Kiken v. Kiken

• Decision Date: 12 June 1997
• Citation: 694 A.2d 557,149 N.J. 441
• Parties: Donald KIKEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ellen KIKEN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 441

149 N.J. 441

694 A.2d 557

Donald KIKEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ellen KIKEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 22, 1997.

Decided June 12, 1997.

Louis Pashman, Hackensack, for defendant-appellant (Pashman Stein, attorneys; Mr. Pashman, Michael S. Stein and Dennis T. Smith, on the briefs).

Marc J. Bressler, Edison, for plaintiff-respondent.

The opinion of the Court is delivered by

POLLOCK, J.

The primary issue is whether the estate of Donald Kiken is liable for the costs of the college education of his son, David, as provided in the judgment of divorce between Donald and Ellen Kiken. Ellen is Donald's former wife and David's mother. The Chancery Division, Family Part, denied Ellen's motion to enforce a provision in the judgment pertaining to the payment of David's college expenses. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. It held that Donald's obligation to contribute to college expenses terminated on his death and that his executor should not be substituted as a party in the divorce action. We granted certification, 146 N.J. 500, 683 A.2d 202 (1996), and now reverse.

I.

Donald and Ellen were married on May 9, 1976. On July 28, 1977, David was born. Thereafter, Donald and Ellen separated. They negotiated a property-settlement agreement, which was incorporated in a "Dual Judgment of Divorce" entered on December 22, 1982. Pursuant to the judgment, the court granted Ellen custody of David and accorded Donald liberal visitation rights. The court further ordered Donald to pay Ellen a lump sum of $75,000 in satisfaction of her claim for equitable distribution. Donald agreed to pay Ellen alimony totaling $87,285, payable in thirty-six monthly installments of $2,424.58 each. According to Paragraph D of the judgment, the installments were to "be paid by the first of each month commencing December 1, 1982 and ending upon the occurrence of the earliest event: November 1, 1985 (after all thirty-six payments have been made) or [Donald's] death." Paragraph E provided that "[i]n no event and under no circumstances shall [Ellen's] remarriage or death terminate [Donald's] obligation to pay aforesaid alimony payments contained herein." Donald made all the required alimony and support payments.

Paragraph F required Donald to pay $200 per week in child support until David's emancipation. Furthermore, Paragraph G obligated Donald to maintain a $200,000 life insurance policy, naming Ellen as a beneficiary of $100,000 until Donald paid the equitable distribution and naming David as the beneficiary of the remaining $100,000. After completion of the equitable distribution, David was to become the sole beneficiary of the entire $200,000 until he was emancipated. Paragraph G also indicated that "[i]f for any reason the life insurance policy is not in full force and effect or the named beneficiaries are not consistent with this agreement, [Donald's] estate shall be liable to [Ellen] or [David] in the specific amounts set forth herein." Finally, Paragraph K provided that Donald and Ellen "will pay for college for the infant child commensurate at the time with their income and assets."

In August 1985, Donald married his second wife, Harriet. On October 24, 1985, he executed a will, which bequeathed twenty-five percent of his estate to Harriet and a nominal sum to each of his three stepsons. He also bequeathed "the proceeds of a policy of life insurance ... to my beloved son, [David]." The bequeathed policy apparently was the same one that the divorce judgment obligated Donald to maintain. Finally, he left the residue of the estate in equal shares to his mother, Harriet Kasselman, and his sister, Betty Hurwitz.

Donald, a real estate developer, died on August 11, 1986, at the age of 44. See Del Tufo v. Township of Old Bridge, 147 N.J. 90, 95-97, 685 A.2d 1267 (1996) (describing circumstances surrounding Donald's death). David was then nine years old. The estimated value of Donald's estate, which consisted largely of real estate, was between ten and sixteen million dollars.

Between March 1988 and October 1990, the executor made partial distributions: Harriet Kasselman, $862,500; Betty Hurwitz, $862,500; and Harriet Rinder Kiken, $575,000. According to the Deputy Surrogate of Middlesex County, approximately two million dollars remained in the estate as of October 1990. Apparently because of a decline in real estate values, no further distributions have been made from the estate, which remains unsettled. According to Ellen and David, the balance of the life insurance proceeds are invested in a mutual fund with a market value of $145,000.

