Kilmer v. Gustason, 14467.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1954
• Docket Number: No. 14467.,14467.
• Citation: 211 F.2d 781
• Parties: KILMER et al. v. GUSTASON et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

211 F.2d 781 (1954)

KILMER et al. v.GUSTASON et al.

No. 14467.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 31, 1954.

C. Clyde Atkins, Miami, Fla., Cecil T. Farrington, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Walton, Hubbard, Schroeder, Lantaff & Atkins, Miami, Fla., for appellants.

T. J. Blackwell, S. J. Powers, Jr., Cody Fowler and Walter Humkey, Blackwell, Walker & Gray and Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, all of Miami, Fla., for appellees.

Before STRUM and RIVES, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.

STRUM, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff below, John E. Gustason, appellee here, individually recovered judgment for $15,000 for personal injuries to himself, and in a separate action as administrator of his wife's estate $27,000 for her wrongful death as a result of an automobile collision alleged to have been the result of the negligence of Marion A. L. Kilmer, who, together with his wife, Cora, were also killed in the collision.

The collision occurred in Iowa.The suits were brought in Florida.The plaintiff, Gustason, was the driver of one car, Mr. Kilmer driver of the other.The suits were brought against Kilmer's personal representatives.In Gustason's individual suit, the defendants filed a counterclaim asserting that Gustason's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision, but there was a jury verdict of not guilty on the counterclaim.

On appeal, defendants below contend that the trial court erred by permitting the plaintiff, Gustason, to testify as to certain of his own actions, and the position, speed and movements of his own car immediately before the collision.Defendants assert that the admission of this testimony was contrary to Section 90.05,Fla.Stat.Ann., sometimes called the "dead man"statute, which provides, inter alia, that no party to any action or proceeding, nor any person interested in the event (sic) thereof, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination deceased or insane.Defendants contend that the collision was a "transaction" within the purview of the statute, and Kilmer being dead the plaintiff, Gustason, should not have been allowed to testify.¹

In U. S. A. C. Transport, Inc. v. Corley, 5 Cir., 202 F.2d 8, this court recently considered a like question arising under Section 38-1603(3) of the Georgia Code, which is of substantially like effect as the Florida statute in the respect here under consideration.We there held that in an action for damages by the surviving driver of an automobile for injuries sustained in a collision with a truck, the driver of which was dead at the time of the trial, it was not reversible error to permit the plaintiff to testify concerning his own actions, and the position and movements of his own car just prior to the collision.²

That case is decisive here.The trial judge permitted this plaintiff to testify only as to his own actions, and the position and movements of his own car.³These were independent facts, not a part of any transaction or communication between the two drivers.The trial judge, however, carefully excluded all testimony by the plaintiff pertaining to the deceased's car and its movements, even to the extent of forbidding plaintiff to testify that there was in fact a collision.There was no reversible error in admitting the evidence in question.In any event, however, Gustason's testimony on these matters was merely cumulative, and therefore harmless, as all the facts surrounding the collision were also established by the testimony of other and disinterested witnesses.Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, Fla., 38 So.2d 434;Smith v. Biscayne Park Estates, Fla., 42 So.2d 442;Community Natural Gas Co. v. Henley, 5 Cir., 54 F.2d 59.

The cause of action having arisen in Iowa, the elements and quantum of damages are governed by the laws of that state.Under Iowa law, loss of services and consortium are not recoverable individually by a husband in an action for the death of or injury to his wife.Appellants charge that reversible error was committed by the inclusion of this element of damage in appellees' complaint and opening statement, which the trial court allowed to go to the jury over objection, and that the court erred in refusing to specifically charge the jury that these elements of damage were not recoverable.

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