Kidd v. Chissell
| Decision Date | 20 June 1924 |
| Docket Number | 34. |
| Citation | 126 A. 82,146 Md. 169 |
| Parties | KIDD v. CHISSELL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore City Court; H. Arthur Stump, Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Suit by Katherine L. Kidd against R. Garland Chissell. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial awarded.
Argued before PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, and BOND, JJ.
Walter L. Clark, of Baltimore (Bowie & Clark, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Randolph Barton, Jr., and Laurie H. Riggs, both of Baltimore, for appellee. URNER, J.
At the trial of this suit for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident, the plaintiff testified that, as the car which she and several campanions occupied was moving southwardly at the intersection of Guilford avenue and Twenty-Third street in Baltimore, it was struck on the left side by the defendant's car, approaching from the east and was diverted by the impact to the sidewalk and against a building. Both cars were moving at a moderate rate of speed according to the plaintiff's testimony. The accident occurred in the daytime, and the occupants of each car readily observed the movement of the other as they neared the point where their lines of progress would cross. It was assumed by the plaintiff, and by her sister who was driving their car, that they had the right of way, and that it would be duly recognized by the defendant in approaching with his car from the left. An alleged violation of that right is the primary ground of the liability asserted in this action. In the pleadings and proof the defendant was also sought to be charged with responsibility, apart from the effect of the right of way rule, on the theory that he could have avoided the collision, by the exercise of due care, after he became aware of its imminence.
The plaintiff's description of the accident was corroborated by other testimony, but a wholly different version was given by the defendant and his witnesses. They testified that he actually conceded the right of way to the other car and allowed it to pass before he proceeded beyond the center line of Guilford avenue, and that the two cars never came in contact with each other, but that the plaintiff's sister operating their automobile at a high rate of speed, suddenly made it swerve to the right and towards the corner building because she became startled by the near approach of the defendant's automobile.
The conflicting theories presented by the evidence were submitted to the jury by certain instructions, which made no reference to the right of way. But other instructions, granted at the defendant's request, informed the jury that he was entitled to the right of way at the time of the accident, if as proved without dispute by the evidence, he was a duly registered physician and held a right of way permit issued by the City Police Department. In thus restricting the plaintiff's possible ground of recovery, the trial court gave effect to an ordinance of the mayor and city council of Baltimore, enacted in 1908, which provides:
Objection to the instructions based on this ordinance was made on the theory that it was not intended, so far as physicians are concerned, to affect the right of precedence at street intersections, now regulated by the general law of the state (Acts 1920, c. 506; Code, art. 56, § 163), but that, if the ordinance was designed to have such an application, it is inoperative because in conflict with the statute and is invalid as an unreasonable exercise of municipal authority. This contention is renewed on appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict for the defendant which is attributed by the plaintiff to the instructions on the subject of the right of way.
The statute referred to provides, in part:
"All vehicles shall have the right of way over other vehicles approaching at intersecting roads from the left, and shall give right of way to those approaching from the right."
This is one of the Code provisions relating to motor vehicles, which are "intended to be state-wide in their effect," but which reserve the right to incorporated cities and towns to "prescribe and...
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