King Trailer Company v. United States
Decision Date | 29 April 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 63-937 WB.,63-937 WB. |
Citation | 228 F. Supp. 1013 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | KING TRAILER COMPANY, Inc., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
W. S. Rainbolt, Long Beach, Cal., for plaintiff.
Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., Loyal E. Keir, Asst. U. S. Atty., Herbert D. Sturman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
This is an action for refund of excise taxes assessed and paid pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 4061.1
King Trailer Company, Inc., plaintiff, is a manufacturer of units denominated as "pickup coaches", which are primarily designed to be transported in the bed of a pickup truck. The pickup coach is similar in design to a house trailer, but for the sake of safety and convenience it is so shaped that it fits in the bed of the truck, and does not have a chassis of its own, or wheels. Each coach is a self-contained unit, having insulated walls, a roof, and a floor of its own, together with a door and window. The coaches are equipped with temporary living and sleeping quarters and have, or may have, furnishings and appliances similar to those commonly found in house trailers. The coaches have the plumbing features which are found in the typical house trailer, and they are subjected to the house trailer inspection standards. In addition, each is equipped with six volt wiring, 110 volt house wiring, and butane equipment. While the units are not spacious it is possible to take up a permanent residence in them, although this is seldom done. However, it is not uncommon for people to live in them for two or three-months at a time. The units are merely set in the bed of a pickup truck and are held therein by two turnbuckles, which can be attached to the post-holes in the body. No special drilling or other modification of the truck bed is required for the purpose of carrying a coach. The units are easily removed. They can be removed in from 10 to 15 minutes by simply jacking them up and driving the truck out from under them. Functioning of the units is not dependent upon the truck itself; they can as easily be used on a trailer, on the ground, and, indeed, on anything that will bear their weight. Of course, they are normally transported on pickup trucks, for their design is aimed at making such a method of conveyance ideal.
On May 25, 1955, R. J. Bopp, Chief of the United States Treasury Department's Excise Tax Branch, advised the plaintiff by letter that:
However, on April 1, 1960, the Internal Revenue Service issued Rev.Rul. 60-39, C.B. 1960-1, p. 406, which states, in pertinent part:
Pursuant to this ruling plaintiff's coaches were considered "truck bodies", and it was required to pay an excise tax upon them for the period from May, 1960, through September, 1962.
After performing all the conditions precedent, plaintiff brought this action against the United States of America, defendant, to collect the taxes so paid. Two major issues are now before the Court: (1) Are plaintiff's coaches "automobile truck bodies" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 4061 (a) (1); and (2)? If not, are they automobile "accessories" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 4061 (b)?
This Court has jurisdiction of this action by reason of 26 U.S.C. § 7422 and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1). Venue is also proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2).
At the outset the defendant points out the fact that where a regulation construing an ambiguous statute has been acted upon by the officials charged with its administration it should not be disturbed except for cogent reasons. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 50 S.Ct. 115, 74 L.Ed. 457 (1930), and Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 34 S.Ct. 685, 58 L. Ed. 1121 (1914). On the other hand it has also been held that where the construction is "neither uniform, general, nor of long standing" and serves no particular purpose other than compliance with the supposed command of the statutes, it is not entitled to any great weight. 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 3.20. See Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 60 S.Ct. 337, 84 L.Ed. 340 (1940), and United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357, 59 S.Ct. 281, 83 L.Ed. 217 (1939). Moreover, the deference normally given to regulations does not necessarily extend to informal rulings of the Internal Revenue Service in answer to taxpayer's questions. See, Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 379, 82 L.Ed. 431 (1938). Similarly, rulings may not be arbitrary or unreasonable, or extend the scope or terms of a tax statute, and are entitled to no more weight than the reasons sustaining them. And, it has also been said that tax statutes should be construed strictly, though reasonably, and should not be unduly expanded. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 44 S.Ct. 462, 68 L.Ed. 949 (1924), and United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 44 S.Ct. 69, 68 L.Ed. 240 (1923).
Thus, the fact that the Internal Revenue Service has issued a Revenue Ruling provides no talisman which will answer the questions presented here. The reasonableness of the defendant's position cannot be decided in a vacuum, and this court must look to the legislative history; the particular facts involved here; and the Service's own interpretations in similar cases.
The germinal statute, upon which 26 U.S.C. § 4061 is based, was passed in 1932, 47 Stat. 261, c. 209 § 606, June 6, 1932. That statute provided for a tax on, in general, automobile truck bodies and chassis, parts, accessories, and tires; as well as other automobile chassis and bodies, etc. It did not specifically levy a tax on trailers. There were many statements made on the floor of Congress concerning this statute, and many letters were read into the record. Although no member of Congress, or letter writer, made any specific statement regarding the definition of a truck or automobile chassis or body, what was said is informative. One thing which stands out in the Congressional Record is the fact that although many Congressmen referred to all of the other items in this statute in detail, they referred to chassis and bodies simply as automobiles or trucks. This is to be expected. To the legislators, and to most people, an automobile or a truck is a unit made for carrying people or things. If one is required to state what remains when the body is removed he will probably say "the chassis". Thus, what was truly intended to be taxed was the truck or automobile itself. Of course, the tax cannot be evaded by selling the chassis and body separately, each is subject to the tax. Supporting this view is the fact that accessories were specifically mentioned. An accessory is distinguished from a body or chassis. The body and chassis together comprise the truck or automobile. If accessories are removed you still have the truck or automobile unit; not so if you take away the whole body. A further fact which can be distilled from the legislative history of 47 Stat. 261 is that the legislature considered it was taxing the "automobile industry". And, more importantly, it intended to tax things that were primarily designed for transportation purposes. Many of the objections to this statute centered around the complaint that only one means of transportation —trucks and passenger automobiles —was being taxed. Since trains, ships and airplanes were also used for transporting people and things it was said to be unduly discriminatory to tax this single mode of transportation. Despite the objections, the statute was passed. For the debates and letters bearing on this legislative history see, Congressional Record, vol. 75, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pages: 1137-39; 1648; 2210; 5798; 7038; 7040-41; 7329; 9878; 10086; 10382; 10610; 11136-37; 12021; and 12024.
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