King Cnty. v. Abernathy
| Decision Date | 26 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | C20-0060-RAJ-SKV |
| Parties | KING COUNTY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ABERNATHY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Michael J. Abernathy's, Gina M. Abernathy's, Scott C. Baisch's, Jennifer C. Baisch's, Jody J. Brewster's, Howard M. Crow's, Margaret W. Crow's, Andrzej Milkowski's, Lisa M. Milkowski's, Michael Parrott's, and Diana Parrott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 40;[1] Defendant Patricia Harrell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 48;[2] and Plaintiff King County's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 65. Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary, and finds that Defendants' Motion, Dkt. 40, should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Defendant Harrell's Motion, Dkt. 48, should be GRANTED; and Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt. 65, should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the reasons explained herein.
This dispute concerns a 3.6-mile section of the East Lake Sammamish Trail (“ELST”), located in Government Lot 4 of Section 6, Township 24N, Range 6E (“Lot 4”) in Sammamish, Washington. Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 1, 17. The Seattle, Lake Shore & Eastern Railway Company (“SLS&E”) initially acquired an easement over this portion of the ELST (“Corridor”) in the 1890s pursuant to the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (“1875 Act”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939. Id. at ¶ 19. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”), SLS&E's successor in interest to the Corridor, deeded its rights in the Corridor to The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County (“TLC”) in 1997. Id. at ¶ 24. On September 16, 1998, the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) issued an order “railbanking” the Corridor under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (“Trails Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 1247 et seq., and authorizing its interim use as a recreational trail. Id. Two days later, TLC deeded its rights in the Corridor to Plaintiff King County. Id. Since that time, Plaintiff has constructed an interim public trail along the Corridor and is in the process of constructing a permanent, paved trail. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.
On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendants-who own properties in Lot 4 and have built or maintained docks, boat lifts, decks, fences, and other structures in the Corridor and adjacent shorelands-for quiet title, ejectment, and trespass. See Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 31, 33-42. Plaintiff alleges that it owns the Corridor either as an exclusive railroad easement or in fee simple and contends that Defendants' structures are encroaching on the Corridor and trespassing on public lands. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. Plaintiff asks the Court to adjudge it the legal owner of the Corridor and to require Defendants to remove the encroaching structures under Chapter 7.28 RCW. Id. at 9. Plaintiff also seeks damages from Defendants for restoration and remediation of the Corridor and for back rent and other damages under RCW 4.24.630 (“Waste Statute”). Id.
While Defendants acknowledge they or their predecessors in interest constructed the structures at issue, they contend that they own the Corridor in fee simple and that Plaintiff only has easement rights to it. Dkt. 37 at 7-8, 14; Dkt. 22 at 5; Dkt. 24 at 6-7, 13. Because of this, they argue Plaintiff cannot prevent them from using the Corridor, so long as their use does not interfere with Plaintiff's easement. See, e.g., Dkt. 22 at 7. They further contend the Corridor does not include any shorelands adjacent to their properties, meaning Plaintiff has no right to interfere with or prohibit their structures on the lake's shorelands. Dkt. 37 at 11-12; Dkt. 22 at 6; Dkt. 24 at 10. Defendants Abernathy, Baisch, Brewster, Crow, Harrell, Milkowsi, and Parrott assert counterclaims for quiet title, trespass, and waste. Dkt. 37 at 14; Dkt. 24 at 13. Defendants Beres assert a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that Plaintiff has no right to interfere with structures in or uses of the Corridor that do not materially interfere with the Corridor's use as a railroad or trail. Dkt. 22 at 8.
Defendants now move the Court on partial summary judgment for an order finding that Plaintiff's interest in the Corridor is limited to easements under the 1875 Act and Trails Act for railroad and public trail purposes; that the 1875 Act did not permit railroad easements across shorelands; and that the Corridor does not burden the shorelands adjacent to Lot 4. See Dkt. 40. By cross motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that Defendants do not have standing to claim ownership of the Corridor; that the Corridor burdens the shorelands in question by operation of the 1875 Act and/or Article 17, Section 2 of Washington's Constitution; that Plaintiff has the right to eject Defendants' encroachments in the Corridor; and that Defendants Beres and Parrott are barred by res judicata from asserting their counterclaims and defenses. See Dkt. 65. Finally, Defendant Harrell moves the Court on partial summary judgment for an order dismissing, or in the alternative limiting, Plaintiff's Waste Statute claims. See Dkt. 48.
