Kiger v. United States

Decision Date08 May 1963
Docket NumberNo. 13732.,13732.
Citation315 F.2d 778
PartiesDonald Allen KIGER, Petitioner Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Carl D. Overman, Christopher Kirages, Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.

Richard P. Stein, U. S. Atty., Joseph A. Kutch, Asst. U. S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.

Before SCHNACKENBERG, KILEY, and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.

KILEY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Kiger's petition for a writ of error coram nobis was denied without a hearing by the District Court, and he has appealed.

Kiger was arrested in 1957 by federal agents on suspicion of an Indiana bank robbery.1 He passed a lie test, an eye witness failed to identify him, and he was released. In 1959, Kiger was arrested in New York, and returned to Indiana to stand trial for the 1957 Indiana bank robbery. He was convicted on January 21, 1960, and sentenced to a term of eighteen years. He did not appeal. It is for relief from that Indiana judgment that he commenced this coram nobis proceeding, on June 14, 1961, charging, among other things, that he was convicted on perjured testimony knowingly used by the Government.

There is no doubt that knowing use of false testimony by the federal government in gaining conviction violates the Fifth Amendment. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959),2 James v. United States, 175 F.2d 769 (5th Cir., 1949). Since Kiger is in Leavenworth prison and relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is unavailable to him,3 coram nobis was the appropriate remedy for him to seek. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). However, in Morgan, the Supreme Court was careful to say that "Continuation of litigation after final judgment and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be allowed through this extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice." 346 U.S. 502, at 511, 74 S.Ct. 247, at 252. The rule in Morgan also carried the qualification that there must be "sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief," 346 U.S. 502, at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247, at 253, before a petition for the extraordinary relief of coram nobis must be heard by the federal trial court.4 And this court has interpreted Morgan as having "served notice" that the scope of coram nobis relief is narrow. United States v. Campbell, 278 F.2d 916, 919 (7th Cir., 1960).

On January 25, 1960, four days after his conviction, counsel for Kiger filed with the District Court a motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial. Ten separate grounds were set forth. The Government filed a brief in answer to the motion, and the District Court denied the motion on February 5, 1960. No mention was made in Kiger's new trial motion of the alleged coerced and knowingly used perjury of Estes, on which, alone, he relies in this court for the coram nobis relief.

There is no allegation in Kiger's coram nobis petition to show that he learned after the ruling on the new trial motion, of the alleged coerced and knowingly used perjury. He was represented at the trial by two attorneys of unquestionable reputation and competence. There is no allegation that he disclosed to them during the trial, after his conviction and before the denial of the new trial motion, the facts he now relies upon to vacate the sentence and judgment. Had they been informed by Kiger of the alleged perjury, their inquiry, in determining whether to urge the ground for new trial, would have discovered all the facts as to whether there was perjury and, if so, whether it had been coerced, and knowingly used by the Government.

We hold that Kiger has failed to show "sound reasons * * * for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief,"5 on the grounds alleged here, when the new trial motion was made, so as to justify the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Deckard v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 7, 1967
    ...the appropriate remedy for the relief Deckard seeks. Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 410-411 (5 Cir. 1965); Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778, 779 (7 Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 270, 11 L.Ed.2d 166; McDonald v. United States, 356 F.2d 980, 981 (10 Cir. 1966), ......
  • Mathis v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • October 25, 1966
    ...in reversing, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L. Ed.2d 285 (1963), expressed similar views on this question. 14 E. g., Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1963); Woykovsky v. United States, 309 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 838, 83 S.Ct. 1889, 10 L.Ed.2d 1059 (19......
  • Petition of Brockmueller, 14740
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • September 6, 1985
    ...injustice--when no other remedy is available. People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77, 176 N.E.2d 90 (1961); Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778 (7th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 270, 11 L.Ed.2d 166 (1963). With the repeal of the Uniform Post Conviction Act by ......
  • United States v. Russo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • May 15, 1973
    ...which coram nobis was designed to operate. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1965); Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778, 779 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 270, 11 L.Ed.2d 166 (1963). We have MERITS Defendant seeks to have the Marchetti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT