Kinder v. Coleman & Yates Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 02 September 1997
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 95-167-A.
• Citation: 974 F.Supp. 868
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: Lee KINDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COLEMAN & YATES COAL CO., et al., Defendants.

Page 868

974 F.Supp. 868

Lee KINDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COLEMAN & YATES COAL CO., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 95-167-A.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Abingdon Division.

September 2, 1997.

Lawrence L. Moise, III, Vinyard & Moise, Abingdon, VA, for plaintiff Lee Kinder.

John F. Corcoran, U.S. Attorney's Office, Roanke, VA, Ronald Gurka, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Sol., Arlington, VA, James V. Blair, Caryl L. Casden, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Arlington, VA, for intervenor-plaintiff Stuart Glassman.

Joseph Wisler Bowman, Street, Street, Street, Scott & Bowman, Grundy, VA, Stanford Thomas Mullins, Grundy, VA, Mark E. Solomons, Michael Robert Goodstein, Arter & Hadden, Washington, DC, for defendants.

OPINION

JONES, District Judge.

The defendants, a coal company and its insurer, have moved to dismiss this action to enforce an administrative penalty awarded against the company due to its late payment of black lung benefits. The defendants contend that enforcement is barred by the relevant limitations periods, and, alternatively, that the intervening plaintiff lacks standing. The plaintiff, a former employee, and the intervening plaintiff, a government official who administers black lung claims, contend either that no limitations period applies, or that the action is timely under the relevant limitations period to be borrowed from federal law or, alternatively, from state law. The plaintiff also asserts, under a separate enforcement provision, that his action is not barred by that provision's one year limitations period. I hold that the action is untimely under either enforcement provision and will grant the motion to dismiss on this basis.¹

I. Factual Background.

On July 2, 1975, the plaintiff, Lee Kinder, a former employee of Coleman & Yates Coal Company ("Coleman"),² filed a federal workers' compensation claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA"), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp.1997). Following a formal hearing, a Department of Labor administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a decision, dated December 9, 1986, requiring Coleman to begin paying monthly benefits and to pay retroactive benefits, covering the July 1975-January 1987 time period, in the amount of $74,653. This decision was filed with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs District Director ("District Director") on December 17, 1986.

Although Coleman began paying monthly benefits in February, 1987, it refused to pay any retroactive benefits, pending its appeal to the Benefits Review Board. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ("Fund"),³ paid Kinder $74,653, the amount of the retroactive benefits that Coleman refused to pay. On October 25, 1988, the Benefits Review Board vacated the ALJ's order and remanded the case. In response, Coleman discontinued its provision of monthly benefits in November, 1988. The ALJ issued a second decision, dated February 16, 1989, and filed with the District Director on March 2, 1989, ordering Coleman to recommence monthly benefits and to pay retroactive benefits in the amount of $4,347.30, for the period of November, 1988 through February, 1989.⁴ Coleman resumed monthly payments to Kinder in June, 1989, but again refused to make any retroactive payments pending its appeal to the Benefits Review Board. These retroactive benefits were paid by the Fund in September, 1991.⁵

On July 30, 1991, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's second benefits award and, subsequently, Coleman reimbursed the Fund for the retroactive benefits paid to Kinder, totaling $79,000.30. On March 17, 1992, the District Director,⁶ sua sponte, issued a "supplemental award of benefits," requiring Coleman to pay Kinder $15,800.06, representing a twenty percent penalty due to its failure to make timely payments of the retroactive benefits.

Kinder filed this action on October 6, 1995, seeking to enforce the March 17, 1992, supplemental award of benefits, pursuant to section 918(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C.A. § 918(a) (West 1986), a provision incorporated into the BLBA pursuant to 30 U.S.C.A. § 932(a) (West 1986). On March 4, 1996, the District Director moved to intervene as a plaintiff and sought to enforce the supplemental award of benefits under section 921(d) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(d) (West 1986), another incorporated enforcement provision.⁷ By order of March 7, 1996, this intervention was permitted.

The defendants now move for dismissal on the ground that the action is barred by the one year statute of limitations contained in section 918(a),⁸ and, in the absence of an express limitations period in section 921(d), by Virginia's general or "catch-all" one year statute of limitations. Alternatively, the defendants contend that the District Director lacks standing to bring this action. The plaintiffs have raised numerous arguments in response to the defendants' assertions. Briefs and oral argument have been presented and the defendants' motions are ready for decision.

