Kinard v. Kinard, Civil Action No. 10–cv–01960–PAB–KMT.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–cv–01960–PAB–KMT. |
| Parties | Lu Celia KINARD, Plaintiff, v. Cynthia Rothrock KINARD, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Walter A. Kinard, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brett Emil Myers, Robert G. Frie, Frie, Arndt & Danborn P.C., Arvada, CO, for Plaintiff.
Stuart Scott Lasher, Hinds and Hinds Family Law, P.C., Greenwood Village, CO, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Lu Celia Kinard's motion for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 35, 77] and defendant Cynthia Rothrock Kinard's cross motion for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 68, 81].1 The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1), North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (“North American”) filed an interpleader complaint August 17, 2010, naming plaintiff and defendant as defendants because they had filed conflicting claims to a life insurance policy issued by North American. On August 18, 2010, 2010 WL 3307363, the Court granted [Docket No. 4] North American's motion to deposit the disputed amount of $409,926.19, including accrued interest, into the Registry of the Court [Docket No. 3]. By order dated April 21, 2011 [Docket No. 61], the Court dismissed North American from this action and realigned the parties.
The life insurance policy at issue in this case was issued to Walter Alan Kinard (“Kinard”). Plaintiff Lu Celia Kinard married Kinard in 1974. They divorced on October 24, 2002 pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (the “divorce decree”) issued by the District Court of Jefferson County, Colorado. See Docket No. 77–1. The divorce decree incorporated by reference a Separation Agreement, see Docket No. 77–2, between plaintiff and Kinard. The Separation Agreement provided, among other things, that [Kinard] shall continue [plaintiff] as sole beneficiary under his North American Life Insurance Company level term life insurance policy and will continue to pay the premium thereon. This policy is intended to provide the approximate equivalent of the amount of maintenance and child support to [plaintiff] that would be lost in the event of [Kinard's] death. [Kinard] shall have the option of substituting a decreasing amount of life insurance under another plan of life insurance on his life at his option. [Kinard's] obligation to continue [plaintiff] as beneficiary of this life insurance policy shall terminate when [Kinard] shall no longer be obligated to pay child support and maintenance under this agreement.
Docket No. 77–2 at 8. In June 2003, Kinard signed a Beneficiary and Owner Change Request Form making defendant the beneficiary of the North American policy. As of June 2003, Kinard's child support and maintenance obligations had yet to terminate. By the time of his death on September 12, 2009, Kinard's child support obligation had already been fulfilled. Had he lived, he would have been required to pay maintenance to plaintiff for an additional fourteen months.
In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that, because Kinard's change of the beneficiary of the North American policy violated the Separation Agreement, his attempt to do so had no legal effect. Consequently, plaintiff argues that she is entitled to all of the life insurance proceeds. Defendant, in her cross-motion, agrees that Kinard was not permitted to change the beneficiary in the manner he did. However, defendant contends that the policy was intended as security for Kinard's maintenance and child support obligations. Therefore, argues defendant, plaintiff should receive the total amount of maintenance plaintiff lost on account of Kinard's death, with defendant receiving the remainder.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir.1994); see also Ross v. The Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico, 599 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir.2010). A disputed fact is “material” if under the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir.2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & County of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir.2005). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1997). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; see McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 715 (10th Cir.2010). However, where, as here, there are cross motions for summary judgment, the reasonable inferences drawn from affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions are rendered in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party. Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 425 (10th Cir.2004). Furthermore, “[w]hen the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, we are entitled to assume that no evidence needs to be considered other than that filed by the parties, but summary judgment is nevertheless inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The parties dispute the implication of the Separation Agreement on their respective entitlement to the life insurance proceeds. The Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and, therefore, will apply state law to the parties' dispute over the insurance proceeds. See 7 Wright, Miller, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1713 (3d ed. 2001) (); see generally Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348 (10th Cir.1965). The Separation Agreement provides that it “shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Colorado.” Docket No. 81–3 at 13, § 19.11.
Under Colorado law, “[i]nterpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the court.” In re Marriage of Thomason, 802 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Colo.App.1990) (citing Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1984)). The Court must “ascertain the parties' intent at the time of execution, and that intent is determined primarily from the instrument itself.” In re Marriage of Sinkovich, 830 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo.App.1992) (citing Hefley Ranch, Inc. v. Stewart, 764 P.2d 415 (Colo.App.1988)). “Parol evidence of intent is generally admissible only if the contract terms are ambiguous.” Id. (citing In re Marriage of Piper, 820 P.2d 1198 (Colo.App.1991)). Here, the parties have not submitted any parol evidence and, having filed cross motions for summary judgment, both contend that the Court can determine entitlement to the proceeds as a matter of law from examination of the instrument itself. See Atlantic Richfield Co., 226 F.3d at 1148 () (internal quotation marks omitted). “The sole fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of the terms of a contract does not itself create an ambiguity.” In re Marriage of Thomason, 802 P.2d at 1190.
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to the entirety of the life insurance proceeds because Kinard, as of the time of his death, was obligated to maintain her as the policy's beneficiary. Defendant argues that the insurance policy served only as security for Kinard's child support and maintenance obligations and, therefore, plaintiff's interest in the policy is limited to the amount of maintenance plaintiff did not receive due to Kinard's death.
The parties have not cited a Colorado case on the precise issue presented here. In Konczyk v. Konczyk, 367 N.J.Super. 551, 843 A.2d 1190, 1195 (2003), the court similarly noted that, “[u]nfortunately, there are no cases in New Jersey that squarely address the issue ... where the obligor died, alimony is to be paid for a specified timeframe and the insurance policy considerably exceeds the remaining obligation.” In this case, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff, as a “person who is required to be named as the beneficiary of life insurance under a divorce decree[,] has a vested equitable interest in such life insurance.” Konczyk, 843 A.2d at 1196 (citing 22 Causes of Action § 463, Sec. 2). The parties disagree, however, as to “the amount of that equitable interest.” Konczyk, 843 A.2d at 1196.
“[I]n cases where the insurance obligation functions as security for the support obligation, courts in other states have shown a willingness to limit payment of insurance proceeds to conform with the underlying obligation and avoid a windfall to the supported spouse or his/her estate.” Id.; see 22 Causes of Action § 463, Sec. 2 ( ...
To continue reading
Request your trial