In December 1994, the University of Pennsylvania granted David early admission. Subsequently, he matriculated at that university, where he continues his undergraduate studies. On March 17, 1995, Ellen filed a notice of motion to enforce litigant's rights, seeking to substitute Gerald Del Tufo, the executor of Donald's estate, as the plaintiff in this proceeding. The notice also sought an order compelling the estate to pay David's college expenses. That request was based on Paragraph K of the divorce decree, which indicated that the parties would pay "commensurate at the time with their income and assets." Ellen is a substitute teacher. She asserts that because of the disparity between her income and the value of Donald's estate, the estate should pay the full costs of David's college education. The executor opposed the motion, arguing that the obligation to pay for David's college expenses terminated on Donald's death.

In May 1995, the Chancery Division denied the motion, finding that the agreement incorporated in the judgment of divorce did not bind Donald's estate. In so concluding, the court stated:

[A]s a human being, I really don't understand the paternal grandmother's position here at all.

I mean when we're ... dealing with the amount of money that she has inherited here. And what we're talking about in terms of sending this young man through the University of Pennsylvania. And ... what is so wrong with this child; it's her flesh and blood; maybe her only flesh and blood left. I don't know. It's amazing to me that ... grudges can be born that far....

I don't see how I can basically change this judgment of divorce to say that the estate of Donald Kiken and heirs are liable for the college expenses of the child....

I wish I could, ... [b]ecause there's so much money here--we're talking about $8, $9, $10, $11 million.

The Appellate Division affirmed. It reasoned that the absence of any language explicitly binding the respective estates for college expenses "permits the 'reasonable assumption' that the parties had intended the obligation to terminate upon death and that this not be enforceable against either party's estate." The court stated that if the parties had intended to bind their estates for college-education expenses, they would have done so expressly.

II.

The parental obligation to support children until they are emancipated is fundamental to a sound society. See Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 591, 660 A.2d 485 (1995) (noting that parents have duty to provide for their unemancipated children). At issue is whether that obligation extends to the estate of an obligated parent.

In this century, the path of the law has been one of expanding notions of parental obligations to children. The parental duty of support, originally only a moral obligation springing from natural law, has become an obligation enforceable at law. Grotsky v. Grotsky, 58 N.J. 354, 356, 277 A.2d 535 (1971). At early common law, the duty of support terminated on the death of the parent. See Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 135 N.J. 571, 575, 641 A.2d 535 (1994) (noting common-law rule in context of alimony, but declining to apply rule). More recent cases recognize that the duty may bind a parent's estate. See, e.g., Black v. Walker, 295 N.J.Super. 244, 263, 684 A.2d 1011 (App.Div.1996) (holding father's estate liable for illegitimate daughter's college expenses); Della Terza v. Estate of Della Terza, 276 N.J.Super. 46, 49, 647 A.2d 180 (App.Div.1994) (holding father's estate liable for portion of insurance proceeds due daughter under court-ordered life-insurance policy); DeCeglia v. Estate of Colletti, 265 N.J.Super. 128, 133, 625 A.2d 590 (App.Div.1993) (holding that father's obligation to support illegitimate child was enforceable against his estate); Koidl v. Schreiber, 214 N.J.Super. 513, 516-17, 520 A.2d 759 (App.Div.1986) (holding that support order entered against father who admitted paternity would be interpreted as requiring support payments to continue after father's death).

The continuation beyond death of a parent's support duty can arise in a variety of contexts. In an intact family, the law assumes that parents will provide for the children as well as they can. Sometimes, the parents have never married. See, e.g., Black, supra, 295 N.J.Super. 244, 684 A.2d 1011 (involving illegitimate child); DeCeglia, supra, 265 N.J.Super. 128, 625 A.2d 590 (same). Often, the parents have married, divorced, and remarried. See, e.g., Della Terza, supra, 276 N.J.Super. 46, 647 A.2d 180 (involving matter where daughter sued new-wife executrix of father's estate). Generally, courts assume that the parents, as the natural guardians of a child, will provide in the separation agreement or support order for the child's needs. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-46, 416 A.2d 45 (1980). Consequently, parents often provide in such agreements and orders for those needs. No matter what the arrangement may be between the parents, the child's needs continue. Consequently, courts have a continuing obligation to review support orders to assure that they are fair and equitable. See id. at 148-49, 416 A.2d 45.

An early Appellate Division opinion sustained the obligation of a deceased husband's estate to continue to pay alimony and support under a property-settlement...