Kincade v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Decision Date | 25 November 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 75-187-NA-CV.,75-187-NA-CV. |
Parties | Bobby Lee KINCADE, et al. v. The FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
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Avon N. Williams, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., Jack Greenberg, Barry Goldstein, New York City, David A. Copus, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Daniel Karnes, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio, William N. Ozier, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for defendant.
This is an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. At the time the complaint in this matter was filed, the original named plaintiffs fell into the following categories. Plaintiffs Joseph Johnson, Bobby W. Ivy, Emily Henry, and Alice Gail Cook were unsuccessful black applicants for employment at defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber Company's ("Firestone") LaVergne, Tennessee, manufacturing plant. Plaintiffs James O'Dell Hunter and Mary Louise Pope (Fite) were current black employees at the plant. Plaintiffs Bobby Lee Kincade, Thelma M. McHenry and Sharon McHenry were former black employees at the plant. In addition, in an Order entered May 17, 1986, this Court, through the Honorable L. Clure Morton, Chief District Judge, certified the plaintiffs as representatives of a class comprised of the following three subclasses:
Also named as a plaintiff was the Nashville Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP").
The nonjury trial of this case was held intermittently beginning on June 23, 1980 and ending on February 28, 1983. This Memorandum constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Court first considers plaintiffs' claims of class-wide racial discrimination. It then considers individual claims of discrimination by the individual named plaintiffs in this action.
The Court now considers plaintiffs' claims of class discrimination. In support of these claims, plaintiffs rely upon testimony of members of the class and a statistical analysis of the relationship between race and Firestone's employment practices. The Court examines Firestone's employment practices in three separate categories: (1) recruitment, hiring and initial assignments; (2) promotions; and (3) disciplinary actions and discharge practices. For each category, the Court begins by making findings of fact, including a review of the statistical evidence presented by both parties. It then makes conclusions of law with respect to class claims pertaining to each category. Thus, the Court's discussion of plaintiffs' class claims proceeds as follows:
Plaintiffs allege discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The objectives of Title VII are clearly delineated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), which make it unlawful:
Two judicial theories have been articulated by the Supreme Court to effectuate these objectives. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Court enunciated the disparate treatment theory, and in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), the Court articulated the disparate impact theory. Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
Id. Thus, these theories merely present alternative foundations upon which a court may base liability.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
This statute reaches only conduct motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and does not apply to practices that merely have a disparate impact on a particular class. General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-91, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3148-3150, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982). The standards for evaluating a plaintiff's claim of purposeful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are the same as those applied to a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII. Long v. Ford Motor Company, 496 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir.1974).
The Court now examines the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories as they apply to class actions.
To prove class-wide disparate treatment, plaintiffs must show a "systemwide pattern or practice" of intentional discrimination. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-1855. They must show Id. (footnote omitted).
The means by which plaintiffs in a class action claiming disparate treatment can meet their burden of proof was articulated by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). In Franks plaintiffs made out a prima facie case by introducing proof of a discriminatory pattern and practice sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption that defendant's decisions were the result of such a pattern or practice. Id. at 773, 96 S.Ct. at 1268. The nature of this presumption was discussed by the Teamsters Court as follows:
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