King v. Auto, Truck, Industrial Parts and Supply

• Decision Date: 28 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 3:96-cv-542/LAC.,3:96-cv-542/LAC.
• Citation: 21 F.Supp.2d 1370
• Parties: Selina K. KING and Pamela Hinote, Plaintiffs, v. AUTO, TRUCK, INDUSTRIAL PARTS AND SUPPLY INC., a Florida Corporation, and Mark Francis McDaniel, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

21 F.Supp.2d 1370

Selina K. KING and Pamela Hinote, Plaintiffs, v. AUTO, TRUCK, INDUSTRIAL PARTS AND SUPPLY INC., a Florida Corporation, and Mark Francis McDaniel, Defendants.

No. 3:96-cv-542/LAC.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division.

March 28, 1998.

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Matthew Bordelon, Gulf Breeze, FL, Stephanie Ann Taylor, Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Kathryn Bargo, Catherine Hobart, Atlanta, GA, Douglas F. Miller, Pensacola, FL, for Defendants.

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COLLIER, District Judge.

Defendant Auto, Truck and Industrial Parts and Supply ("ATI")¹ is an auto parts store supplying automotive and truck parts and industrial supplies to local garages, service stations, car dealers, and the public in the Pensacola area (doc. 61, exh. B:¶ 3) . Wholly owned by Defendant Mark McDaniel, ATI offers what was once a unique system of parts delivery called "hot shot" service, whereby ATI would make immediate delivery of customer orders, regardless of the size of the order (id. at ¶¶ 1, 4; doc. 75:132). Generally, orders are taken by Counter Sales Persons ("CSPs") and then delivered to the customer via Delivery Drivers ("Drivers") (doc. 61, exh. B:¶ 5). In ensuring efficiency and promptness, this process usually results in a frantic and fast-paced cycle of constant pick-ups and deliveries between ATI and its customers (id.).

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment and documents in support thereof (docs.60-63). Plaintiffs timely filed a memorandum and evidentiary materials in opposition (docs.71-82). Defendants also move to strike portions of affidavits submitted in response to their motion (docs.87-89). The Court has taken summary judgment under advisement, (doc. 69), and is now prepared to rule on all pending motions. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

Mark McDaniel serves as president of ATI, while his wife, Lisa, is the secretary/treasurer (doc. 75:6). Other supervisory positions are held by George Burbank, manager, Robert Saxton, assistant manger, and Terrance Denny, bookkeeper (id. at 15-17).² The ATI employment hierarchy is then comprised of basically three lower-level positions, including CSPs, Drivers, and Outside Sales Representatives ("OSRs") (id. at 57, 111, 130). The Drivers are also "managed" by a Delivery Coordinator, a position which was temporarily abandoned between 1993 and 1995 (id. at 15, 39, 44-45).

Plaintiff Selena King was first employed at ATI between 1988 and 1989 (doc. 63, King Depo. [hereinafter exh. A] at 15).³ She then returned to ATI in October of 1993 and resumed working as a Driver (id. at 16). While employed during this second period, King alleges that she was harassed by fellow employees and supervisors and witnessed harassment of other female Drivers (id. at 16-17). As a Driver, Plaintiff was responsible for delivering automotive parts to local mechanics' shops and car dealerships (doc. 61, exh. B:¶ 3). It was during these trips that Plaintiff claims she was additionally harassed by ATI customers (doc. 63, exh. A:90-98). Ultimately, Plaintiff King resigned on March 22, 1996 (doc. 1, exh. A:Complaint at ¶ 7) after an incident between Mark McDaniel and herself at which time he made disparaging remarks to her in front of other ATI employees (doc. 63, exh. A:79-80).

Plaintiff Pamela Hinote was also employed as a Driver at ATI beginning in March of 1995 (doc. 63, Hinote Depo. [hereinafter exh. B] at 36, 142). While at ATI, Plaintiff Hinote alleges that she was subject to hostile environment sexual harassment as well as discriminatory hiring and promotional practices (id. at 72, 151, 170-71). Like Plaintiff King, she also maintains that ATI customers harassed her while making deliveries to various locations in the Pensacola area (id. at 72, 75, 84). Because of an injury, Plaintiff Hinote stopped working on February 5, 1996 (id. at 36-37, 114-16). She then states in her complaint that she resigned on March 22, 1996, contemporaneously with Plaintiff King (doc. 1, exh. A:Complaint at ¶ 7).

