Kincaid v. Sturdevant

• Citation: 437 F.Supp.2d 1219
• Decision Date: 07 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-2418-JWL.,05-2418-JWL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
• Parties: Jennifer K. KINCAID, Plaintiff, v. Stacey STURDEVANT, et al., Defendants.

437 F.Supp.2d 1219

Jennifer K. KINCAID, Plaintiff, v. Stacey STURDEVANT, et al., Defendants.

No. 05-2418-JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

July 7, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Christopher P. Lawson, Lawson Law Office, LLC, Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiff.

Charlie J. Harris, Jr., Sharon A. Stallbaumer, Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, Carole K. Dewald, David Lee Heinemann, Shank & Hamilton, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jennifer Kincaid filed suit in Kansas state court on September 7, 2005, alleging claims for defamation and wrongful eviction. The matter subsequently was removed to this court by Ms. Sturdevant, the manager at plaintiffs former apartment building. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on November 30, 2005. In addition to Ms. Sturdevant, she named as defendants in the case the so-called "AIMCO defendants."¹ The new complaint also added seventeen new claims. In all, plaintiff has alleged nineteen claims against Ms. Sturdevant and the AIMCO defendants (together, "the defendants").²

This matter comes before the court on the partial motions to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Ms. Sturdevant (doc. 20) and the AIMCO defendants (doc. 49). As explained below, the motions are granted in part and denied part. Specifically, the motions to dismiss are granted as to count 5 (Americans with Disabilities Act), count 6 (Kansas Human Rights Act), count 7 (Kansas Consumer Protection Act), count 14 (defamation), count 15 (fraud), count 16 (negligent misrepresentation), count 18 as to Ms. Sturdevant (negligent hiring and retention), and count 19 (assault). The motions to dismiss are denied, however, as to count 8 (breach of contract), count 9 (intentional infliction of emotional distress), count 11 (breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment), count 12 (wrongful eviction), count 13 (retaliatory eviction), and count 17 (conversion).

BACKGROUND

This suit arises out Ms. Kincaid's eviction from her residence at Central Park Towers ("CPT"), an apartment complex in Kansas City, Kansas. Plaintiff resided at CPT from May 1, 2003, until her eviction became effective on February 1, 2005. The defendants allege that they evicted her based on eight lease violations, including: (1) disturbing and/or harassing other residents; (2) failure to obey quiet hours; (3) cursing at management; (4) permitting prohibited persons to enter the property; and (5) allowing guests to participate in drunk and disorderly conduct. Based on these combined violations, the defendants issued plaintiff a notice of eviction on October 18, 2004. The defendants then obtained an order of eviction from the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, on January 19, 2005. Based on the judgment issued by that court, plaintiff was ordered to surrender possession of her residence at CPT as of February 1, 2005.

Plaintiff, in response to the defendants' actions, alleges that she was wrongfully evicted from her apartment in CPT, a public housing facility, because Ms. Sturdevant targeted her based on the mixed race of plaintiffs daughter and the race of plaintiffs boyfriend at the time. Plaintiff contends that the AIMCO defendants are liable for the actions of their manager, Ms. Sturdevant, whom plaintiff alleges is an overt member of the Ku Klux Klan. As a result of Ms. Sturdevant's and the AIMCO defendants' malicious efforts in concocting eight false lease violations, which plaintiff alleges she was given all at once so that she could not avoid being evicted, plaintiff alleges that she has suffered a variety of physical, mental, and economic damages.

At issue now are many of the claims raised by plaintiff in her amended complaint. As a preliminary matter, through her response briefs plaintiff has withdrawn against all the defendants her claims in count 5 (Americans with Disabilities Act), count 6 (Kansas Human Rights Act), count 7 (Kansas Consumer Protection Act), and count 14 (defamation). The motions to dismiss those claims are therefore granted as unopposed. In addition, plaintiff has clarified that count 18 (negligent hiring and retention) applies only to the AIMCO defendants. Thus, the motion to dismiss count 18 is granted as to Ms. Sturdevant.

The defendants' partial motions to dismiss target several other claims. They initially assert that based on the prior eviction judgment entered in Kansas state court against plaintiff, the claims in count 8 (breach of contract), count 12 (wrongful eviction), and count 13 (retaliatory eviction) are all barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. They also attack as deficient as a matter of law the claims alleged in count 9 (intentional infliction of emotional distress), count 11 (breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment), count 15 (fraud), count 16 (negligent misrepresentation), count 17 (conversion), and count 19 (assault).

LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his [or her] claims which would entitle him [or her] to relief," Aspenwood Investment Co. v. Martinez, 355 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)), or when an issue of law is dispositive. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir.2003). The issue in resolving a motion is "not whether [the] plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)).

ANALYSIS

Following the order of the parties' motions, the court will now address the counts of plaintiffs amended complaint attacked in the partial motions to dismiss.

Counts 8, 12, and 13—Collateral Estoppel

The defendants initially argue that count 8 (breach of contract), count 12 (wrongful eviction), and count 13 (retaliatory eviction) are all barred based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. They contend that because the legality of plaintiffs eviction is confirmed in a Kansas state court judgment, then plaintiff may not attempt to re-litigate in this forum any of the issues decided by that prior judgment.

In deciding whether to give preclusive effect to the prior state court judgment, the court would usually determine whether state law or federal law principles control the inquiry. That choice, however, would be without consequence here, as both paths produce an identical conclusion. Because "`Kansas law does not appear to differ significantly from the federal law regarding preclusion doctrines,' Kansas courts specifically look to Supreme Court and circuit law to decide application of the doctrines." Woodard, 18 Fed.Appx. 706, 712-13 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Grimmett v. S & W Auto Sales Co., 26 Kan.App.2d 482, 988 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Kan.App.1999)). "Thus, in this case, the outcome is the same whether we apply federal law or [Kansas] law to the question of collateral estoppel." Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975, 978 (10th Cir.1995). Adhering to that guidance, the court will apply federal common law and Kansas law interchangeably in this context.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from re-litigating an issue that was actually litigated and determined in a prior action. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Aselco, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 28 Kan.App.2d 839, 849, 21 P.3d 1011 (2001). More specifically, "[t]he doctrine precludes a court from reconsidering an issue previously decided in a prior action where (1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action." B-S Steel Of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas Industries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 662 (10th Cir.2006); see also In re City of Wichita, 277 Kan. 487, 506, 86 P.3d 513 (2004) (citing Waterview Resolution Corp. v. Allen, 274 Kan. 1016, 1023, 58 P.3d 1284 (2002)).

In this matter, the defendants have not established the first element of collateral estoppel; they have not shown that the same issues in this case were "actually litigated" in the prior eviction proceeding. It is true that "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case." Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Intern., Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). But in arguing collateral estoppel based on a prior judgment, it is essential to show the precise contours, if not the exact language, of that prior judgment. Indeed, the linchpin to issue preclusion is a clear demonstration of what was "actually litigated" in the matter below; the doctrine applies "only `[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.'" B-S Steel Of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas Industries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 662 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414, 120 S.Ct....