Khianthalat v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 31 March 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:13-cv-2702-T-36TGW
• Parties: SAYSINH P. KHIANTHALAT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

SAYSINH P. KHIANTHALAT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Case No. 8:13-cv-2702-T-36TGW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

March 31, 2017

ORDER

Petitioner Saysinh P. Khianthalat, an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 11). He challenges his convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida, in 2005. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 15), in which it concedes the petition's timeliness. Khianthalat filed a reply (Dkt. 22) and notices of supplemental authority (Dkts. 23, 24). Upon review, the petition must be denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Khianthalat with nine counts of lewd battery on a child 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age (counts one through nine), one count of solicitation to commit perjury in an official proceeding (count ten), and one count of tampering with a witness (count eleven). (Dkt. 18, Ex. 1.) The trial court granted judgments of acquittal on counts six, eight, and nine. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 2, pp. 277, 282.) A jury convicted Khianthalat of the remaining counts. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 3.)

The trial court sentenced Khianthalat to an overall sentence of 45 years in prison. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 5, pp. 1-2.) The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences in a written opinion. Khianthalat v. State, 935 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in a written opinion. Khianthalat v. State, 974 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2008). The United States Supreme Court denied Khianthalat's petition for writ of certiorari. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 7.) The state appellate court denied Khianthalat's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Dkt. 18, Exs. 9, 10.)

Subsequently, Khianthalat was resentenced as a result of a motion to correct illegal sentence. The trial court sentenced Khianthalat to an overall term of 33 years in prison. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 12.) The Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed this sentence. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 19.)

Khianthalat then filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 14.) The state court summarily denied several claims, dismissed two claims with leave to amend, and directed the State to respond to the remaining claims. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 15.) After Khianthalat filed an amended petition and the State filed its response, the state court denied some of Khianthalat's claims but held an evidentiary hearing on his other claims. (Dkt. 18, Exs. 16, 17.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the state court entered a final order denying Khianthalat's postconviction motion. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 20.) On appeal, Khianthalat raised one issue. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 21.) The Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the denial. Khianthalat v. State, 140 So.3d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (table).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Khianthalat's charges stem from his relationship with S.T. Khianthalat was divorced from S.T.'s older sister but had regular contact with the sisters' family. Khianthalat engaged in vaginal and oral sex with S.T. and digitally penetrated S.T.'s vagina. These acts began to occur when S.T. was thirteen years old and continued when she was fourteen years old.

After S.T. and her mother approached law enforcement, Detectives Scott Kercher and Steven Richburg obtained a statement from S.T. They next spoke to Khianthalat at his place of employment. After some initial discussion, they began taping the interview. In his recorded statements, Khianthalat admitted to sexual activity with S.T.

Khianthalat was arrested at a later date. Following his arrest, he called S.T. from jail. This call was recorded. Khianthalat told S.T. that at a trial, "all you have to do is say you made it all up." He and S.T. discussed dropping the charges, but S.T. told him she could get in trouble for changing her statements.

At trial, Khianthalat denied sexual activity with S.T. He testified that he only ever gave S.T. one "peck on the cheek." Khianthalat further testified that he admitted to the sexual activity during his interview with police to tell the detectives what "they wanted to hear" so that he could return to work.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different froman incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that [the federal court is] to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ("This is a 'difficult to meet,' . . . and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted).

The state appellate court affirmed the rejection of Khianthalat's postconviction claims in a per curiam decision without a written opinion. This decision warrants deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does notlessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").

Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.

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