indian) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In his original complaint, Mr. Khandelwal sought the remedies available under Title VII, as they existed at the time of filing.

On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "Act"). The Act amended Title VII and provided new remedies for victims of national origin discrimination. Under the Act, victims of unlawful discrimination may recover compensatory and punitive damages if they prove that the defendant acted "with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Plaintiffs who seek compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII, as amended by the Act, are also guaranteed a trial by jury. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1). Mr. Khandelwal now seeks leave of Court to amend his complaint in order to secure the remedies available to him under the recent congressional enactments. Compuadd has declined to agree to such an amendment, arguing that the Act is not retroactively applicable.

ISSUE

Are the remedies set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 available to a victim of unlawful discrimination where his case was pending on November 21, 1991?

DISCUSSION

Mr. Khandelwal argues that he should be allowed to amend his complaint because the language of the Act, the legislative history, and the prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court demonstrate that the remedies of the new Act are available to victims of unlawful discrimination that occurred before November 21, 1991, the date of enactment. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.

A. The Language of the Act

The plaintiff claims that Congress clearly intended the Act to apply retroactively. As support for this position, the plaintiff lists five provisions which arguably concern retroactivity:

1. Section 109 states that the provision extending Title VII and the ADA overseas "shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act."
2. Section 110, authorizing the establishment of a Technical Assistance Training Institute, states that it "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act."
3. Section 116 states that "nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law."
4. Section 402(a), the general statement on the effective date, provides that "except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment."
5. Section 402(b) provides that "nothwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983."

The plaintiff argues that if the Act as a whole was not intended to be applied retroactively, then Congress would not have needed to specifically provide that certain provisions, such as the extraterritoriality provisions of § 109, would not be retroactive. Similarly, Mr. Khandelwal claims that the language of § 116 and § 402(b) is wholly unnecessary and mere surplusage, if the remedies of the Act are not retroactive in effect.

It is obvious that no provision of the new Act conveys a clear indication that Congress intended the Act to apply retroactively. See also, Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F.Supp. 83 (D.D.C.1991) ("The 1991 Act contains no provision stating specifically whether or not the damages and jury sections cited above apply to cases, such as the present case, already pending in U.S. District Courts.").

The first three provisions cited by the plaintiff§ 109 (overseas application), § 110 (establishing a Technical Assistance Training Institute), and § 116 (preserving affirmative action plans) — are irrelevant to the issues raised in the present case. The argument that these three provisions would not have been included if Congress had intended the Act to apply only prospectively is one that cannot readily be inferred and invites the Court to speculate as to legislative intent. Moreover, the presence of these three provisions demonstrates that where Congress wanted to express any intent concerning the retroactive application of the Act, it took the initiative to state that intent specifically. If Congress intended the remainder of the Act to apply retroactively, it would have stated so.1

The remaining provisions from the Act cited by Mr. Khandelwal are § 402(a) and § 402(b). Section 402(a) provides simply that the Act shall "take effect upon enactment." This nebulous provision is really at the heart of the instant dispute and neither supports nor refutes retroactivity. See, Van Meter, 778 F.Supp. at 85 (§ 402(a) "makes no reference to Title VII ... cases that have already been filed in federal court").

Likewise, § 402(b) lends no support to plaintiff's position. As everyone who has followed the enactment of this Act knows, § 402(b) was inserted solely to insure that the Act would not be interpreted to allow further litigation in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,2 the only case satisfying this section's prerequisites. Under a settled rule of statutory construction, it could be said that § 402(b) would be meaningless if § 402(a) is not construed as a general rule of retroactivity. However, such a reading is certainly not conclusive, and, in any event, the language of the Act should be considered in light of its legislative history.3

Other language in the Act seems to indicate that the Act will apply only prospectively. According to § 102(a) of the Act, only a "complaining party" may seek compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial. Section 102(d) defines a "complaining party" as "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under title VII...." (emphasis added). One plausible reading of the statute is, therefore, that, by its own terms, the Act contemplates that only plaintiffs who have not yet brought an action are entitled to invoke the new Act. See, Van Meter, 778 F.Supp. at 85.

After examining the provisions of the Act and the arguments of the parties, the Court finds that there is no clear, unambiguous statement as to retroactivity necessary to overcome the presumption of prospective application. Any inference or construction one way or the other would be pure speculation.

B. The Legislative History

In his brief, the plaintiff cites legislative history favoring retroactive application of the Act. Specifically, the plaintiff quotes a lengthy excerpt from an interpretive memorandum submitted by Representative Edwards (D-Cal.). This memorandum favors application of the Act to pending cases. 137 Cong.Rec. H9530-31 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991). In turn, the defendant cites to the remarks of Senator Danforth, a principal sponsor of the Act, who states among other things that "new statutes are to be given prospective application only, unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise, which we have not done in this instance." 137 Cong.Rec. S15483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).4

This sampling of statements, as well as a review of the entire legislative history, confirms that Congress was anything but clear on whether the Act would apply to pending cases. The main Senate sponsors of the Act, Senators Danforth and Kennedy, issued a joint "interpretive memorandum" in which they agreed on every issue except retroactivity. Id. The republican senators lined up behind Senator Danforth, asserting that the Act was not intended to be retroactive. The democratic senators adopted the position of Senator Kennedy and asserted that the Act was indeed intended to be retroactive. Id. at S15485. The legislative history from the House is similar, with the republicans saying "no" to retroactivity and the democrats saying "yes." See, e.g., Id. at H953 — 31, H9548, and H9549 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).

In sum, the legislative history is both partisan and unclear. Judge Gesell in Van Meter aptly stated that "the congressional `debates' were, with few exceptions, hardly more than a series of declarations and counter-declarations, which often addressed `retroactivity' without defining that term or focusing on the crucial, separate problem at issue here of how the 1991 Act was supposed to affect federal employment cases pending before the Courts." Van Meter, 778 F.Supp. at 84. This Court, therefore, cannot make a determination as to retroactivity based on the legislative history.

C. Legal Presumptions

Because both the language of the Act and the legislative history are unclear, the Court must look at whether retroactivity or prospectivity is presumed to apply under the law. Unfortunately, this issue is not altogether clear either.

Mr. Khandelwal relies on Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), to support his...

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