Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, WINSTON-SALE

CourtCourt of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
Citation103 N.C.App. 77,404 S.E.2d 176
Docket NumberWINSTON-SALE,INC,No. 9021DC425,9021DC425
PartiesKIMZAY, Plaintiff, v. Christine L. JESTER, d/b/a Make Mine Yogurt and Harrell Andrews, d/b/a Make Mine Yogurt, Defendants.
Decision Date21 May 1991

House & Blanco, P.A. by Peter J. Juran, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.

Chester C. Davis, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant Christine L. Jester.

PHILLIPS, Judge.

Though defendant's appeal is dismissible since it is from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right, G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Veasey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1950), to prevent manifest injustice to the appellant, and to expedite the end of this overly litigated matter, which was legally set at rest more than nineteen months ago when the default judgment was satisfied, we suspend the rules under the provisions of Rule 2 of our appellate rules and treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari made pursuant to Rule 21(a) and grant it. For the order undertaking to relieve plaintiff from the amount of the judgment and reopen the case for hearings is erroneous for several reasons, plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything further of defendant, and if the case is not terminated now she, the trial court and this Court will be further burdened and inconvenienced by it to no purpose.

The first reason the order is erroneous is because the court had no authority to enter it. The order neither set aside the default judgment nor relieved plaintiff of it as Rules 55(d) and 60(b), N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, authorize upon good cause being shown; instead, it keeps the judgment in effect and permits it to be enlarged, which no rule or statute authorizes. Though the only basis for the default judgment was that a "sum certain" was then due plaintiff from defendant, Rule 55(b)(1), N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, the order left the default judgment standing while permitting its base to be destroyed by the recovery of future debts. This contradictory, incongruous directive is in the nature of permitting plaintiff to retain its cake after eating it, which is no more possible in court than elsewhere. Under similar circumstances our Supreme Court said: "Neither Rule 60(b)(6) nor any other provision of law authorizes a court to nullify or avoid one or more of the legal effects of a valid judgment while leaving the judgment itself intact." Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 91, 361 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1987).

The second reason the order is erroneous is because our law does not permit a party to claim that a judgment is defective after relying upon its validity and accepting its benefits. Draughon v. Draughon, 94 N.C.App. 597, 380 S.E.2d 547 (1989). In this case, after petitioning the court to enter the...

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11 cases
  • Wolfe v. Villines
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 2005
    ...appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and grant the petition. See N.C.R.App. P. 2, Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C.App. 77, 79, 404 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1991). Defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whethe......
  • County of Durham v. Daye
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 3, 2009
    ...a Rule 60 motion if that order does not "set aside" the judgment or "relieve[] [the moving party] of it." Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C.App. 77, 79, 404 S.E.2d 176, 177, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 497, 407 S.E.2d 534 (1991). The Eighth Circuit has similarly held with resp......
  • Brown v. City of Winston-Salem
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 5, 2005
    ...appellate court to permit review ... when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists...."); Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C.App. 77, 79, 404 S.E.2d 176, 177 (using Rule 2 to treat an appeal from an interlocutory order as a petition for a writ of certiorari), disc. r......
  • RUTHERFORD MANAGEMENT CORP. v. TOWN OF COLUMBUS
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 4, 2005
    ...to treat the Town's appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari under Rule 21(a)(1) and allow it. See Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C. App. 77, 79, 404 S.E.2d 176, 177, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 497, 407 S.E.2d 534 (1991). I The Town first argues "that the trial court erre......
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