Killian v. Caza Drilling, Inc., No. 05-37.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: Hill
• Citation: 2006 WY 42,131 P.3d 975
• Decision Date: 07 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-37.
• Parties: Lee Ann KILLIAN and Donna Oakley, as co-personal representatives of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, and the Estate of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. CAZA DRILLING, INC., a Colorado corporation; and Orville Long, Appellees (Defendants).

131 P.3d 975 2006 WY 42 Lee Ann KILLIAN and Donna Oakley, as co-personal representatives of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, and the Estate of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, Appellants (Plaintiffs),
v.
CAZA DRILLING, INC., a Colorado corporation; and Orville Long, Appellees (Defendants). No. 05-37. Supreme Court of Wyoming. April 7, 2006.

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Robert N. Williams of Meyer and Williams, Jackson, Wyoming, and James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming, for Appellants. Argument by Mr. Williams.

George Santini of Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, For Appellee

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Caza Drilling, Inc. Gary R. Scott and Robert C. Jarosh of Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Orvil Long, for Appellees. Argument by Messrs. Santini and Jarosh.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Lee Ann Killian and Donna Oakley (collectively Appellants) are co-personal representatives of the estate of Jeff Pool, who was killed when he was struck by a vehicle driven by an employee of Caza Drilling, Inc. (Caza). On behalf of the estate, Appellants filed an action against Caza and Orvil Long, the supervisor of the employees involved in the accident, alleging that they negligently allowed the employees to drink alcohol on company premises in violation of Caza policy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants concluding that Caza and Long did not owe a duty to Pool, and that their actions were not the proximate cause of his death. We agree that there was no duty and affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Appellants set forth the following issues:

A. Does a duty to the motoring public arise where an employee became intoxicated on company premises with the corroboration and knowledge of his supervisor and in violation of a company policy expressly adopted to protect the public?

B. Is the Wyoming Dram Shop Act applicable to the facts of this case?

C. Is court-ordered counseling one of the express exceptions to a privilege under W.S. § 33-38-103?

Caza sets out the following issues:

1. Should this Court create a duty on the part of employers which have adopted policies prohibiting worksite possession or consumption of alcohol greater than those recognized under the Wyoming Dramshop Act?

2. Can an employer be held vicariously liable for off duty, off premises torts committed by employees or ex-employees?

3. Was there a legally recognizable duty owed by Caza Drilling to the Appellant?

4. Assuming such a duty exists, was the death of Jeffrey Pool so far attenuated and disconnected from the breach of the duty to the extent that any such breach as a matter of law could not be a proximate cause?

Long responds with the following:

1. Does Wyoming Statute Annotated § 12-8-301 immunize Orvil Long from liability for damages resulting from the accident that caused Jeffrey Christopher Pool's death?

2. If Wyoming Statute Annotated § 12-8-301 does not immunize Orvil Long from liability for damages resulting from the accident that caused Jeffrey Christopher Pool's death, does Wyoming law impose a duty upon Long, under the circumstances of this case, to protect against the harm caused to Pool?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that information regarding Orvil Long's alcohol counseling, which was court-ordered in an unrelated case, was confidential pursuant to Wyoming Statute Annotated § 33-38-113?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On April 15, 2001, Clint Hammers (Hammers) and Wyatt Ditterline (Ditterline) were employed by Caza on a drilling crew working on Rig 73, near Marbleton, Wyoming. Long was the driller and supervisor of the crew. At 6:30 that morning, the crew finished a twelve-hour shift and retired to Caza's mancamp, which was located about five miles from the rig site. The mancamp consisted of a trailer provided without cost by Caza to its employees while they worked at the rig site. Although employees were not required to stay at the mancamp, Hammers, Ditterline, and Long elected to do so.

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[¶ 4] Caza prohibited the possession or consumption of alcohol at its mancamp. The policy was posted on the trailer door at the mancamp. Hammers and Ditterline were aware of the policy. Nevertheless, the policy was not enforced. After returning to the mancamp on April 15, members of the crew, including Hammers, Ditterline, and Long, began drinking. After a couple of hours, Hammers and Ditterline left the mancamp in Ditterline's truck with Hammers driving. Initially, Hammers and Ditterline went to the rig site, where they allegedly smoked marijuana with another Caza employee.¹ They then decided to go see Hammers' new cabin in Dubois. After a brief stop in Jackson, they headed north on U.S. Highway 191. At approximately 1:30 p.m. Hammers was driving about sixty-five miles per hour near the Jackson Hole Airport when he struck Jeff Pool, who was riding his bicycle. Pool was killed instantly. Hammers and Ditterline were arrested a short time later after fleeing the scene. Subsequently, Hammers pleaded guilty to aggravated homicide by vehicle and hit and run while Ditterline pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting hit and run.

[¶ 5] On April 14, 2003, Appellants filed a wrongful death action against numerous individual and corporate defendants alleging that their negligent misconduct resulted in the death of the decedent.² Caza and Long filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted the motions concluding that Caza and Long were "entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no duty of care owed by these Defendants to the Plaintiff's [sic] or Plaintiffs' decedent." Alternatively, the court found that "even if defendants owed some duty of care to Jeffrey Pool[,] Summary Judgment is still appropriate for defendants because there is no proximate cause as a matter of law." Appellants appeal.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted.... The movant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. If the movant carries his burden, the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.... This court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as the district court employed and used. We examine the record in the light most favorable to the party who opposed the motion for summary judgment, and we give that party all the favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. We accord no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law.

Christensen v. Carbon County, 2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413-14 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Company v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo.2002)).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Through application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is only liable for the negligence of an employee who is acting within the scope of his employment. Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo.1999); Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo.1997).

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The conduct of an employee is within the scope of his employment "only if it is of the kind he is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." [Hamilton v. Natrona County Education Association, 901 P.2d 381, 385 (Wyo.1995)] (citing Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co., 598 P.2d 20, 22 (Wyo.1979)); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228 (1958).

Austin, at Id. There is no contention that Hammers and Ditterline were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident. Rather, Appellants ask us to expand the recognized circumstances in which an employer is liable for the negligence of its employees by imposing a duty directly upon the employer when it has adopted a safety policy with the intent to benefit the public. Appellants cite the following language from Caza's employee safety manual:

SECTION 1 — SAFETY POLICY AND PROGRAM

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The management of CAZA Drilling Inc. is sincerely committed to providing a safe and healthful workplace. Safety is an integral part of our Company's work. It is part of our daily operations and is there to protect our employees, customers, contractors, property, the environment, and the public.

....

Everyone employed by CAZA is responsible for maintaining the safety program. Managers and supervisors are responsible for identifying safety needs ... and informing supervisors of any unsafe conditions...

As a CAZA Drilling Inc. employee, you are expected to comply with all applicable CAZA safety rules, to perform all duties in a safe and workmanlike manner, and promote safety awareness among fellow employees...

....

1.3 GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT — DRUGS, ALCOHOL, FIREARMS, & OTHER HAZARDS.

CAZA Drilling Inc. subscribes to the following policy regarding illegal drugs, alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives, or other hazardous conditions:

1. The possession, use, sale or distribution of any illegal controlled substance(s) or being under the influence of same, by any employee while in the workplace, on company premises, or in the conduct of company-related work off-site, is prohibited. The presence of any detectable amount of any illegal drug (or any metabolities) in any employee in the company workplace, on its premises, or in the conduct of company-related work off-site is prohibited. Company vehicles, as well as private vehicles parked on company premises or worksites are...