Killeen v. U.S.
Decision Date | 28 November 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 3949. {DO] No. 3950. {DO] No. 3951.,3949. {DO] No. 3950. {DO] No. 3951. |
Parties | James J. KILLEEN and William H. Fentress, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. James J. KILLEEN, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. William H. FENTRESS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Charles A. Mays, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee in No. 3949.
John R. Hess, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Milton D. Korman, Acting Corp. Counsel, and Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee in Nos. 3950 and 3951.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.
Appellants, the president and the treasurer of a corporation operating a local restaurant, were convicted of keeping a disorderly house1 and vagrancy.2 The former charge was tried before a jury; the latter submitted to the court. On appeal, they contend that the trial court erred (1) in failing to grant a motion for a verdict of not guilty, (2) in certain of its charges to the jury, and (3) in the admission of certain evidence. Since the vagrancy conviction must necessarily stand or fall with that of keeping a disorderly house, only the latter will be discussed.
The government's principal witness was Officer Graham of the Prostitution and Perversion Squad of the Morals Division, Metropolitan Police Department, who had visited the restaurant ten times in an undercover capacity. He stated that while on the premises he observed some of appellants' employees (waitresses, a piano player, and a femal impersonator) engaging in homosexual activities with customers. He also testified to witnessing homosexual conduct on the part of both male and female customers and to seeing numerous transvestites, some of whom were engaged in other homosexual acts.3 All of these acts were committed openly, and although appellants and other "managers" were on the premises and in a position to observe this improper conduct, they at no time made any attempt to suppress it. He further testified that after leaving the restaurant each evening, he made a written report of his observations. These reports were subsequently admitted into evidence over appellants' objections. Officer Graham's testimony was supported in part by that of another officer who accompanied him on five of his ten visits.
Lieutenant Fochett, who had authorized the investigation of the restaurant, testified that he had had a conversation with appellant Killeen at the time of his arrest. At that time Killeen told him that appellants did allow men to dance with men and women with women at the premises. Fochett further recounted an earlier conversation during which Killeen said he was aware that local businessmen were unhappy with the type of clientele he had in his restaurant.
Appellants took the stand and stated that although they were on the premises almost every night during the period of observation, they did not witness any improper conduct, nor was any brought to their attention by employees, customers, or members of the police department. They also introduced evidence tending to show that the construction of the premises prevented anyone from having a clear view of the entire restaurant and bar at one time, and presented other witnesses who testified to their good character.
Appellants' first argument is that the government failed to prove a prima facie case since it did not show that they had knowledge of the improper conduct of the patrons and employees of the restaurant. In order to prove the crime charged, the government had to establish that the acts done at the premises were contrary to law and subversive of the public morals, that the premises were commonly resorted to for the commission of such acts, and that the proprietors knew or should in reason have known what was occurring and did nothing to prevent it. DeForest v. United States, 11 App.D.C. 458, 463 (1897); Payne v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 171 A.2d 509, 511 (1961). It was therefore not necessary to prove actual knowledge if it could be shown that appellants should in reason have known what was happening. In addition, the requisite knowledge could have been proved inferentially since a proprietor is presumed to have knowledge of that which goes on in his premises. De-Forest v. United States, supra, 11 App.D.C. at 464. After reviewing the record, we are convinced that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found or inferred that appellants had or should in reason have had the requisite knowledge.
Appellants next argue that the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding the element of knowledge was erroneous. The court stated:
This instruction is merely a restatement of the law established in DeForest v. United States and Payne v. United States, supra, and we find no error in this regard. Accord, State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 12 N.J. 468, 97 A.2d 480, 491, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 869, 74 S.Ct. 124, 98 L.Ed. 379 (1953).
In another part of his instructions, the trial judge charged:
Appellants claim this was erroneous. In the light of Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948), and Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 242, 184 F.2d 261, 263, 21 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1950), we hold that this instruction was a proper statement of the law. In addition, appellants neither offered an instruction on this point nor objected to the instruction as given, and they will not be allowed to raise an objection to it for the first time on appeal. Villaroman v. United States, supra at 241, 184 F.2d 262; Collins v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 41 A.2d 515, 518 (1945).
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the reports written by Officer Graham. For many years...
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