Kim v. Veglas

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: Young
• Citation: Kim v. Veglas, 607 F.Supp.2d 286 (D. Mass. 2009)
• Decision Date: 16 April 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-11096-RCL.
• Parties: Soeun KIM, Plaintiff v. Beverly VEGLAS, Kathleen Dennehy, Martin A. Magnusson, Jeffrey Merrill, Carl McHatten, Jane DePalma, Jackie Weddle, John Marshall, Abbe Nelligan, Anne Marie Aucoin, Tom Neville, Nelson Riley, and John Doe Starbird, Defendants.

Page 286

607 F.Supp.2d 286

Soeun KIM, Plaintiff v. Beverly VEGLAS, Kathleen Dennehy, Martin A. Magnusson, Jeffrey Merrill, Carl McHatten, Jane DePalma, Jackie Weddle, John Marshall, Abbe Nelligan, Anne Marie Aucoin, Tom Neville, Nelson Riley, and John Doe Starbird, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 06-11096-RCL.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

April 16, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marc J. Goldstein, Krista L. Hawley, Beveridge & Diamond PC, Wellesley, MA, for Plaintiff.

David J. Rentsch, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, Diane Sleek, Maine Attorney General's Office, Augusta, ME, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 22, 2006, the plaintiff Soeun Kim ("Kim") filed suit against various prison officials in Massachusetts and Maine. In his complaint, Kim, a prisoner initially convicted and incarcerated in Maine, alleged that his transfer to a Massachusetts corrections facility violated a variety of his constitutional and statutory rights. One portion of the complaint claimed that various Massachusetts and Maine defendants denied Kim his constitutional right to access the courts by refusing to send him any Maine legal materials unless he provided "exact citations" for the opinions and statutes he required.

A. Procedural Posture

Kim initially filed his complaint pro se on June 22, 2006. [Doc. No. 1.] Kim also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on August 10, 2006. [Doc. No. 10.] Under the Court's authority to screen the claims of plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis, Judge Lindsay initially dismissed without prejudice all of Kim's claims against the Maine defendants. [Doc. No. 26.] On December 21, 2006, Kim filed an amended complaint. First Amended Verified Civil Complaint with a Jury Trial Demand ("Cmplt.") [Doc. No. 29]. On January 7, 2008, Judge Lindsay granted Kim's motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel. [Doc. Nos. 76, 77.]

The parties agreed after conferring that in this case's "present posture, the only possible claim remaining in this case against the Maine defendants is the plaintiff's access to the courts claim...." Memorandum of Law in Support of Revised Motion to Dismiss of Maine Defendants ("Def. Mem."), at 3 [Doc. No. 90]. The three Maine prison officials—Martin A. Magnusson ("Magnusson"), Carl McHatten ("McHatten"), and Jackie Weddle ("Weddle") (collectively the "Maine defendants")—moved to dismiss the access to courts claim against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 89.]

B. Alleged Facts

Kim is a state prisoner initially convicted and incarcerated in Maine. On April 5, 2005, he was transferred from the Maine State Prison to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution—Cedar Junction ("Cedar Junction") pursuant to the New England Interstate Corrections Compact. Cmplt. ¶ 2. Once settled at Cedar Junction, Kim began seeking Massachusetts and Maine legal materials to challenge the legality of his transfer from Maine. Id. ¶ 35. While he easily obtained the requested Massachusetts materials because he was incarcerated in a Massachusetts facility, Kim's attempts to procure relevant Maine materials met persistent and varied obstacles. From mid-2005 until January 2006, Kim's requests were shuttled between a number of Maine and Massachusetts prison officials, including Massachusetts defendants Beverly Veglas, John Marshall, Abbe Nelligan, Jane DePalma, and Ann Marie Aucoin and Maine defendants Magnusson and McHatten, all of whom indicated that they could not aid Kim. Id. at 39-63. Finally, on January 31, 2006, Kim received a letter from Maine defendant Weddle, the law librarian at the Maine State Prison and apparently the only official in Massachusetts or Maine who could provide Kim with the requested legal materials. Ex. A, attached to Cmplt. Weddle's letter explained that "[a]ny requests for law material from the Maine State Prison Law Library should be addressed directly to me [Weddle].... Citations will need to be specific and accurate to correctly provide you with the material you need." Id. On February 10, 2006, Kim wrote back to Weddle explaining that without the benefit of access to a Maine citator, digest, or treatise, it would be impossible for him to provide precise citations for any materials. Cmplt. ¶ 64. Weddle never responded to this letter. Id. Kim still has not been able to access Maine legal materials.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.2002).¹ In asserting personal jurisdiction, "a party cannot rest upon the pleadings but must adduce evidence of specific facts" to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 284 F.Supp.2d 204, 211 (D.Mass.2003) (citing Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir.1995)). In other words, as in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court "must accept the plaintiff's (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true" in making its determinations. Id.

