Kilcoin v. Ortell
| Decision Date | 19 April 1922 |
| Docket Number | No. 14276.,14276. |
| Citation | 302 Ill. 531,135 N.E. 16 |
| Parties | KILCOIN v. ORTELL et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by John Kilcoin against Louis Ortell and another, for specific performance. From a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, complainant appeals.
Affirmed.
Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sinnett, of Moline, for appellant.
John K. Scott, of Rock Island, for appellees.
This was a bill for specific performance brought by appellant against appellees, to enforce a contract between the parties with reference to a trade as to certain real estate. The cause was referred to a master, who reported in favor of allowing the prayer of the bill for specific performance. On a hearing before the chancellor, the master's recommendations were overruled and a decree entered dismissing the bill for want of equity. From that decree this appeal has been taken.
The contract is dated April 23, 1920, was signed by the parties hereto, and is as follows:
The contract was written and signed in appellees' office. They and Dan Flynn were partners engaged in the real estate business, but Flynn had no interest in the trade and took no part in it. When the trade was first spoken of, appellant offered to trade his Wisconsin land for appellees' Rock Island houses and lots and $600 cash. Appellees would not agree to pay $600 difference, and they finally agreed on $300 boot money.
Appellees testified, and were corroborated by other witnesses, that throughout the negotiations and after the contractwas signed it was understood and agreed that appellees were to see the Wisconsin land before closing the deal, and, if they were dissatisfied with the land, the contract was to be destroyed and abandoned. Appellant contends that the contract is absolute on its face, is unambiguous, and cannot be contradicted or modified by proof of oral declarations made before or at the time it was signed. The rule is well settled that it is not competent to prove by parol that a completed and valid contract does not mean what its plain language imports, but we are of opinion that rule is not controlling in the decision of this case. The proof shows the contract was not delivered to appellant. The mere signing of the contract was not sufficient to make it presently binding, unless it was also delivered. That appellant said he had never seen his Wisconsin land, and that appellees had never seen it, is undisputed. Burkey, who was present when the transaction took place, lived in Wisconsin not far from the land and was acquainted with it, of which fact appellant informed appellees. Koester, who was also present, had often seen the land and was familiar with it.
Soon after the contract was signed appellees went to Wisconsin to see the land, and they testified Burkey showed it to them. Appellees testified appellant told them 40 acres of the Wisconsin land was in cultivation; that there was a good road through it and a schoolhouse near it. Wood testified that the land was low, with a ditch running through it; that 100 acres or more of it was under water; that part of it was sand, and there were some trees and underbrush on it. None of it appeared to have ever been broken with a plow. The road was more of a path than a road. There was a dilapidated building near it that at one time was a schoolhouse or church, or both. After their return appellant came to appellees' office and inquired if they had seen the farm. Wood said he had and they could not trade, for he did not consider the land of any value. Appellant said that was all right; that he had never seen the land himself and they would call the deal off. Ortell testified he visited the land; that it looked like quicksand; that about 100 acres of it was under water and none of it had been plowed. After his return appellant came to Ortell's office and asked what he thought of the land. Ortellsaid he would not give a dollar an acre for it, and appellant told him to tear up the paper. About two days later appellant's attorney came to appellees' office and demanded performance of the contract, and May 14, 1920, the bill was filed.
The bill alleges the contract was not in appellant's possession; that it was by mutual agreement left with appellees, and they had refused to give him a copy of it. He testified on the trial that, when the contract was signed, he turned it over to appellees to keep and never had it in his possession afterwards. Groesbeck, appellees' bookkeeper, to whom appellant dictated the contract, testified that, after it was signed, appellant gave it to him and said he did not want it and told witness to keep it; that if the land was not satisfactory to appellees the deal was not to go through. Wood testified appellant handed the contract to the bookkeeper, Groesbeck, and left the office. Ortell testified appellant told them to keep the contract and, if the farm was not satisfactory, to tear it up. Cramer, who was present at the time of the transaction, testified Ortell said he would not give appellant the check until he had seen the land, and appellant said he could go see the land and if it did not suit him he could tear up the contract. He afterwards met appellant on the street, and appellant said he did not care whether the deal went through; that appellees could tear up the contract if they wished to. Flynn testified he has present when appellant dictated the contract; that Ortell objected to delivering the check until appellees had seen the land; that appellant said that was all right; that if appellees did not like the land they did not have to take it and the deal would be off. The check referred to by the witnesseswas for $300 and was written by Wood. It was never torn out of the check book and remained in the possession of appellees.
We think the testimony referred to was competent on the question whether the contract was a completed one, intended by the parties to become presently binding. A written contract may fail to become binding for want...
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