Kile v. the Town of Yellowhead.

Decision Date30 September 1875
Citation80 Ill. 208,1875 WL 8735
PartiesREASON C. KILEv.THE TOWN OF YELLOWHEAD.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. N. J. PILLSBURY, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. BONFIELD & PADDOCK, and Mr. C. A. LAKE, for the appellant.

Mr. H. LORING, and Mr. J. N. ORR, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

This appeal is prosecuted to reverse a judgment of the court below, convicting appellant for obstructing a public highway.

The first ground for reversal urged is, that there is a variance between the allegation, in describing the highway claimed to have been obstructed, and the proofs.

In determining this question, it is necessary to consider, at the outset, whether we can take notice of what is meant by the initials used in describing the lands over which the alleged road is located, without explanatory proof. We believe that the practice of using initials for this purpose in conveyances, levies of executions, judicial sales, surveys, assessments for taxes, etc., etc., has been very general, from the first organization of our State government, and that any person would as readily comprehend their meaning as if the words they represent were written in full.

It was said in Munn et al. v. Burch et al. 25 Ill. 35, in discussing the custom of bankers in regard to depositors' checks: “Where a custom is so universal and of such antiquity that all men must be presumed to know it, courts will not pretend to be more ignorant than the rest of mankind, but will recognize and act upon it.” And Greenleaf, in the first volume of his treatise on Evidence, at the conclusion of § 9, says: “In fine, courts will generally take notice of whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction.”

The principle, in our opinion, requires that we should take notice of the meaning of these initials, without further proof.

The description in the complaint is: “A certain highway leading from the N. E. corner of the W. 1/2 of the N. E. 1/4 of sec. 36, T. 32 N. of R. 14 E., south to the south line of said town of Yellowhead.”

The description in the petition for the location, etc., of the highway is: “Commencing at the quarter stake, 80 rods west of the north-east corner of section 36, in said town, on Momence road, thence south on quarter line, to run one mile, to town line.”

The words “said town,” in the connection they occur, refer to township 32 north, range 14 east.

We understand that the north-east corner of the west half of the north-east quarter, in the absence of evidence that the section is less or greater than 640 acres, must be presumed to be at the same place with the “quarter stake, 80 rods west of the north-east corner of the section,” and that, running thence south to the south line of said town, etc., is substantially the same as “thence south on quarter line, to run one mile, to town line.” The direction is south, and the limit the town line, in both cases.

The order establishing the road described it as “commencing at the north line of section 36, township 32, range 14 east of the third principal meridian, where the corner is between the east and west half of the N. E. 1/4 of said section, and running thence south on the line of lots, 80 chains, to the south line of the section.” It does not appear here whether township 32 is north or south; but we must take notice it is township 32 north, for there is no other township 32 in Kankakee county. Billings v. Kankakee Coal Co. 67 Ill. 489. So we must, likewise, in taking notice of the mode of laying lands off into townships, sections, etc., by the general government, take notice that the south line of section 36, and the south line of the township, are but one and the same line.

The plat of the road describes it, after representing the township, section, etc., thus: “Commencing at a point on the north line of said secti...

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41 cases
  • Stein v. Meyers
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 15, 1912
    ...and ‘’ for ‘dollars' (Jackson v. Cummings, 15 Ill. 449); ‘N. E. 1/4’ for ‘northeast quarter’ (Bowen v. Prout, 52 Ill. 354;Kile v. Town of Yellowhead, 80 Ill. 208;Law v. People, 80 Ill. 268;Paris v. Lewis, 85 Ill. 597); also ‘W. side’ was held to mean the west side of a piece of land (Taylor......
  • Burgess v. Nail, 1776
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • May 1, 1939
    ...D. 381, 222 N.W. 256, 259; Todd v. Moore, 205 Ala. 451, 88 So. 447, 449; Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S.C. 89, 118 S.E. 178, 184; Kile v. Town of Yellowhead, 80 Ill. 208; People v. Raquette Falls Land Co., 100 Misc. 601, 166 N.Y.S. 12 Wilson v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 8 Cir., 59 F.2d 5......
  • Burke v. The City of Kansas
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 27, 1893
    ...v. Danbury, 25 Conn. 516; Test v. Larsh, 76 Ind. 452; Railroad v. Johnson, 84 Ind. 420; Chatterton v. Parrott, 46 Mich. 436; Kile v. Yellowhead, 80 Ill. 208; Hartshorn Potroff, 89 Ill. 509; Hatch v. Hawkes, 126 Mass. 177; Magrath v. Brock, 13 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 629; Company v. Middaugh, 12 Co......
  • Sanborn v. Duyne
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1903
    ... ... Town v. Town of Blackberry, 29 Ill ... 137; Rees v. City, 38 Ill. 322, 334; Kile v ... Town, 80 ... ...
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