B. This Court Cannot Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over Magnusson or McHatten

Kim and the Maine defendants (Magnusson, McHatten, and Weddle) agree that Kim's only remaining claim against the Maine defendants is for denial of access to courts, and in his opposition to the Maine defendants' motion, Kim also concedes that Weddle is the only Maine defendant against whom he can possibly assert personal jurisdiction. See Kim's Opp. at 14 ("[N]either Magnusson nor McHatten opened themselves up to this Court's jurisdiction as their incidental contacts with Kim in Massachusetts did not cause the constitutional violation at issue. There is no allegation that either Magnusson or McHatten undertook any action but-for which there would not be a legal access claim. Only the actions of defendant Weddle satisfy this analysis."). Thus, as an initial matter, the Court granted Magnusson and McHatten's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2).

C. This Court Can Assert Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Weddle

The only remaining question this Court need answer is whether Kim has adduced sufficient facts to assert personal jurisdiction over Weddle. A plaintiff can establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.2005) (explaining the difference between the two types of personal jurisdiction). Kim does not allege that Weddle had "continuous and systematic contacts with" Massachusetts such that this Court could exercise general jurisdiction over Weddle. Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.2008). Consequently, Kim must put forward evidence to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Weddle. "Specific jurisdiction exists when there is a demonstrable nexus between a plaintiff's claims and a defendant's forum-based activities, such as when the litigation itself is founded directly on those activities." Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1998). "[T]o establish personal jurisdiction, [Kim] must show that `the Massachusetts long-arm statute grants jurisdiction and, if it does, that the exercise of jurisdiction under the statute is consistent with the Constitution.'" Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52).

1. Weddle's Conduct Satisfies Massachusetts' Long-Arm Statute

Generally, the First Circuit has "construed the Massachusetts long-arm statute to be coextensive with the limits allowed by the United States Constitution," and thus "`sidestep[s] the statutory inquiry and proceed[s] directly to the constitutional analysis.'" Id. (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52). Despite the usual leapfrogging of the statutory inquiry, in Hannon v. Beard, a 2008 First Circuit case, the court engaged in an independent analysis of the long-arm statute given factual circumstances similar to the instant lawsuit. Id. The court explained that the additional analysis was necessary because the plaintiff's claims against out-of-state prison officials for retaliatory transfer and violation of access to the courts "involve[d out-of-state prison officials'] exercise of their discretion, rather than a conventional contract or tort claim." Id. As the instant matter involves like allegations, this Court will also determine whether Kim's complaint satisfies Massachusetts' long-arm statute.

Kim alleges that Weddle's conduct satisfies the long-arm statute because his claims "aris[e] from [Weddle's] transacting any business in this commonwealth." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a). Courts construe the "transacting business" requirement broadly, as the language "is general and applies to any purposeful acts by an individual, whether personal, private, or commercial." Ealing Corp. v. Harrods Ltd., 790 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir.1986). "Physical presence in Massachusetts is not required in order to `transact business' in Massachusetts." Hannon, 524 F.3d at 280 (citing Fairview Mach. & Tool Co., Inc. v. Oakbrook Int'l, Inc., 56 F.Supp.2d 134, 137 (D.Mass.1999) (Ponsor, J.)).

Because of similarities between the instant case and Hannon, as well as Weddle's reliance on Hannon's holding, a brief discussion of that case is in order. Hannon, a Pennsylvania prisoner transferred to a Massachusetts penitentiary pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact, brought two claims against Pennsylvania officials. Hannon, 524 F.3d at 278. First, Hannon alleged that the Secretary of the Pennsylvania prison system violated Hannon's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by transferring him out of Pennsylvania in retaliation for grievances and lawsuits Hannon had filed against prison officials. Id. Second, Hannon claimed...