Kidwell v. Mason

Decision Date11 April 1978
PartiesJulia Mason KIDWELL and Edgar Kidwell, her husband, Appellants, v. Ernie MASON and Myrtle Mason, his wife, Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Joseph E. Lambert, Mount Vernon, for appellants.

Jerry J. Cox, Clontz & Cox, Mount Vernon, for appellees.

STERNBERG, Justice.

The 12-year marriage of Julia and Ernie was dissolved by a decree of the Rockcastle Circuit Court on March 22, 1974. During their marriage they acquired two tracts of land in their joint names. The trial judge concluded that the effect of these two deeds was to convey an undivided one-half interest to each of them. The decree dissolving the marriage made no provision for the assignment of any property. (KRS 403.190). It merely dissolved the marriage and restored Julia to the use of her maiden name. Both parties have married and the spouse of each is a party to this proceeding.

On March 27, 1976, Julia filed a suit seeking a sale of the property and a division of the proceeds. (KRS 389.020). Ernie filed an answer and counterclaim in which he alleged that Julia, by her action and conduct in the dissolution of marriage action, was estopped to and had waived any interest or claim she may have in or to these properties. Ernie also moved the judge of the Rockcastle Circuit Court to redocket the divorce action and to correct the judgment entered therein so as to order Julia to execute a deed to him for any and all interest she may have in or to these properties. The two actions were consolidated. A summary judgment was entered on July 7, 1976, ordering Julia to make such a conveyance within thirty days from the date of the judgment.

An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, where the action of the trial judge was affirmed. A motion for discretionary review was granted by this court on September 13, 1977.

In his opinion the trial judge presented and discussed the factual background leading up to the entry of the decree of March 22, 1974. The court, however, stated the issue to be as follows:

"The question presented to the Court is whether the decree of dissolution of marriage of March 22, 1974, amounted to a final settlement of property rights between Mrs. Kidwell and Mr. Mason thereby precluding any further claims by Mrs. Kidwell to the property including a claim to have it sold as asserted in the instant action."

In affirming the judgment of the Rockcastle Circuit Court, the Court of Appeals, by an opinion rendered March 11, 1977, said:

" * * * It is our opinion that the record sustains the finding of the trial court that Mrs. Mason waived her interest in any marital property held by the parties during their marriage. * * * "

The appellants state the issues as follows:

"A. Are the two tracts of land in controversy marital property?

B. Did the 1974 judgment in the prior divorce proceeding...

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6 cases
  • Fry v. Kersey
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • June 26, 1992
    ...as if the court had so adjudged their respective interests." Ping v. Denton, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 314, 317 (1978). See also Kidwell v. Mason, Ky., 564 S.W.2d 534 (1978). Thus, if Fry had an interest in Kersey's pension plan at the time of the decree, she would still have an interest in the plan ......
  • Van Horn v. Van Horn
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • August 10, 2018
    ...that provision by treating post-decree property divisions as thoughthey were included in the dissolution decree. In Kidwell v. Mason, 564 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky. 1978), the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the former wife had no interest in the proceeds of a sale of marital pro......
  • O'Neal v. O'Neal
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • December 27, 2002
    ...cites no legal support for her position on this issue nor are we aware of any. In fact, the Kentucky Supreme Court held in Kidwell v. Mason, Ky., 564 S.W.2d 534 (1978), that any interest one party to a divorce may have had in or to the property of the other party which was indisposed of in ......
  • Davis v. Davis, 2013-CA-001243-MR
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • January 16, 2015
    ...is conscionable, the terms are binding after it is incorporated into the decree. The decree is a final judgment. Kidwell v. Mason, 564 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Ky.1978). After entry of the decree, a party can seek to have it set aside or modified only by way of motion under CR 59.05 or in accordanc......
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