II. Black Lung Claims Procedure.

Prior to addressing the merits of the defendants' motion, some discussion of the procedural framework for the adjudication and enforcement of black lung claims is necessary. The BLBA established a comprehensive scheme designed to compensate miners for medical problems and disabilities related to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp.1997). Claims under the BLBA are processed by the Secretary of Labor,⁹ in accordance with the procedural provisions of the LHWCA, as incorporated into the BLBA. 30 U.S.C.A. § 932(a) (West 1986).

These provisions favor the prompt resolution of claims and enforcement of compensation awards. Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Barry, 41 F.3d 903, 907 (3d Cir.1994) (noting that purpose of the LHWCA is to place a "compensation award in the hands of the entitled claimant as soon as possible"). Once a claim arises and notice is provided, an employer must either pay or contest the claim within fourteen days. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(a)-(d) (West 1986). If a claim is contested, upon the request of an interested party, a District Director¹⁰ must order a hearing before an ALJ. 33 U.S.C.A. § 919(c) (West 1986). During this interim period, an employer is under no obligation to pay a disputed claim.¹¹ However, after an ALJ has made an award, payment must be made within thirty days of the award's "effective" date, regardless of whether the employer chooses to appeal the award.¹² 33 U.S.C.A. § 918(a) (West 1986). An award is effective once it is filed in a District Director's office. 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(a) (West 1986). An effective award becomes "final" after thirty days, if the employer fails to appeal, or after the employer has exhausted its appeals. Id.

The LHWCA contains separate provisions for the enforcement of effective and final awards in the event of an employer's default. Section 918(a) governs enforcement after a default on an effective award. An employer is in default, for the purposes of section 918(a), if payment has not occurred within thirty days of the award's effective date, the date of filing with the District Director. 33 U.S.C.A. § 918(a) (West 1986). Within one year of the default, an employee¹³ may obtain, from the District Director, a "supplementary order" declaring the amount in default and may then file this order with a district court which will enter "judgment" for that amount. Id. A supplementary order issued under section 918(a) is not subject to administrative appeal, and review of the order is limited to the district court's assessment, prior to enforcement, of whether the award was issued "in accordance with law."¹⁴ Id.

A "final" order is enforceable under section 921(d). Under this provision, any beneficiary or the District Director may apply to a district court for enforcement of a final order. 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(d) (West 1986). Section 921(d) provides that a district court "shall enforce obedience to the order by writ of injunction or by other proper process ... to enjoin ... compliance with the order." Id. Section 921(d) contains no express statute of limitations for such an enforcement action. Cassell v. Taylor, 243 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C.Cir. 1957).

The LHWCA also seeks to encourage prompt payments by penalizing employers who delay in meeting their obligations. Section 914(f) imposes an automatic penalty of twenty percent of an underlying compensation award in the event that an employer fails to pay the award within ten days of its effective date. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(f) (West 1986); Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 782 F.2d 1217, 1222 (5th Cir.1985). Section 914(f) does not specifically provide for the issuance or enforcement of a penalty award. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(f) (West 1986); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 765 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir.1985).

Section 914(f) penalty assessments have been interpreted as more logically enforceable through the issuance of a supplementary order under section 918(a), rather than pursuant to section 921(d). Providence Washington Ins. Co., 765 F.2d at 1386. Courts, however, have not precluded the enforcement of a section 914(f) penalty under section 921(d), Reid v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 41 F.3d 200, 202 (4th Cir.1994), but have noted that section 918(a) enforcement "far better meets the Congressional purpose of a quick and streamlined mechanism for the collection of compensation under the LHWCA." Providence Washington Ins. Co., 765 F.2d at 1385.

III. Section 918(a) Claim.

Kinder attempts to resurrect his section 918(a) action by relying on a unique construction of the procedural provisions of the LHWCA. Under Kinder's reasoning, his compensation awards were not "due and payable" until after the Benefits Review Board decision of July 30, 1991. By extension, the District Director's March, 1992 decision, allegedly initiating his enforcement action, occurred within one year of Coleman's default on these...