Kicklighter v. Evans County School Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. CV 696-153.,CV 696-153.
• Citation: 968 F.Supp. 712
• Parties: Crystal G. KICKLIGHTER, Plaintiff, v. EVANS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dewey Hulsey, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Principal of Claxton High School, and Durell Lynn, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Superintendent of Evans County Schools, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

968 F.Supp. 712

Crystal G. KICKLIGHTER, Plaintiff, v. EVANS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dewey Hulsey, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Principal of Claxton High School, and Durell Lynn, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Superintendent of Evans County Schools, Defendants.

No. CV 696-153.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division.

June 12, 1997.

James Bevard Rutledge, William Jarell Jones, III, Statesboro, GA, for Plaintiff.

Ronald W. Hallman, Hallman & Stewart, Claxton, GA, Thomas F. Richardson, Jon C. Wolfe, Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

EDENFIELD, District Judge.

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action attempts to make a "federal case" out of what is, at bottom, an in-school disciplinary matter. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. While the litigants have cluttered the record with numerous (and voluminous) non-material details, the basic facts are undisputed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

I. Background

Plaintiff Crystal G. Kicklighter, a white female, was born in 1978. C. Kicklighter Dep. (doc. # 32) at 7. In June 1994, prior to starting the tenth grade at Claxton High School, Kicklighter became pregnant by Eugene Burney, a young black man she had been dating for two years. Id. at 8, 21, 40. By the time school opened on 8/29/94, school officials knew of her pregnancy. Id. at 42. Indeed, when Kicklighter went to pick up her class schedule that first day, a secretary suggested that given her "condition," she should consider enrolling at an "alternative school" geared, in Plaintiff's words, for "reform students." Doc. # 32 at 45, 48-49; see also Hulsey Dep. (doc. # 26) at 60.¹

Two days later, Kicklighter got into an inappropriate "exchange of words" with another student before her English class had been called to order. Doc. # 32 at 51-54.² Overhearing the discussion, the teacher, Louise Jones, informed Kicklighter that she would not abide any off-color remarks in the classroom. Doc. # 32 at 52; Jones Dep. (doc. # 46) at 16. Plaintiff's retort included an invitation to "check the Declaration of Independence" with respect to free speech rights. Doc. # 32 at 54-56; doc. # 46 at 17-18. Jones then asked Kicklighter to find a seat, but when Plaintiff could not locate one, the teacher sent her to see Defendant Dewey Hulsey, the principal. Doc. # 32 at 57-58; doc. # 46 at 17.

Hulsey directed Kicklighter to return the following day with a parent, which she did. Doc. # 32 at 64-65, 78. At that 9/1/95 conference — which Jones did not attend — Hulsey disciplined Kicklighter by ordering her to issue an apology "in front of the whole class." Doc. # 32 at 65-66; doc. # 25 at 40-41; doc. # 26 at 127, 132, 135. In addition, he imposed a five-day suspension, to be served either in school or at home. Doc. # 32 at 66, 71; doc. # 25 at 40-41; doc. # 26 at 136.

Yet, Plaintiff understood Hulsey to have given her the option of either serving a suspension or communicating an apology. Doc. # 32 at 79-80 ("I didn't gather that I would have to do two things to get back in school"). On 9/13/94, Plaintiff called the Evans County School District superintendent, Defendant Durrell Lynn, hoping that he "could help me in the matter and hear me out," but he declined to get involved at that time. Doc. # 32 at 86-87; but see doc. # 25 (Lynn) at 37-38, 39-40, 72 (remarking that he scheduled an appointment to meet with Kicklighter on 9/14/94, but she failed to appear). Plaintiff ultimately remained home for five days (and then some), and when she returned to school on 9/15/94, she thought the incident was well behind her. Doc. # 32 at 79-80, 85, 96 ("I figured that I could just go back to school. I had done my time").

However, upon her arrival, Hulsey informed Plaintiff that she could not attend class until she spoke with Lynn. Id. at 99-100; doc. # 26 at 158; Complaint (doc. # 1) Exh. C. Feeling that she neither had to apologize nor see the superintendent, and aware that she was openly flouting Hulsey's "directive," Kicklighter proceeded to homeroom. Doc. # 32 at 101. Ten minutes later, the principal and two policemen arrived at the classroom. Id. at 102-03; doc. # 37 (Todd Aff.) ¶¶ 2-3. Hulsey "motioned for [Kicklighter] to come here," but when she refused, the officers entered and escorted her from the room. Doc. # 32 at 103-05; doc. # 26 at 55, 111, 159-60; doc. # 37 (Todd Aff.) ¶ 3. As they guided her down the hall, Kicklighter announced that Hulsey "don't want me in here ... because I'm pregnant by a black boy"; the principal responded by telling the officers to arrest her for trespassing if she returned to school. Doc. # 32 at 105, 108; doc. # 26 at 162-63; doc. # 37 (Todd Aff.) ¶ 4.

