Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, No. O

CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Writing for the CourtGRANT
Citation927 P.2d 796,187 Ariz. 136
PartiesThomas J. KILEY, as Conservator for E.M. Ray, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lois Ray, as Trustee of Ray Revocable Trustne, and as Trustee of Lois Ray Testamentary Trustne, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JENNINGS, STROUSS & SALMON; Hamilton E. McRae, III, and Jane Doe McRae; William Perkins and Jane Doe Perkins; John Christian and Jane Doe Christian; Frank B. Campbell and Jane Doe Campbell, Defendants-Appellees. 95-0259.
Decision Date23 April 1996
Docket NumberCA-CV,No. O,No. 1

Page 796

927 P.2d 796
187 Ariz. 136
Thomas J. KILEY, as Conservator for E.M. Ray, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lois Ray, as Trustee of Ray Revocable Trust No. One, and as Trustee of Lois Ray Testamentary Trust No. One, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JENNINGS, STROUSS & SALMON; Hamilton E. McRae, III, and Jane Doe McRae; William Perkins and Jane Doe Perkins; John Christian and Jane Doe Christian; Frank B. Campbell and Jane Doe Campbell, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 95-0259.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1, Department B.
April 23, 1996.
Review Denied Nov. 19, 1996 *.

Page 798

[187 Ariz. 138] Meehan & Associates by Michael J. Meehan, Mark Dinell, Charles A. Davis, Tucson, for Appellant.

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, by William R. Jones, Jr., Jay P. Rosenthal, Alisa J. Gray, Eileen J. Dennis, Phoenix, for Appellees.

Opinion

GRANT, Judge.

Thomas J. Kiley ("Kiley"), in his various capacities as conservator for E.M. Ray, as personal representative of the estate of Lois Ray and as trustee of the Ray Revocable Trust Number One, appeals from the summary judgment in favor of Defendant law firm Jennings, Strouss & Salmon ("JSS"), an Arizona Professional Partnership, in an alleged case of legal malpractice. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.21.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1982, the Ray family, E.M. Ray ("Charlie"), Lois Ray ("Lois"), and their two sons Bill Ray ("Bill") and Mike Ray ("Mike"), owned the Ray Lumber Company. Charlie, Bill and Mike were officers and employees of the company. They were having a difficult family dispute and sought assistance from JSS to reorganize the company, pass control to one of the sons and partition jointly owned assets including real estate, ranches and rolling stock. 1

Lois either was or became incompetent during this period of time. One of the attorneys at JSS stated that a will the firm had drawn for Lois in 1983, as part of the partition agreement, could not be executed because of concern about her legal capacity. There was also evidence that Charlie was becoming mentally incapacitated during this time.

In 1987 and 1988, a series of disputes among the family members over the meaning of the JSS-drafted partition agreement led to the filing of several lawsuits. Control of the company was uncertain and the company filed for bankruptcy. In each of these suits, including the bankruptcy proceeding, the terms of the partition agreement were at issue.

On June 10, 1988, Charlie executed the Ray Revocable Trust Number One. He was acting for himself, as well as for Lois, based upon a power of attorney she executed in 1982. In January of 1993, the suits among the family members ended with what is referred to as a "global settlement agreement." The day after this agreement was signed, Kiley filed this suit against JSS.

JSS filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its contention the statute of limitations had run. The trial court initially denied the motion and extensive discovery ensued. The trial court later held, in a minute entry dated December 21, 1994, the cause of action for legal malpractice had accrued in 1988 and "a material fact dispute exists over whether Mr. Ray was or is of unsound mind, requiring a jury finding." If Charlie was of unsound mind when the cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations would be tolled during the period of his incompetency. The trial court also held the appointment of a conservator did not cease the tolling of the statute of limitations.

The trial court requested additional briefing on the question whether the cause of action had been transferred to the trust. On completion, the trial court found "it is indisputable that the Rays' cause of action was transferred to the trust." The trial court also found that tolling of the statute of limitations ceased because "it is the trustee's soundness of mind which matters for section 12-502(A) purposes because the trustee is the 'person entitled to bring an action'."

Based upon its finding the cause of action for legal malpractice had been transferred to the trust in 1988, an action which ceased the tolling of the statute of limitations, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of JSS, holding the action was time-barred.

