Kimball v. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 19 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:13cv225 |
| Parties | JAMES T. KIMBALL, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINIONAND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff James T. Kimball filed this Bivens action1 against the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), Federal Correction Institution Elkton (FCI Elkton)Warden Robert Farley, Captain R. Wilson, Secret Investigative Service (SIS) Lieutenant Butts, Counselor Crissman, Health Services Administrator (HSA) Bunts, Assistant Health Service Administrator (AHSA) Barnes, and Clinical Director Dr. Dunlop. In the Complaint, Kimball alleges a variety of constitutional claims related to the conditions of his confinement, including deliberate indifference to serious medical need, crueland unusual punishment, and deprivation of due process. He seeks $ 1.26 million in damages. For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).
Kimball is a federal inmate incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low. The Complaint describes five separate incidents that occurred while Kimball was incarcerated at FCI Elkton as the basis for his claims.
First, Kimball requested a "medical type mattress due to a torn roto cuff and serious degenerating back problems," but HSA Bunts, AHSA Barnes and Clinical Director Dunlop, refused his request, causing him"to endure excruciating pain and suffering for many months before being transferred to another prison." ECF No. 1 at 4. He contends Warden Farley and the BOP "refused to correct the torture." Id. Kimball seeks $100,000 in damages for this claim. Id. at 8.
Second, Kimball contends he received improper medical care for a kidney condition, leading to a loss of "serious amounts of blood" and "excruciating pain" lasting for about a month. Id. at 5.
He alleges when he arrived at FCI Elkton he was due for follow-up medical testingafter receiving a "stacked stint implant and a renal stint implant" at Lexington Medical Center, however Bunts, Barnes, and Dunlop delayed the medical testing. As a result, when the testing was finally completed, it revealed an "emergency condition . . . comprised of a totally blocked right kidney, which was blocked and shut down by [a] huge kidney stone." Id. Kimball asserts these Defendants then delayed treatment of his condition for 60 days causing him to "lose function in three quarters of his right kidney." He also contends the physician who conducted laser surgery to treat the kidney stone and who performed a stint retraction, "botched the surgery," and Barnes, Bunts and Dunlop refused his request to replace this doctor, "leaving Kimball to contend with unbelievable pain and bleeding." Id. Kimball seeks $1 million in damages for this claim. Id. at 8.
Third, Kimball complained to prison officials about excessive noise and "screaming" in his housing unit emanating from a nearby "large entertainment room." Id. at 6. He asserts the noise prevented him from sleeping more than 30 minutes at a time, and that Counselor Crissman and Warden Farley refused to remedy the "constant noise" or move him to a different unit. Kimball seeks $50,000 in damages for this claim. Id. at 8.
Fourth, Kimball alleges Farley and Captain R. Wilson urged another inmate toassault him. Id. He contends SIS Lt. Butts conspired with these defendants to cover-up the assault, "keeping Kimball in the Hole and refusing to request outside prosecution, while releasing Kimball's assailant." Id. Farley and Wilson also purportedly did not provide Kimball medical care for his injuries following the assault, would not identify Kimball's attacker, and "tortured Kimball while he was in the Hole over 3 months . . . ." Id. at 7. This alleged "torture" included, "banging on Kimball's cell door every 30 minutes, 24 hours a day, seven days a week," refusing Kimball exercise periods, food, sanitary items, shoes, and a watch, and refusing to provide Kimball legal documents or copies of his legal filings. Id. Kimball seeks $100,000 in damages on this claim. Id. at 8.
Fifth, Kimball purchased 2 copy cards from the FCI Elkton commissary for $5 each, but the copy cards did not work. When he reported this to the commissary officials, they would not issue a refund, but informed Kimball they could send the cards back to the manufacturer. However, they also told Kimball that the replacement cards would not work, in any event, because a new system was being installed. Kimball then requested a receipt if he was to send the cards back, but the commissary refused. Kimball seeks $10,000 in damages for this claim. Id. at 8.
Kimball asserts he has filed or attempted to file grievances regarding each ofthe foregoing incidents and that he has exhausted his administrative remedies.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U .S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable tothe Plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true." Id. (citations omitted). The Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), further explains the "plausibility" requirement, stating that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. This determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
In his complaint, Kimball alleges causes of action against the Bureau of Prisons, as well as Defendants Farley, Wilson, Butts, Crissman, Bunts, Barnes, and Dunlop in both their official and individual capacities, "as non-governmental employees." ECF No. 1 at 1.
Kimball cannot assert a Bivens claim against the BOP. The United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it explicitly waives its immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941). Congress defines the exact terms and conditions upon which the government and its agencies may be sued and the terms of its consent define the parameters of federal court jurisdiction to entertain suits brought against the United States. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967). A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, unequivocally expressed, and cannot be implied. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,4 (1969); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957).
Bivens provides a cause of action against individual officers acting under colorof federal law alleged to have acted unconstitutionally. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). The United States has not waived sovereign immunity for itself or for any of its agencies for a Bivens action. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994). Because the only claims Kimball asserts against the BOP are Bivens claims, the BOP must be dismissed from this action. Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App'x 182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) ().
Kimball's official capacity claims against Defendants Farley, Wilson, Butts, Crissman, Bunts, Barnes, and Dunlop must be dismissed as well. These claims are necessarily construed as claims against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and, thus, the United States. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 65 8, 690 n. 55 (1978) ("official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); Dotson v. Wilkinson, 477 F. Supp. 2d 838, 851-52 (N.D. Ohio 2007). Because claims against the United States are barred, as discussed above, Kimball's claims against these Defendants in their official capacities as agents of the BOP (and, thus, the United States) are also subject to summary dismissal under § 1915(e).
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