Kinard v. Centurion of Fla., LLC

• Decision Date: 30 June 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:19-cv-490-J-34JRK
• Parties: ROY DAVID KINARD, Plaintiff, v. CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

ROY DAVID KINARD, Plaintiff, v. CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-490-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

June 30, 2020

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Roy Kinard, an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, initiated this action on April 29, 2019,¹ by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kinard is proceeding on a first amended complaint (First Amended Complaint; Doc. 70), filed, with the assistance of counsel, on November 1, 2019. In the First Amended Complaint, Kinard names as defendants the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), Centurion of Florida, LLC (Centurion), and Corizon Health, Inc. (Corizon). Kinard, who alleges he suffers from the hepatitis C virus (HCV), argues that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act(RA) when they allegedly created and implemented a cost-savings policy that sanctioned the denial of medically necessary treatment for Kinard's HCV infection. As relief, Kinard seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees and costs. Before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Defendant Corizon Health, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Corizon Motion; Doc. 77); Motion by Florida Department of Corrections to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (FDOC Motion; Doc. 88); and Centurion of Florida, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Count III of the First Amended Complaint (Centurion Motion; Doc. 89). Kinard filed responses in opposition to the motions. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant Corizon Health Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Response to Corizon Motion; Doc. 81); Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant Florida Department of Corrections' Motion to Dismiss (Response to FDOC Motion; Doc. 90); and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to the Defendant Centurion of Florida, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Response to Centurion Motion; Doc. 91). Each Defendant filed a reply to Kinard's responses. See Defendant Corizon Health, Inc.'s Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (Corizon Reply; Doc. 87); Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss (FDOC Reply; Doc. 97); and Defendant Centurion of Florida, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Centurion Reply; Doc. 98). The Motion is ripe for review.

II. Kinard's Allegations

In the First Amended Complaint, Kinard asserts three claims. First Amended Complaint at 20-29. As Count One, Kinard alleges that his HCV diagnosis constitutes a disability under the ADA. He contends the FDOC violated the ADA by discriminating against him based on his disability when it withheld medical treatment in the form of direct-acting antiviral drugs (DAA) from him, while not withholding medical treatment fromprisoners with other disabilities or who are not disabled. Id. at 20-24. In Count Two, Kinard alleges that FDOC violated the RA when it excluded Kinard from receiving DAA based on his HCV disability. Id. at 25-26. Lastly, in Count Three Kinard contends that Corizon and Centurion exhibited deliberatele indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when they refused to prescribe him DAA to treat his HCV. Id. at 27-29. Underlying all three claims is Kinard's assertion that Defendants created and implemented a cost-savings policy that resulted in the denial of DAA to prisoners diagnosed with HCV, despite the fact that treatment with DAA is more effective than other treatments and has been the standard of care for treatment of HCV since 2014. Id. at 5-19.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim hasfacial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed," Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), "'this leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.'" Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App'x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)² (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11thCir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 706).

IV. Eighth Amendment Standard

Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment "imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). "To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official's conduct." Oliver v. Fuhrman, 739 F. App'x 968, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Under the objective component, a prisoner must allege a condition that is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. The challenged condition must be extreme and must pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's future health or safety. Id. The Eighth Amendment guarantees that prisoners are provided with a minimal civilized level of life's basic necessities. Id.

Under the subjective component, a prisoner must allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate indifference. Id. This means the prisoner must show that the prison officials: (1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) displayed conduct that is more than mere negligence. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 969-70. "To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

As it relates to medical care, "[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.'" Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that

To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, [a plaintiff] must show: "(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.2009). To establish deliberate indifference, [a plaintiff] must prove "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence." Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir.2010) (alteration in original). The defendants must have been "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]" and then actually draw that inference. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted).

Easley v. Dep't of Corr., 590 F. App'x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014). "For medical treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be 'so grossly incompetent,...