Kimberlin v. Hicks
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | ALLEN, Justice. |
| Citation | Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 P.2d 335 (Kan. 1939) |
| Decision Date | 07 October 1939 |
| Docket Number | 34397. |
| Parties | KIMBERLIN v. HICKS et al. |
Aubrey Neale, of Coffeyville, and O. L. O'Brien and Walter L McVey, both of Independence, for appellants.
Chas D. Welch, of Coffeyville, for appellee.
This was an action in partition. A demurrer to plaintiff's amended petition was sustained and plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff and defendants claim under the will of Charles M. Hicks who died October 3, 1920. The will provided:
On August 12, 1938, L. C. Ele by quit claim deed conveyed "the balance of the twenty year period in and to the life estate which I own in and to" the land in question to the defendant O. E. Ele. L. C. Ele died September 13, 1938.
Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of an undivided 77/108 interest in the real estate by virtue of deeds made to him by the "legatees of Charles M. Hicks, deceased;" that plaintiff and certain of the defendants, remaindermen under the will, are entitled to the immediate possession of the land, and asks for partition.
Plaintiff contends that under the will of Charles M. Hicks, the devisee L. C. Ele acquired a right of personal use and occupancy only in the premises; that whatever the nature and extent of his interest it was forfeited by his failure to pay the taxes, by waste committed, by abandonment, and in any event that it was terminated by his death. These theories, urged with sincerity in an elaborate brief, must be examined.
1. What interest or estate did L. C. Ele take under the will?
A motive for giving a substantial interest in the property to this devisee is disclosed in the declaration: "For services rendered me in my lifetime." The first paragraph specifies "a period of twenty years from the date of my death," and the fourth definitely states the gift to the remaindermen is not to arise until "the end of twenty years after my death." Beyond dispute this language is apt and appropriate to create a term of twenty years in Ele. It is contended however that the words "the use, rent free" degrades the estate for years to a right of personal use and occupancy only. We are unable to agree with this contention. As the devisee was to have the use of the land for twenty years without paying rent, necessarily he was to have the avails,--the rents, issues and profits of the land for the term. It has been settled since the time of Lord Coke that a grant or devise of the rents, issues and profits of land passes the land itself.
In Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 484, 72 Am.Dec. 760, it was said: ***"
In Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 154, 45 A. 73, 74, 75 Am.St.Rep. 692, it was said: '
In Lachmund v. Moore, 192 Iowa 980, 981, 181 N.W. 4, it was said: ***"
See, also, Schnack v. City of Larned, 106 Kan. 177, 180, 186 P. 1012; Johnson v. Muller, 149 Kan. 128, 86 P.2d 569; Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28, 210 P. 417; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 292 Ill. 275, 126 N.E. 736; McCoy v. Houck, 180 Ind. 634, 99 N.E. 97.
An estate for years is an estate, the duration of which is fixed in units of a year or multiples or divisions thereof, and we are clear that L. C. Ele received such an estate in the land devised. His interest therein was alienable. Conveyances of land or of any estate or interest therein may be made by deed properly executed. G.S.1935, 67-205. Under our statute of frauds, 33-105, any estate or interest in land, exceeding one year in duration, may be assigned by deed. Under the law of this state any interest in land is subject to voluntary (Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 98, 181 P. 621) and involuntary (Thompson v. Zurich State Bank, 124 Kan. 425, 260 P. 658) alienation. The quit claim deed from L. C. Ele to O. E. Ele effectually conveyed the unexpired portion of the twenty year term.
2. Appellant invokes Sherman v. Critzer, 135 Kan. 579, 11 P.2d 993, quotes at length from that case and asserts that the doctrine there announced requires a reversal in this case. In the Critzer case the testator devised land to his wife for a period of ten years, then to pass to and become the property of his wife and three children in equal shares, and if any child should die before the end of the ten year period, the share of such child to go to his or her children if any, if none, to his or her surviving brother and sister. The wife died two weeks before the testator. The court held the remainders were accelerated into possessory estates.
It is contended that upon the death of L. C. Ele the remainders were accelerated as in the Critzer case. The argument as stated in the brief of appellant runs thus: "If, in the Critzer case, the wife of the testator had lived three weeks longer, which would have been one week after the death of the testator, would not the same argument and rule have been applied-- that is, that there was no one who for the balance of the ten year period would have the use and benefit of the property, and that the remaindermen would be immediately entitled to possession."
Passing for the moment the point that the death of the tenant does not terminate a term of years, there is slight analogy between the Critzer case and the case at bar. This will clearly appear by contrasting the real question there raised with the question now before us.
Whenever prior and succeeding interest in property are created there is a possibility that one or more of the interests may fail to come into existence. An attempted prior interest,--as a life estate, or a term of years,--may fail either by renunciation, or by the death of the devisee, before the testator. Cases where a widow renounces a life estate devised to her, and elects to take under the statute, are common. Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625; Fennell v. Fennell, 80 Kan. 730, 106 P. 1038, 18 Ann.Cas. 471; Pittman v. Pittman, 81 Kan. 643, 107 P. 235, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 602. In Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136 P. 953, L.R.A.1915A, 671, Ann.Cas.1917A, 918, the renunciation was by a life tenant, a grantee under a deed. See Restatement, Property, sections 231 to 235. In the case of the widow's renunciation, that event, for the purpose of construction, is regarded as relating back to the death of the testator, or the delivery of the deed, and the instrument is reconstrued in the light of that fact. Simes, Future Interests, sec. 752. Thus by construction the interest renounced never came into existence.
Likewise where the devisee dies before the testator, the gift fails. In the Critzer case the term of ten years attempted to be created in the widow failed by the death of the widow in the life time of the testator. Hence the remainders limited after extinct life estate, not being subject to a condition precedent (Compare Miller v. Miller, supra), were advanced and became possessory estates.
In the case before us there was no failure of the twenty year term by renunciation or death of the tenant before the testator,--on the contrary the twenty year term vested in Ele and he took possession thereof. Being an estate validly created it could be terminated only in manner provided by...
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In re Gereke's Estate
...beneficiary under the trust is now of no consequence. Her renunciation caused the gift to her to fail at its inception. Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 453, 94 P.2d 335; Ward v. Ward, 153 Kan. 222, 109 P.2d 68, 134 657; and Tomb v. Bardo, supra. V. We notice briefly appellant's complaint'......
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Lario Enterprises, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals
...holding legal title fails the ownership test of 79-201a Second. The nature of an estate for years was addressed in Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 P.2d 335 (1939). The Supreme Court defined an estate for years as "an estate, the duration of which is fixed in units of a year or multiple......
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Hawe v. Hawe
...upon a neglect of their estate.' To the same effect are: Faulks v. Schrider, 69 App.D.C. 137, 99 F.2d 370 (1938); Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 P.2d 335 (1939); Keeler v. McNeir, 184 Okl. 244, 86 P.2d 1004 (1939); Cottrell v. Daniel, 30 Tenn.App. 339, 205 S.W.2d 973 The trial court w......
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Goodan
...proportions, depending upon the source of the property sold. Such a bequest passes absolute title to the land itself. Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 P.2d 335, 337; Lachmund v. Moore, 192 Iowa 980, 181 N.W. 4; Schnack v. City of Larned, 106 Kan. 177, 186 P. 1012, 1014; In re Franck's E......