The Court briefly summarizes the historical background relevant to the parties' dispute below.
In the early 1860s, Congress began granting railroad companies rights of way through, and fee simple title to, public lands in checkerboard blocks. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 96-97 (2014). In the late 1860s, however, public resentment toward these generous land grants began to grow and, by the 1870s, legislative policy shifted to reserving public lands for settlers. Id. at 97. Even so, Congress still wished to encourage railroad construction and passed a number of special acts between 1871 and 1875 granting specific railroads “the right of way” through public lands without any accompanying fee simple land grant. Id. at 97-98. In 1875, rather than continuing to enact special legislation for each such right of way, Congress passed the 1875 Act. Id. at 98.[3]
The 1875 Act provided that “[t]he right of way through the public lands of the United States is granted to any railroad company” meeting certain requirements “to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of said road.” 43 U.S.C. § 934. In order to obtain a right of way, a railroad could either actually construct its road or, prior to construction, file a proposed map of its rail corridor with the local office of the U.S. Department of the Interior in accordance with Section 4 of the Act. Brandt, 572 U.S. at 98. Section 4 required a railroad company to file its map within twelve months of survey or location of its right of way. 43 U.S.C. § 937. It further required a company to complete construction of its right of way within five years of locating it. Id. Once approved by the Department of the Interior, the right of way would be noted on the land plats at the local office and, moving forward, any lands over which it passed would be “disposed of subject to the right of way.” Id. By its terms, the 1875 Act did not apply to “any lands within the limits of any military, park, or Indian reservation, or other lands specially reserved from sale” unless an Act of Congress passed prior to March 3, 1875, provided otherwise. 43 U.S.C. § 938.
It is undisputed that the right of way granted to railroads under the 1875 Act was an easement. See Brandt, 572 U.S. at 102-06.
On July 5, 1887, pursuant to the 1875 Act, the Department of the Interior approved a map submitted by SLS&E for a proposed railway right of way along Lake Sammamish. See Dkt. 434; Dkt. 66-1. The right of way, or Corridor, crossed Lot 4. Dkt. 43-4; Dkt. 66-1. SLS&E's map showed the centerline of the Corridor over portions of the shorelands adjacent to Lot 4. Dkt. 434 at 4; Dkt. 65-1 at 2; Dkt. 66-1.
In March of 1888, SLS&E completed construction of its tracks through Lot 4. Dkt. 66-2. On April 18, 1891, SLS&E filed a second map showing the definite location of its completed tracks. Dkt. 65-1 at 3; Dkt. 66-3. This map indicated that part of the completed tracks had been built over the lake's shorelands. Dkt. 65-1 at 3; Dkt. 66-3.
On November 11, 1889, following SLS&E's construction of its rail line through Lot 4, Washington became a state. See Dkt. 43-7. In its constitution, Washington “assert[ed] its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state . . . up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes.” Wash. Cont. art. XVII, § 1. At the same time, Washington disclaimed “all title in and claim to all tide, swamp and overflowed lands, patented by the United States, ” provided that “the same is not impeached for fraud.” Id. at § 2 (“Article 17, Section 2” or “Section 2”).
Two years later, on January 11, 1892, the United States patented Lot 4 to William H. Cowie. Dkt. 43-8; Dkt. 67-1. It is undisputed that Mr. Cowie's patent did not include any of the shorelands adjacent to Lot 4. Then, in 1934, Mr Cowie's widow deeded Lot 4 to A.W. Rochford by statutory warranty deed (“1934 Deed”). Dkt. 67-3. The deed conveyed “all of Government Lot Four (4) . . . EXCEPT railroad right-of-way and except County road.” Id. at 2. Subsequently, Mr. Rochford and his wife conveyed Lot 4 to Fritz and Helen Sutter by deed recorded on March 31, 1948. Dkt. 67 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 67-4. The deed conveyed Lot 4 “[s]ub to ease of ...
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