Kiker v. National Structures, Inc.

Decision Date07 January 1977
PartiesEarnest KIKER et al. v. NATIONAL STRUCTURES, INC. SC 1869.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Richard Dominick and Carleton P. Ketcham, Jr., Birmingham, for appellants.

Donald L. Newsom, Birmingham, for appellee.

HEFLIN, Chief Justice.

In November 1973, National Structures, Inc., filed a complaint against Earnest Kiker (appellant), Durwood Rivers, and K. L. Shackleford individually and doing business as United Services Enterprises. The complaint alleged breach of contract by failure of the defendants to pay $5,937.50 for each of eight modular homes delivered to the defendants for a total of $47,500. Charles L. Howard, Jr., as 'attorney for defendants,' filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in April 1974, and after the motion was overruled he filed an answer and demand for jury trial on December 2, 1974. The next day, Charles M. Thompson, as attorney for Kiker, filed a motion to quash service, which was granted. Thompson, as Kiker's counsel, later filed an answer, on January 13, 1975 but was allowed to withdraw as attorney for Kiker on November 18, 1975. Kiker then sought the services of Charles Howard, who was then the attorney of record for the other two defendants. It should be noted that Kiker intimates that he had no choice in allowing Howard to represent him because Thompson withdrew as his attorney less than three weeks before trial date. He also contends that he was unaware of the individual defenses that he alone possessed.

A consent judgment was entered on December 5, 1975, and was approved by attorney Howard as counsel for all three defendants. The consent judgment was in the amount of $45,000 plus costs and also provided:

(1) 'Execution' on the judgment was stayed until April 1, 1976;

(2) Balance due on the judgment would be reduced to $5,000 if $25,000 was paid before April 1, 1976;

(3) The judgment would be deemed satisfied if the remaining $5,000 was paid by June 15, 1976.

After the consent judgment of December 5, 1975 was entered, National Structures, on January 12, 1976, recorded the judgment in Blount, Jefferson, and Shelby counties. Kiker alleges that between December 5, 1975 and April 1, 1976 he executed several contracts to sell real property in order to raise money to satisfy the judgment but because of the lien created by the recording of the judgment he was unable to close any sales. National Structures alleges that the judgments were recorded to prevent Kiker from divesting himself of property before satisfying the judgment. After April 1, 1976, National Structures garnished Kiker and further executed on the $45,000 judgment.

On March 21, 1976, Kiker, having retained new counsel, filed what was titled a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, contending that National Structures materially breached the terms of the consent judgment by filing the judgment in the probate office of three counties. National Structures then filed a motion to strike, arguing that the motion was not filed within the time required by Rule 59(e) ARCP. After a hearing, the motion to strike was granted on April 12, 1976. Kiker then filed a notice of appeal from the December 5, 1975 consent judgment and from the court's ruling on his Motion to Set Aside Judgment. National Structures filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on June 30, 1976.

Kiker submits that the primary issue on this appeal is whether or not the recordation of the consent judgment by National Structures in Blount, Jefferson, and Shelby counties on January 12, 1976 constituted an 'execution.' It is Kiker's argument that these recordings of the judgment amounted to execution and as such...

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5 cases
  • Iberiabank v. Niland (Ex parte Arvest Bank)
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 16, 2016
    ...the event an execution later occurs, filing has no other interlocking aspects with execution on the judgment."Kiker v. National Structures, Inc. , 342 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1977). In other words, as is implicit from the passage from Hargett quoted above, recording a judgment lien in itself do......
  • Smith v. Arrow Transp. Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 7, 1990
    ...all of the property of the defendant that is located in the county of recordation and is subject to levy and sale. Kiker v. Nat'l Structures, Inc., 342 So.2d 746 (Ala.1977); Shrout v. Seale, 287 Ala. 215, 250 So.2d 592 (1971); Second National Bank v. Allgood, 234 Ala. 654, 176 So. 363 (1937......
  • In re Sintz, Bankruptcy No. 92-12062. Adv. No. 92-1313.
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • June 29, 1993
    ...ten years does not begin to run until the certificate of judgment is recorded. This argument is unpersuasive. In Kiker v. National Structures, Inc., 342 So.2d 746 (Ala.1977) the Alabama Supreme Court held that "recording a judgment is not the same as executing a judgment." Kiker, 342 So.2d ......
  • Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Fifth Dist. Court, 960735-CA
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • February 27, 1997
    ...ninety-day period elapses. We disagree. "Recording a judgment is not the same as execution on a judgment." Kiker v. National Structures, Inc., 342 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1977). "Recordation of an abstract of judgment merely creates a lien upon real property of the judgment debtor...
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