Kincade v. MAC CORP.

• Decision Date: 26 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0201-CV-8.,49A02-0201-CV-8.
• Citation: 773 N.E.2d 909
• Parties: Amy KINCADE and Rick Kincade, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MAC CORPORATION, Paul I. Cripe, and Muller Welding Company, Inc., d/b/a Muller Rentals, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

773 N.E.2d 909

Amy KINCADE and Rick Kincade, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MAC CORPORATION, Paul I. Cripe, and Muller Welding Company, Inc., d/b/a Muller Rentals, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 49A02-0201-CV-8.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 26, 2002.

D. Robert Webster, Bamberger & Feibleman, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellants.

Jeffrey S. Zipes, Matthew L. Hinkle, Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C., Carmel, IN, Attorneys for Appellee MAC Corporation.

Julia Blackwell Gelinas, James Dimos, Allison S. Avery, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Paul I. Cripe, Inc.

Rodney Tucker, Christopher M. Keefer, Law Offices of Citizens Insurance, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Muller Welding Company, Inc., d/b/a Muller Rentals.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Amy Kincade ("Amy") and Rick Kincade ("Rick") (collectively "the Kincades") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of three defendants, MAC Corporation (MAC), Paul I. Cripe (Cripe), and Muller Welding Company, Inc., d/b/a Muller Rentals (Muller) (collectively "the defendants"), on the Kincades' negligence claim. The Kincades raise six issues; however, we find dispositive the following: whether there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether any of the defendants proximately caused Amy's injuries.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 1997, Amy was working at the Kroger store in Fishers, Indiana. Near the end of her twelve-hour shift, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Amy sustained injuries when she fell on steps leading to the store's trash compactor.

The compacting device is located at the rear exterior of the store. In order to access it and dispose of trash, one must ascend a pre-cast set of two concrete stairs leading to a concrete platform three and one-half feet by four feet in size. At the time of the accident, the platform had no handrails. A steel door allows access to a chute and the compactor. To open the door, an individual would remove a pin with one hand and open the steel door with the other hand. Upon removal of the pin, the door then would spring open three to four inches toward the person. Because the platform did not provide enough room for the person to stand and open the door simultaneously, the individual was required to step back to the first stair below the platform when opening the steel door.

On the day she was injured, Amy had reached the top of the platform and had pulled out the pin, while holding the door closed with the other hand. She started to take a step back to open the steel door, which was still shut, when her feet slid out from under her, and she fell backward down the two steps sustaining injuries.

Amy filed a negligence suit, asserting that the trash compactor system was inherently and unreasonably dangerous as it was designed, installed, constructed, and/or maintained and that as a proximate result she suffered damages. Her husband, Rick, claimed a loss of services and consortium. The Kincades named as defendants, among others, MAC, the manufacturer of the trash compactor, Muller, the installer of the trash compactor system, including the chute and steel door, and Cripe, the architectural firm that provided design services to Kroger for the construction of its Fishers store. Sometime after the installation of the compactor system, Kroger hired Keen Specialty Company ("Keen") to install the set of pre-cast stairs and platform that led to the steel door. Keen employed Rick, who installed the set of stairs upon which his wife was later injured.

MAC and Cripe each moved for summary judgment, and the court granted their motions after hearing. Thereafter, Muller moved for summary judgment, which the trial court likewise granted.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The Kincades assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to each of the defendants. On appeal, we apply the same standard as the trial court when reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment. Hayden v. Paragon Steakhouse, 731 N.E.2d 456, 457 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). The granting of summary judgment requires that the moving party establish two factors: (1) the designated evidentiary material shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Hayden, 731 N.E.2d at 457. If the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to respond with specifically designated facts that establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Hayden, 731 N.E.2d at 457-58. A presumption of validity clothes a trial court's grant of summary judgment, and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating to this court that the trial court's action was erroneous. Id. at 458. However, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure the non-movant was not improperly denied his day in court. Id.

In this case, the trial court entered summary judgment on the Kincades' negligence claim. The tort of negligence consists of three elements: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by that breach. Id. Negligence will not be inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence action must be supported by specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable inferences that might be drawn from those facts. Id. (citing Miller v. Monsanto Co., 626 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind.Ct.App.1993)). An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more than speculation or conjecture. Id.

A negligence action is generally not appropriate for disposal by summary judgment. Miller, 626 N.E.2d at 541. However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. The Mike Madrid Co., 734 N.E.2d 1048, 1052 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (2001). While proximate cause is generally a question of fact, it becomes a question of law where only a single conclusion can be drawn from the facts. City of Indianapolis Housing Auth. v. Pippin, 726 N.E.2d 341, 347 (Ind. Ct.App.2000); Basicker ex rel. Johnson v. Denny's, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. The Kincades allege that each defendant breached a duty of care to Amy, and, further, that a factual dispute exists as to the proximate cause of the accident, thereby precluding summary judgment. While there may be a factual dispute as to what caused Amy's injuries, there is no question of fact as to whether any of the defendants caused her injuries. Because we find there is no evidence that the defendants proximately caused the accident, we do not reach the Kincades' duty or breach arguments.

A review of the designated materials¹ reveals that Amy did not know what caused her fall. On some occasions, she testified that she fell on the stairs in apprehension of the steel door opening toward her, Appellants' Appendix at 158, 226, and, similarly, that the manner in which the door opened caused her to fall. Id. at 277. See also id. at 259-60; Transcript of 8-6-01 at 18; Transcript of 12-3-01 at 7. Amy also explained that while there was nothing on the bottom of her work boots at the time of the incident that may have caused her fall, the stairs had a tendency to "get stuff all over them." She testified:

Q...