Kimball v. City of Grantsville City

• Citation: 57 P. 1,19 Utah 368
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 29 April 1899
• Parties: H. PARLEY KIMBALL, RESPONDENT, v. GRANTSVILLE CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, S.W. HOUSE, TREASURER AND COLLECTOR, APPELLANTS. [1]

57 P. 1

19 Utah 368

H. PARLEY KIMBALL, RESPONDENT, v. GRANTSVILLE CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, S.W. HOUSE, TREASURER AND COLLECTOR, APPELLANTS. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Utah

April 29, 1899

Appeal from the Third District Court, Hon. A. N. Cherry, Judge.

Action to restrain the collection of a city tax levied upon property of the plaintiff for the year 1897 by the authorities of Grantsville City, a city of the third class, incorporated under the act of the territorial Legislature. The lands on which the tax in controversy was levied are situated about one and one-half miles from platted and built-up portions of the city and are used for agricultural purposes.

At the trial a portion of these lands was held to be within the range of municipal benefits, subject to the city tax, and the remaining portion was held to be without the range of such benefits and not subject to taxation, although within the territorial limits of the city.

From the decree entered, defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Messrs Rawlins, Thurman, Hurd & Wedgwood, for appellants.

Under the express terms of the statutory provisions, all property within the corporate limits is subject to the payment of city taxes.

The boundaries of Grantsville City are defined in Sub. 1, Sec 1511 of the Laws of 1888, and this law, under Sec. 2, Art. 24 of the State constitution, and Sec. 311 of the Revised Statutes of 1898, is continued in force, and the boundaries thereof, as theretofore established, adopted, and confirmed. Under Sec. 1527, Vol. 1 of Laws of 1888, which was in force at the time of the levy complained of, all property within the corporate limits of Grantsville City is made liable to pay city taxes.

The statutory provisions requiring the payment of city taxes upon all the property within the corporate limits, do not violate any provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions, but are a valid and lawful exercise of the legislative functions, and should be given full force and effect.

Whatever may be said as to the latter propositions, it certainly can not be said that the collection of taxes would deprive respondents of their property without due process of law. This question would seem to be definitely settled by both this court and the Supreme Court of the United States. People v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288; Kelly v Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, affirming 85 Pa. 170; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578; Cooley's Const. Lim., 437 et seq. (5th ed.).

The constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, relates simply to the power of eminent domain, and is not a restriction on the power of taxation. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., Sec. 738; Desty on Taxation, 30, 31; Hare Am. Const. Law, 332; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 404, et seq.; Cooley's Const. Lim. (5th ed.), 620; Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 2 Black, U.S. 510; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 702, et seq.; Cooley on Const. Lim., p. 620.

James A. Williams, Esq., for respondent.

The broad question involved is the right of a city to tax agricultural lands within the city limits. The record is such that the distinguished counsel for the city have been forced to contend that the city has a right to tax all lands within its limits regardless of the situation, and whether receiving any municipal benefits or not. In other words, the city is compelled to ask this court to overrule all the following cases: Salt Lake City v. Wagener, 2 Utah 400; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288; Ellison v. Linford, 7 Utah 166; Cook v. Crandall, 7 Utah 344; Kaysville City v. Ellison (decided September term, 1898).

This case comes clearly within the rule of stare decisis, and the court is bound, not by one decision, but by a series of decisions. "It is better that the law be settled than that it always be right." Wells on Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisis, 578; Salt Lake City v. Wagener, 2 Utah 400; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah 297; Cook v. Crandall, 7 Utah 344; Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18 Utah 163.

BARTCH, C. J. MINER, J., BASKIN, J., concurring.

OPINION

BARTCH, C. J.

This action was brought to restrain the collection of a city tax levied upon the property of the respondent for the year 1897, by the local authorities of Grantsville City. It appears that Grantsville City is a municipal corporation of the third class, incorporated by act of the territorial Legislature, Sec. 1511, C. L. U., 1888, and its name and boundaries were "perpetuated" under Section 311, R. S., 1898. The city's charter provides for a city government with power, among other things, to levy and collect taxes for city purposes on all taxable property within its corporate limits. C. L. U., 1888, Sec. 1512, et seq.

The area of the city is about four and a half miles square, and has a population, as appears from the findings of fact, of about one thousand. The lands on which the tax in controversy was levied, are situate about one and a half miles from the platted and built-up portion of the city and are used for agricultural purposes. At the trial a portion of these lands were held to be within the range of municipal benefits, subject to city taxation, while the remaining portion was held to be without the range of such benefits, and therefore not subject to such taxation, although all these lands lie within the territorial limits of the city.

The question of paramount importance presented on this appeal is whether the several statutory provisions relating to Grantsville City, and requiring the payment of city taxes upon all property within the corporate limits of the city, are violative of any provision of the State or Federal Constitutions, since such provisions of statute authorize the taxation for city purposes of lands lying outside the platted and improved portion of the city, and used only for the business of agriculture. In other words, is such taxation a lawful exercise of the legislative functions of the State?

To burden such lands or property with city taxes is not inhibited by the provision of Article 5 of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States that private property shall not be taken "for public use without just compensation," because that article is a restriction upon the legislative functions of the Federal government and has no application to such functions of a State government. Kelly V Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, 26 L.Ed. 658.

The appellants insist and the respondent concedes that the exercise of such legislative power by the State is not in violation of Sec. 1, Art. 14, Const. United States, wherein it is provided that no State shall deprive any person of his property "without due process of law." We need therefore, give these provisions of the Constitution of the United States no further consideration in the disposition of this case. It is insisted, however, that a portion of the lands are situate beyond the range of municipal benefits, and that, as to such lands, a tax for city improvements and expenses is inhibited by Sec. 22, Art. 1 of the constitution of this State, which provides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The question is, Does this provision of the constitution relate only to the right of eminent domain, or does it also limit the power of taxation? Private property may be taken constitutionally for public use both by the right of eminent domain and by taxation. The right of eminent domain and the right of taxation are both founded in necessity. They are rights reserved by the people in their collective capacity over the property of individuals, and therefore are powers inherent in the sovereignty itself. The power of the State over the property of its subjects extends not only to taxation and eminent domain, but also to public morals, public health, police, and probably other public interests, and may be exercised by resuming a portion of such property whenever public exigencies demand it. All such governmental rights have their foundation in the social system, and are necessary for the public weal. Hence the government has power to compel the relinquishment of individual interests when it becomes necessary for the benefit of all. While it is true that eminent domain and taxation rest substantially on the same foundation, and that by either right private property may be taken for public use, there are, nevertheless, important distinctions between the two rights. The power of eminent domain operates on real property principally, and seldom if ever, even in time of war, are the exigencies of government such as to require the taking of money by virtue of this power, and never in time of peace. This, however, seems to result from the title to the landed property being in the body politic, as distinguished from the derivative title of the subject to his property. The doctrine that the nation or the people in their organized capacity own the soil had its origin in antiquity. This prevailed under the feudal system which seems to have originated from the military policy of the Celtic nations, who, at the declension of the Roman Empire, migrated into all the European regions, and, to secure their new acquisitions, obtained by right of conquest, continued in their respective colonies. The lands were allotted by the conquering general to the superior military officers, and by them again parceled out to the inferior officers and most deserving soldiers as a reward for services, conditioned, however, that the possessor would faithfully perform certain stipulated service to his lord. "Allotments thus acquired mutually engaged such as accepted them to defend them; and, as they all sprang from the same right of conquest, no part could subsist independent of the...