King v. Board of Educ. of City of Buford, s. A94A0857
| Citation | 214 Ga.App. 325,447 S.E.2d 657 |
| Decision Date | 15 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A94A0857,A94A0858,s. A94A0857 |
| Parties | , 93 Ed. Law Rep. 1017 KING v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BUFORD. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BUFORD v. KING. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Kennedy R. Packer, Athens, for appellant.
Chandler & Britt, Walter M. Britt, Gregory D. Jay, Suwanee, for appellee.
Appellant Joyce King sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of Education of the City of Buford ("the Board") to "retain and renew" her contract "in her capacity as Band Director until such time as it has complied with the law by serving the notice and conducting the hearing as set forth in OCGA §§ 20-2-942 & [20-2-]940." The superior court denied the writ "on the merits," finding that "the position of 'band director' is not encompassed within the procedural safeguards of the Georgia Fair Dismissal Law." OCGA § 20-2-940 et seq. King appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III and OCGA § 9-6-20. The local board filed a cross-appeal enumerating the denial of its oral motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court transferred the cases to this court for disposition.
1. Swicegood v. Heardmont Nursing Home, Inc., 183 Ga.App. 319, 359 S.E.2d 3 (1987). We therefore assume that there is no substantive issue here whether a writ of mandamus was the legal or proper relief to be sought in the superior court, as opposed to an administrative remedy, a writ of certiorari, declaratory relief, or some other remedy at law. See Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991). 1 Therefore we do not consider procedural matters militating against mandamus relief in particular, such as whether King brought this action for reinstatement prematurely, whether she should have first exhausted her administrative remedies, or whether mandamus is a "personal" action that cannot properly be pursued against the Board as a legal entity. Consequently, the issues raised in appellee's cross-appeal are deemed to be without merit.
2. Once it is accepted that other potential issues were resolved or eliminated upon transfer from the Supreme Court, we find that this case turns on the proper interpretation of the Georgia Fair Dismissal Law. OCGA § 20-2-940 et seq. Cf. Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga.App. 680, 402 S.E.2d 545 (1991) ( OCGA § 9- 13-142). These provisions "[set] forth the notice and hearing procedures for termination, suspension or demotion of teachers, principals and other employees having contracts for a definite term." Rockdale County School District v. Weil, 245 Ga. 730, 732(2), 266 S.E.2d 919 (1980). King essentially contends that the Board's decision not to reassign her as the school's "band director" after having assigned those duties to her for the previous four years is a "demotion" within the meaning of the Fair Dismissal Law. We are constrained to disagree.
A "demotion" occurs within the meaning of the Fair Dismissal Law when a teacher or other school employee is effectively moved "from one position in the school system to another position in the school system having less responsibility, prestige, and salary." OCGA § 20-2-943(a)(2)(C); Weil, supra. There is no question that King is being deprived of certain responsibilities and supplementary salary as a result of her loss of "band director" duties. Moreover, we have little difficulty in accepting as true that classroom teachers who are also band directors place a significantly higher value on that status than they do on their underlying status as classroom teachers generally. Nevertheless, it does not follow that King has experienced a demotion from one position in the school system to another under OCGA § 20-2-943(a)(2)(C).
In support of its position, the Board offered the testimony of Judy Wolovick, program director for the Professional Standards Commission of the State of Georgia ("the Commission"). It is Wolovick's responsibility to govern and oversee the certification procedures for secondary school teachers seeking certification in Georgia. Her undisputed testimony reveals that the position of "band director" is not recognized as a "certifiable" position by the Commission. It therefore follows that "band director" is likewise not a cognizable "position" under the Georgia Fair Dismissal Law.
King wishes to establish a property right in her status as "band director" notwithstanding the fact that it is not a recognized position. Her desire to do so is understandable; she wishes to continue teaching subject matter that is neither confined strictly to the classroom nor to regular school hours. However, the General Assembly has established the Professional Standards Commission as the proper authority to "designate and define the various classifications of professional personnel employed in the public schools of this state...." OCGA § 20-2-200(a) see also OCGA § 20-2-989.1. That body has declined to establish the position of "band director" as a cognizable tenured position. This is a matter within the Commission's lawful discretion. It therefore follows that, in the absence of clear authority to the contrary, the position of "band director" is not in itself a distinct "position" affording King the procedural protections of the Fair Dismissal Law.
King's position appears to be that, over time, a teacher may attain property rights in any extracurricular undertaking he or she is allowed to pursue if additional compensation is received as a result. Moreover, she appears to contend that such undertakings do not merely enhance the teacher's primary, tenured position; rather, they elevate him or her to a new and distinct tenured "position" within the meaning of OCGA § 20-2-943(a)(2)(C).
We find no support for this contention, and the Board has certainly not encouraged such an expectation. In the contracts immediately preceding the contract year in question, King signed an addendum containing the following language:
We find nothing unenforceable in the Board's retention of discretion from school year to school year in personnel matters involving extra duty positions such as band director. King was therefore not entitled as a matter of right to retain her "band director" status until such time as the Board held a hearing under OCGA § 20-2-942(b)--a hearing to which she was likewise not entitled.
The trial court correctly held that the Fair Dismissal Law does not apply to the loss complained of in this case, and therefore the court properly denied King's petition for mandamus.
Judgments affirmed.
I respectfully dissent to the judgment of affirmance as it is my view that the superior court erred in entertaining this petition for mandamus on the ostensible merits of the plaintiff school teacher's claim. Rather, I believe the controversy should be analyzed in terms of procedure. It is my view that, the superior court should have exercised its extraordinary authority and compelled the Board of Education to hold, in the first instance, the hearing plaintiff demanded, thereby setting into motion the administrative procedures established by the General Assembly for the benefit of tenured teachers. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand with direction that mandamus issue, directing the Board to provide the procedure contemplated by statute, OCGA § 20-2-940 et seq. I express no opinion on whether plaintiff should prevail before the Board and believe the superior court should have expressed none. I submit only that plaintiff is entitled to procedural relief and the superior court erred in failing to grant mandamus to afford that relief. As my view differs from that of the majority, I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff Joyce King petitioned the Gwinnett County Superior Court for injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus directed to defendant, the Board of Education of the City of Buford ("the Board"), alleging that she had been improperly demoted within the meaning of OCGA § 20-2-942, when the Board extended to her a renewed teaching contract but took away her responsibilities as the Band Director. Plaintiff demanded that the Board be compelled to retain her "in her capacity as Band Director until such time as [the Board] has complied with the law by serving notice and conducting the hearing as set forth in OCGA §§ 20-2-942 & [20-2-]940." A temporary restraining order was denied after a hearing, and further proceedings were scheduled. The Board answered, admitting that plaintiff is a certificated professional school employee who has accepted annual contracts for four consecutive years, but opposing the relief sought and averring that the petition failed to state a claim for relief because it seeks to enjoin the "assignment of supplemental or extra duty assignments which are too far removed from the primary teaching responsibilities of the plaintiff[.]"
The material facts adduced in support of and in opposition to plaintiff's ...
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