Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College

• Decision Date: 30 September 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. 80-1550.
• Citation: 523 F. Supp. 386
• Parties: Majid Ghaidan AL-KHAZRAJI, a/k/a Majid Al-Khazraji Allan, Plaintiff, v. SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE, John Willoughby, Gervase Cain, Kirk Weixel, John Coleman, Rodrique Labrie, Albert Zanzuccki, Adrian Baylock, Marian Kirsch and David McMahon, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

523 F. Supp. 386

Majid Ghaidan AL-KHAZRAJI, a/k/a Majid Al-Khazraji Allan, Plaintiff, v. SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE, John Willoughby, Gervase Cain, Kirk Weixel, John Coleman, Rodrique Labrie, Albert Zanzuccki, Adrian Baylock, Marian Kirsch and David McMahon, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. A. 80-1550.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

September 30, 1981.

C. Kent Price, Harrisburg, Pa., Paul D. Kruper, Caroline Mitchell, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

Nick S. Fisfis, Bethel Park, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION

ZIEGLER, District Judge.

I. History of Case

Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, Ph.D., was employed for nearly six years as an associate professor in the Department of Behavioral Science at Saint Francis College, at Loretto, Pennsylvania. Al-Khazraji is a United States citizen of Iraqui national origin, and a member of the Muslim faith. He received two advanced degrees in this country: a masters degree from Cornell University and a doctorate from the University of Wisconsin.

On February 10, 1978, the tenure committee of Saint Francis College completed its deliberations and voted to deny tenure to plaintiff. The Board of Trustees ratified the recommendation on February 23, 1978. Plaintiff appealed this decision within the institution but the tenure committee voted against reconsideration of plaintiff's application.

On March 20, 1978, Al-Khazraji received a one-year written contract from the college for the 1978-79 academic year. This contract specifically stated that plaintiff's appointment as a full-time faculty member would not be renewed at the conclusion of that academic year. Plaintiff completed the contract, and was officially severed from the faculty on March 20, 1979.

In October of 1980 plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against St. Francis College and the individual trustees. He initially alleged that defendants had engaged in employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.¹ Subsequently, plaintiff secured counsel and filed amended complaints which additionally alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, as well as violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. The thrust of all these claims is that defendants denied tenure to plaintiff due to his national origin (Iraqui), religion (Muslim) or race (Arabian), in violation of federal law and the United States Constitution.

Defendants responded with a bevy of motions aimed at dismissing and striking the various claims brought by plaintiff.² By order dated February 9, 1981, this court dismissed plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 as untimely, but denied the remaining motions.³

Defendants now urge this court to reconsider its order of January 9, 1981, and dismiss the claims founded on Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The issues now have been fully briefed by the parties and, for the following reasons, the motion of defendants to reconsider will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Title VII Claims

Defendants first urge that plaintiff's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be dismissed in their entirety, as being untimely. Defendants take the position that any alleged discrimination occurred on February 10, 1978, when the tenure committee recommended that tenure be denied. Defendants argue that plaintiff had 180 days from that date to file a complaint with the EEOC, which he failed to do. Plaintiff rejoins, however, that the 180-day limitation period embodied in Title VII commenced on March 20, 1979, when he exhausted his internal appeals and was officially discharged. For the following reasons, we are compelled to conclude that plaintiff's Title VII claim is untimely.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that aggrieved persons file a complaint with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This limitation period, while guarantying the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protects employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are dated. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-464, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721-1722, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975).

In a case strikingly similar to the one at bench, the Supreme Court recently held that the limitation period commences—for a college professor who believes that he has been discharged in violation of Title VII— at the time the adverse tenure decision is made and communicated to him. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). There the Board of Trustees of Delaware State College formally voted to deny Professor Ricks tenure on March 13, 1974. Ricks was offered a "terminal" contract to teach one additional year, after which time his employment relationship would end. Ricks executed the contract, and initiated grievance procedures within the college. On September 12, 1974, the Board notified Ricks that his grievance had been denied. On April 4, 1975, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC.

The Supreme Court held that the claim was untimely because Ricks had not filed the charge within 180 days of the date the college initially determined to deny him tenure, namely, March 13, 1974. The Court rejected the contention that the statute of limitations began to run after the one-year "terminal" contract expired, or when the plaintiff exhausted the internal grievance procedures of the college. The Court concluded that "the only alleged discrimination occurred—and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced—at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure—the eventual loss of a teaching position—did not occur until later." 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504.

Likewise, in the instant case, we are bound to conclude that the statute of limitations began to run, for purposes of filing the Title VII action, at the time St. Francis College made its official decision to deny tenure and communicated that decision to Al-Khazraji, namely, on February 10, 1978.⁴ This follows although plaintiff accepted a "terminal" contract for an additional year, and notwithstanding the institution of grievance procedures within the institution.

The Supreme Court's holding in Ricks compels the finding that, once the tenure committee voted to deny plaintiff tenure on February 10, 1978, the alleged discriminatory act was a fait accompli. Plaintiff then had 180 days to file a complaint with the EEOC.⁵ Because he failed to comply with the statutory time period, plaintiff's claim under Title VII must be dismissed.

III. Section 1985(3) Claims

We further find that Al-Khazraji has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff, in Count II of his second complaint, alleges that defendants conspired to violate rights secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.⁶ He alleges that the conspiracy gives rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). We disagree.

The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that § 1985(3) creates no substantive rights by itself. Rather, it is a remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by that section. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2351, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). There the Court held that Title VII provides no basis for a 1985(3) action, because to allow such a detour would authorize an avoidance of most if not all of the detailed and specific provisions of Title VII:

We conclude that § 1985(c) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII ... Unimpaired effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(c).

442 U.S. at 378, 99 S.Ct. at 2352.

Al-Khazraji, having failed to meet the statutory filing requirements of Title VII, may not salvage his claim by submersion within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Nor may a state statute, such as the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, serve as a predicate for a cause of action under § 1985(3) since the latter was meant to provide redress for violations of federal rights. See Novotny, supra, 442 U.S. at 376, 99 S.Ct. at 2351. As a result, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and that claim must be dismissed.

IV. Claims Under Sections 1981 and 1983

Defendants next contend that plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 are time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. We disagree.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., contains no specific statute of limitations. Federal courts, in adjudicating civil rights suits under the Act, are therefore bound to apply the period of limitations that governs the most nearly analogous state law claim. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1980).

Courts within the Third Circuit have, in countless cases, considered the question of the applicable statute of limitations in federal civil rights suits in which a plaintiff alleges racial discrimination in employment. At least to date, these courts have uniformly concluded that such actions are governed by the 6-year period of limitations set forth in 12 P.S. § 31.

The leading case is Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1978). There the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racially discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, Davis alleged harrassment...