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs King and Hinote filed charges of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on April 11, 1996 and May 14, 1996, respectively (doc. 61, exh. 1). Plaintiffs then received their right to sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") (doc. 1, exh. A:Complaint at exhs. A and B) and filed this lawsuit in the Escambia County Circuit Court on October 31, 1996 (doc. 1, exh. A). Defendants subsequently removed the instant action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 and 1441 (doc. 1).

In their two count complaint, Plaintiffs allege hostile environment sexual harassment (Count I) and discriminatory treatment in hiring and promotions (Count II) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, FLA.STAT. ch. 760 ("FCRA") (doc. 1, exh. A).⁴ Defendants now move for summary judgment on both procedural and substantive grounds (doc. 60). In support of their motion, Defendants have filed a memorandum of law, statement of facts, and evidentiary materials pursuant to N.D.FLA.LOC.R. 56.1 (docs.61-63). Plaintiffs have timely responded (docs.71-82) and the Court has taken the motion under advisement (doc. 69). Also pending is Defendants' motion to strike (doc. 87) which Plaintiffs oppose (doc. 89).

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move to strike portions of affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs in opposition to summary judgment (doc. 87). Specifically, Defendants argue that the testimony of Sherry Pahl, Jon Dumond, Joe Langley, and Richard Howard should be stricken on the grounds of irrelevancy, lack of personal knowledge, and inadmissibility under FED. R.EVID. 404(b). Each of these contentions will be considered in turn below.

A. Sherry Pahl

Defendants maintain that the affidavit testimony of Sherry Pahl should be stricken from the record as both inadmissible and irrelevant (doc. 87:2-4). They argue that because the "statements are devoid of any specific information ... there is no basis for determining whether the statements and actions observed by Ms. Pahl had any effect upon the Plaintiffs' work environment" (id. at 2). However, a statement's lack of specificity will not, without more, render it inadmissible. Rather, at the summary judgment stage the Court must decide the materiality of the evidence, and, should a plaintiff survive, the trier of fact then determines the weight and credibility to be afforded that evidence at trial.

Furthermore, the Court finds that Pahl did have personal knowledge of the facts to which she testified. In her affidavit she states that she was employed at ATI while Plaintiff King was working there (doc. 81:¶ 2). She had daily interactions with Mark McDaniel and other male employees and personally observed and complained about harassing behavior (id. at ¶¶ 3-6).⁵ Moreover, her statements regarding Mark McDaniel are not inadmissible pursuant to FED.R.EVID. 404(b). The situations described by Pahl are not being used in order to show some new action in conformity therewith, but rather are to identify instances of allegedly harassing behavior observed at ATI.

Lastly, the Court is not compelled by Defendants' argument that Pahl's testimony is irrelevant (doc. 87:3). Pahl's statement that "Mark McDaniel and George Burbank would not even allow female drivers to be trained on books used by countermen" at least raises an issue of fact as to what training policies were in place at ATI and would tend "to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.EVID. 401.

B. Jon Dumond

Defendants also move to strike the testimony of Jon Dumond and argue that he is without personal knowledge to testify to matters contained within his affidavit (doc. 87:4). Defendants assert that because Dumond was not in a managerial position at ATI and because George Burbank did not have responsibility for hiring CSPs, Dumond's affidavit testimony must be stricken. However, Dumond stated that he had personal knowledge of ATI's policies as a result of conversations with both Mark McDaniel and George Burbank (doc. 79:¶¶ 6, 9). Arguendo, even accepting Defendants' contentions regarding Burbank's lack of hiring authority, such an argument does not preclude testimony based on conversations with McDaniel, who clearly had hiring authority, nor Burbank, who could still have known what those policies were. Additionally, Dumond's non-managerial status does not foreclose the possibility that he knew of ATI's policies from some other source of personal knowledge, such as conversations with either Burbank or McDaniel. Furthermore, as discussed above, a statement which is arguably vague will not by itself render it inadmissible.

C. Joe Langley

Defendants also move to strike the affidavit testimony of Joe Langley, supervisor at competitor auto parts supplier AutoZone (doc. 87:5). At paragraph 5 of his affidavit, Langley states "[t]he automotive parts and supplies catalogs and computer indexing system used by Selina K. King at AutoZone are organized and to the best of my knowledge are used in the same manner as other automotive parts retailers" (doc. 82:¶ 5) (emphasis added). However, Langley has not shown any basis for personal knowledge of the cataloging systems at any other parts store except AutoZone. As such, paragraph 5 of his affidavit must be stricken for lack of personal knowledge required under FED. R.EVID. 602.

In light of this finding, the Court finds it unnecessarily restrictive to strike his affidavit in its entirety for Plaintiffs' failure to disclose him under FED.R.CIV.P. 26(a)(1)(A). Although Plaintiffs concede that Langley...