Kindness v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., Civ. A. No. 86-1634.
| Decision Date | 09 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-1634. |
| Citation | 716 F. Supp. 1538 |
| Parties | Michael KINDNESS, Plaintiff, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION; Donald J. Spang and Robert A. Yohe, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Michael Kindness, Harrisburg, Pa., pro se.
Mary Jane Forbes, Jason S. Shapiro, McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pa., for Donald Spang, Robert A. Yohe, and Bethlehem Steel Corp.
The undisputed facts are as follows. At all times relevant to this action plaintiff was employed as a millwright by Bethlehem Steel Corporation ("the corporation") at the corporation's Steelton plant in Steelton, Pennsylvania. Defendants Robert A. Yohe and Donald J. Spang were employed as managers at the corporation's Steelton plant.
Plaintiff's employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement, dated March 1, 1983, to which plaintiff's union, the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 1688 ("the Union"), and the corporation were parties.
On August 16, 1984, Spang was told by Yohe of an alleged incident of fighting between plaintiff and another employee, Clarence White. Allegedly, plaintiff grabbed White's head in a hammerlock hold, injuring White's right eye and damaging his eye glasses. At the conclusion of the corporation's investigation, plaintiff was notified, in accordance with the requirements of the bargaining agreement, of management's decision to suspend him with intent to discharge him.1 Plaintiff informed Spang, by written notice, he would appeal management's decision. Plaintiff was then sent a letter which stated the reasons for his discharge.
A discharge hearing was conducted on August 31, 1984 before a hearing officer. Plaintiff, the Union and Spang were in attendance. The hearing officer, in a memorandum to Spang dated September 5, 1984, recommended plaintiff not be discharged but suspended for thirty (30) days without pay. Management adopted this recommendation, and notified plaintiff in writing on or about September 6, 1984.
The Union filed a grievance on behalf of plaintiff on or about September 10, 1984. Plaintiff was represented by the Union throughout. Plaintiff's grievance was ultimately denied, and the Union appealed plaintiff's grievance to arbitration.
The arbitration hearing was held on January 20, 1986 before an umpire. Plaintiff was represented by the Union and the Union was represented by counsel. Spang and Yohe testified as to what they learned during the investigation of the alleged altercation. Plaintiff testified, and there were various documents presented as well.
On May 22, 1986 the umpire issued his ruling in favor of the corporation, upholding plaintiff's suspension and denying his grievance. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the umpire's decision is final and binding on the corporation, the Union, and the employee.
Plaintiff filed a suit, pro se, against Spang and Yohe in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, wherein he alleged they defamed him at the discharge hearing of August 31, 1984. Spang and Yohe removed the action to this court, and plaintiff's subsequent petition for remand was denied. Spang and Yohe filed and briefed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. Plaintiff filed a motion to file a first amended complaint. Spang and Yohe did not oppose the motion, but filed a brief in response to it. Therein, they indicated their summary judgment motion should not be deemed withdrawn if the court permitted plaintiff to file the proposed amended complaint because, they contended, the amended complaint would not in anyway affect their summary judgment motion.
The court granted plaintiff's motion to file a first amended complaint. The amended complaint realleged the defamation charges against Spang and Yohe and added as party defendants the corporation and the Union. Plaintiff alleged, although not in so many words, a cause of action against the corporation for wrongful suspension after an inadequate investigation and a corrupt hearing. Plaintiff alleged a cause of action against the Union for breach of their duty of fair representation.
The Union filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice on limitations grounds. In granting the Union's motion and ordering the Union removed from the action, the court found plaintiff failed to satisfy the relation back requirements for amended complaints as set forth in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See this court's order and memorandum dated October 2, 1987.
The court now addresses Spang and Yohe's motion for summary judgment. Mindful of the unusual procedural posture of this summary judgment motion, the court is disposing of the motion on its merits because, as defendants assert in their response to plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint in no way affects the grounds asserted by defendants for summary judgment. Therefore, disposition of this motion is deemed a disposition on a motion for summary judgment as to the amended complaint.
Defendants put forth a number of grounds to support their contention that as a matter of law summary judgment should be granted in their favor. These grounds are: (1) the defamation and breach of contract claims are preempted by federal labor law; (2) the arbitration decision is final, binding and unappealable; (3) plaintiff has failed to plead the Union breached its duty of fair representation (an indispensable predicate for a § 301 action); (4) statute of limitations bars this action; (5) individuals, other than individual employers, cannot be held personally liable for damages under § 301; (6) defendants enjoy absolute or privileged immunity because their alleged defamatory statements were made...
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Deray v. Larson
...1997) (dismissing claims against both union and employer individual defendants for lack of jurisdiction); Kindness v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 716 F.Supp. 1538, 1540-41 (M.D.Pa.1987). See also Bey v. Williams, 590 F.Supp. 1150, 1155 (W.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir.1986). Moreover......