ISSUES

I. Can a cause of action for legal malpractice be transferred to a trust?

Page 799

187 Ariz. 139] II. Did evidence of the incompetency of Charlie and Lois raise triable issues of fact as to whether they knew they had claims for legal malpractice, whether they could have intended to create the trust, and whether they knowingly intended to or attempted to assign those claims to the trust

III. Was Plaintiff estopped as a matter of law to challenge the competence of Charlie and Lois Ray to establish the trust and fund it?

IV. Did the trial court err in making conclusions as a matter of law about what was intended in the declaration of trust and what was intended by the settlor(s) of the trust?

V. Was plaintiff denied the right provided by the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and the Uniform Rules of Practice to rebut a newly raised argument in Defendants' motion for summary judgment?

VI. If a trust is established as a means of helping a person who may be incompetent to manage his own affairs, should the statute of limitations tolling of A.R.S. section 12-502 apply to a claim held by that trust?

CROSS-ISSUE

Does the appointment of a conservator cause the tolling of the statute of limitations to cease?

DISCUSSION

The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is de novo for both factual and legal determinations of the trial court. Blum v. State, 171 Ariz. 201, 829 P.2d 1247 (App.1992). Summary judgment should only be granted in cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the case may therefore be decided on the pleadings. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000 (1990). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

I. Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims

In Arizona, legal malpractice actions are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims set forth in A.R.S. section 12-542. Reed v. Mitchell & Timbanard, P.C., 183 Ariz. 313, 317, 903 P.2d 621, 625 (App.1995). A claim for legal malpractice accrues when: (1) the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the attorney's negligent conduct; and (2) the plaintiff's damages are ascertainable, and not...

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50 practice notes
  • Kaufman v. Jesser, No. CV–12–459–PHX–LOA.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona
    • July 19, 2012
    ...action for ... malpractice[,]” and “[f]or trespass for injury done to ... the property of another.” Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 139, 927 P.2d 796, 799 (Ariz.Ct.App.1996). “The determination of when a cause of action accrues on a claim for legal malpractice is governe......
  • Cecala v. Newman, No. CV 04-02612-PHX-NVW.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona
    • May 2, 2007
    ...institutionalized nor be adjudged legally incompetent to qualify for tolling under A.R.S. § 12-502. Kiley v. Jennings, Strauss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 141, 927 P.2d 796, 801 Cecala concedes that her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued on June 21, 1999, at the lat......
  • Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, Docket No. 127018.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 28, 2006
    ...an action is in fact brought depends on good fortune since the [infant or] incompetent is helpless." Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 140, 927 P.2d 796 (Ariz.App., 1996). Thus, the saving provision, a necessary answer to our court rule, prevents the abrogation of the clai......
  • Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 17426.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 22, 2005
    ...duty of loyalty and confidentiality in rejecting assignments of legal malpractice claims. See, e.g., Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 140, 927 P.2d 796 (Ct.App.1996) (such assignments would negate attorney's 885 A.2d 170 fiduciary and ethical duty to client because assign......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
50 cases
  • Kaufman v. Jesser, CV–12–459–PHX–LOA.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona
    • July 19, 2012
    ...action for ... malpractice[,]” and “[f]or trespass for injury done to ... the property of another.” Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 139, 927 P.2d 796, 799 (Ariz.Ct.App.1996). “The determination of when a cause of action accrues on a claim for legal malpractice is governe......
  • Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 17426.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 22, 2005
    ...duty of loyalty and confidentiality in rejecting assignments of legal malpractice claims. See, e.g., Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 140, 927 P.2d 796 (Ct.App.1996) (such assignments would negate attorney's 885 A.2d 170 fiduciary and ethical duty to client because assign......
  • McCarthy v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, CV18-1351-PHX-DGC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona
    • August 23, 2019
    ...be tolled even if the individual has a parent or guardian who can assert the claim on his behalf. Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 927 P. 2d 796, 801-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no exception if the minor or individual is 409 F.Supp.3d 817 appointed a guardian or con......
  • Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, Docket No. 127018.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 28, 2006
    ...an action is in fact brought depends on good fortune since the [infant or] incompetent is helpless." Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 140, 927 P.2d 796 (Ariz.App., 1996). Thus, the saving provision, a necessary answer to our court rule, prevents the abrogation of the clai......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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