Al Khuzaie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:14-cv-00199-SLC |
| Parties | KRISTINE K. AL KHUZAIE, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, sued as Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Kristine K. Al Khuzaie appeals to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application under the Social Security Act (the "Act") for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").1 (DE 1). For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision will be AFFIRMED.
Al Khuzaie applied for DIB and SSI in 2005, alleging disability as of December 20, 2003, which she later amended to July 2, 2005. (AR 14, 71-75, 1191). Her DIB-insured status expired on December 31, 2010 (AR 14), so with respect to her DIB application, she must show that she was disabled on or before that date. See Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner denied Al Khuzaie's application initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 14, 51-59). After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Terry Miller ("theALJ") rendered an unfavorable decision on June 5, 2009, denying Al Khuzaie benefits. (AR 14-25). The Appeals Council denied Al Khuzaie's request for review (DE 1295-1302), at which point the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Al Khuzaie filed suit in this Court, and on March 5, 2012, the Court reversed and remanded her case for further proceedings. (AR 1258-73, 1293-94). The Appeals Council then remanded the case back to the ALJ and consolidated it with new DIB and SSI claims that Al Khuzaie had filed in the meantime. (AR 1253-56, 1321-27, 1991-93, 1996-2004). On November 20, 2012, a second hearing was held before the ALJ, at which Al Khuzaie, who was represented by counsel, and vocational expert Joseph L. Thompson ("the VE"), a different vocational expert than at the first hearing, testified. (AR 2030-2100). On May 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision denying Al Khuzaie benefits. (AR 1191-1224). The Appeals Council denied Al Khuzaie's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1177-79).
On July 2, 2014, Al Khuzaie filed suit in this Court, appealing the Commissioner's denial of benefits. (DE 1). She asserts that the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) improperly evaluating the opinion of her treating psychologist, Dr. Revathi Bingi; (2) improperly evaluating the opinions of the state agency psychologists; and (3) relying on the testimony of the VE for the number of jobs cited at step five where such testimony purportedly lacked a proper foundation.
At the time of the ALJ's second decision on May 15, 2013, Al Khuzaie was 44 years old(AR 71, 1207); had a ninth grade education (AR 90); and possessed past work experience as a fast food services manager, cashier, certified nursing assistant, deli worker, and waitress (AR 1392). She alleges disability due to "chronic lower back pain; diabetes; obesity; major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder/panic disorder/post traumatic stress disorder; and dependent personality disorder." (DE 18 at 3).
The parties both note the lengthy administrative record (2,100 pages) in this matter and, rather than including a summary of the relevant medical evidence in their briefs, refer the Court to the detailed summary of the medical evidence set forth in the ALJ's decision. (DE 18 at 3; DE 25 at 2). Consequently, the Court will discuss the relevant medical evidence during its analysis of the parties' arguments, referring to the summary of the medical evidence articulated by the ALJ (AR 1194-1220) as needed.
Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court "the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's task is limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's. Id. Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "In other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ's decision denying benefits." Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996).
Under the Act, a claimant is entitled to DIB or SSI if she establishes an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to . . . last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a five-step evaluation process, requiring consideration of the following issues, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1; (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform her past work; and (5)whether the claimant is incapable of performing work in the national economy.2 See Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A negative answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. (citation omitted). The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868 (citation omitted).
An extra analytical step is needed if there is medical evidence of substance abuse or alcoholism. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935. If the Commissioner finds the claimant is disabled and there is medical evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant's drug addiction or alcoholism "is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935. An affirmative answer leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935; see Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 627, 628 (7th Cir. 2006) .
On May 15, 2013, the ALJ issued the decision that ultimately became the Commissioner's final decision. (AR 1191-1224). The ALJ noted at step one of the five-step analysis that Al Khuzaie had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset date of July 2, 2005. (AR 1194). At step two, the ALJ found that Al Khuzaie had the following severe impairments: chronic lower back pain, likely degenerative in nature, status post interventional pain management treatment; diabetes mellitus; obesity; major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder/panic disorder, PTSD, and dependent personality disorder; and polysubstance dependence (history of alcohol, cocaine, and prescription narcotics). (AR 1194).
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Al Khuzaie did not have an impairment or combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing. (AR 1196). Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Al Khuzaie's symptom testimony was not fully credible (AR 1203), and he assigned her the following RFC:
[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform less than the full range of light work . . . . Her capacities for the full range are reduced in that she is limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling and can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Otherwise, she can lift and/or carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally and sit or stand/walk, in combination, for six hours during an eight-hour workday. With respect to her work environment, she needs to avoid concentrated exposure to wetness and hazards (i.e. operational control of moving machinery, unprotected heights, and slippery, uneven, moving surfaces). The claimant retains the mental [RFC] to interact with others, including supervisors, co-workers, and the general public on a casual and superficial basis. She cannot tolerate a work situation that involves large numbers...
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