Hulsey subsequently wrote to Plaintiff's parents and recommended that they schedule an appointment with Lynn. Doc. # 32 at 112. A few days later, the superintendent met with Kicklighter, her parents, and Bette Clark, the alternative school's director. Id. at 112-14; doc. # 25 at 41-42; doc. # 41 at 12. Lynn suggested that Plaintiff consider attending the alternative school in contemplation of her inevitable future absences, see supra note 1, but Kicklighter took this to mean that even if she apologized to the class — which she now was willing to do — she could not return to Claxton High. Doc. # 32 at 116-121.

Kicklighter stayed out of school altogether for the next two months. Id. at 121. In response to a letter authored by Plaintiff's counsel to Lynn, the school district made its position abundantly clear on 12/5/94: "... [Crystal] may return to school at any time, provided that she does not again conduct herself in rude and disruptive manner. Mr. Hulsey has requested, and continues to request, that Crystal apologize to Mrs. Jones and the class for the disruptive behavior." Id. Exh. 1; doc. # 26 (Hulsey) at 135 ("As many days as it took, she was going to apologize to enter school again"). Kicklighter read the letter and properly gathered that the sole condition for her return was a mere expression of contrition. Doc. # 32 at 129 (Q: "Did you understand after reviewing this letter that you could return to school if you made an apology?" A: "Yes." Q: "And that there were not other conditions attached to your returning to school, other than making an apology?" A: "Right."). However, by this time, Kicklighter refused to apologize because "everything" had just gone "too far." Doc. # 32 at 130, 131 ("I just felt like an apology was too much after all that"). Rather than comply with this demand, Plaintiff sat out the entire 1994-95 academic year. Id. at 130-31 & Exh. 1; doc. # 25 at 41, 59, 87.

By the start of the next school year, Hulsey had retired and Lynn told Plaintiff that he was willing to "clean the slate": he dropped the apology requirement and allowed her to resume her education. Doc. # 32 at 134-35; doc. # 25 at 90; doc. # 37 Exh. B. Kicklighter stayed in school about a month and half, but she soon dropped out, claiming that she "couldn't take" people talking and pointing at her. Doc. # 32 at 135, 137-38. Since departing, she has made no effort to return to Claxton High or any other learning institution. Id. at 140.

At no time did Kicklighter challenge the school's actions or her punishment by availing herself of appropriate administrative avenues.³ Although she desired a hearing in front of the "School Board," she never pursued that course of action once Lynn told her, "Well, you can, but chances are it's going to be [futile]." Doc. # 32 at 117; J. Kicklighter Dep. (doc. # 34) at 40 ("he basically said it probably wouldn't do no good anyway").

Instead, Kicklighter instituted this § 1983 action, alleging that Defendants violated her (i) First Amendment freedom of association, as they mistreated her on account of her relationship with Burney;⁴ (ii) Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection by unlawfully discriminating on the basis of Burney's race, her gender and her pregnant condition; (iii) First Amendment right against compelled speech, by demanding that she make an apology to Jones and the class; and (iv) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, by repeatedly failing to comply with internal disciplinary procedures.⁵ Seeking dismissal of this matter, Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has similarly moved, but only on the issues of "compelled speech" and "predeprivation procedural due process."

II. Analysis

This Court applies the summary judgment principles exhaustively detailed in Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.1993) and Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742-43 (11th Cir.1996).

A. Substantive Due Process

As discussed supra note 5, Kicklighter alleges that by imposing a five-day suspension and coupling it with a demand for an apology, Defendants violated her rights to substantive due process. See doc. # ¶ 67. This contention is without merit.

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects only those rights that are "fundamental," that is, rights contemplated by the federal Constitution as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995) (citation omitted). The "right" to attend a public school does not fall into this category; rather, it is a "state-created" right, C.B. By and Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir.1996), which "may be rescinded so long as the elements of procedural — not substantive — due process are observed." McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.

In C.B., supra, a high school student sued his principal, the superintendent, and the school district under § 1983 for constitutional injuries allegedly suffered when defendants suspended him from school. In discussing the "exceedingly limited rights of public school students facing school discipline," id. at 385 (emphasis added), the Eleventh Circuit...