King v. Brice

• Decision Date: 12 April 1916
• Citation: 88 S.E. 960,145 Ga. 65
• Parties: KING ET AL. v. BRICE. BRICE v. KING ET AL.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

88 S.E. 960

145 Ga. 65

KING ET AL. v. BRICE.

BRICE v. KING ET AL.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 12, 1916

Syllabus by the Court.

The description of land in a contract of sale is sufficiently definite where the premises are so described as to indicate the grantor's intention to sell a particular lot of land.Where the contract indicates that a particular tract is intended to be conveyed, its practical identification can be proved by extrinsic evidence.

(a) The description of the property mentioned in the contract of sale, appearing in the first division of the opinion, is sufficiently definite to form the basis of a suit for recovery of damages from a breach of the contract.

In a suit by a vender against a vendee for a breach of contract for the sale of real estate, where the description of the land in the contract is sufficiently definite, it is competent to amend the petition by alleging a fuller description indicative of the adminicular proof relied on to make a practical application of the description to its subject-matter.

(a)The amendment in this case contains an amplification of the description of the land as demonstrative that the description in the contract could only apply to one tract of land, and does not ingraft upon the contract additional words of description.

The measure of damages for a breach of contract of sale of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land at the time of the breach.This rule for the measure of damages, as enunciated in Cowdery v Greenlee,126 Ga. 786, 55 S.E. 918, 8 L.R.A. (N. S.) 137, is not in conflict with the rulings in Ansley v Green,82 Ga. 181, 7 S.E. 921, andGreen v Ansley,92 Ga. 647, 19 S.E. 53, 44 Am.St.Rep. 110.

Certified Questions from Court of Appeals.

Action by J. A. Brice against R. D. King and others.From the judgment, all parties bring error.Heard on questions certified by the Court of Appeals.Questions answered.

R. B. Blackburn, of Atlanta, for plaintiff.

Marion Smith, of Atlanta, for defendants.

EVANS P.J.

The Court of Appeals certifies the following question to the Supreme Court:

"Is the description of the property mentioned in the following contract for the sale of real estate sufficiently full and definite to form the basis of a suit for the recovery of damages for breach of said contract?

The contract is as follows:

'$100.00.Atlanta, Ga. July 2, 1913.

Received of R. D. & C. S. King one hundred 00/100 dollars as part purchase money on the following described property: 26 Ponce de Leon Ave., 70X185, and 15-foot alley included, which, on and for account of the owner and vendor, we have this day sold to the purchaser above named, subject to the titles being good, for the sum of $40,000.00 (forty thousand dollars) to be paid as follows:

Five thousand cash ......... 5,000

Bal. 1, 2, 3, 4 years, 6% .. 14,250

Assumed indebtedness ....... 20,750

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$40,000.00

M. C. Kiser Real Estate Company, per H. K.

I hereby agree to purchase the above-described property on terms and conditions above named.

R. D. & C. S. King, R. D. King, Purchaser.

I hereby approve of the above-mentioned sale on the terms and conditions named, and agree to pay to M. C. Kiser Real Estate Company, real estate agents, on the date formal transfer is made, a commission of ______ dollars.

John A. Brice, Owner and Vendor.' "

No principle of the law of real estate is more generally admitted and followed than the one which declares that a description of land in a deed is sufficiently definite where the premises are so described as to indicate the grantor's intention to convey a particular tract or lot of land.It is not necessary that the deed should specify the precise boundaries; and, where it can be gathered from the whole instrument that the intention of the grantor was to convey a particular tract or lot of land, extrinsic evidence is receivable to show the boundaries.As was said in Crawford v. Verner,122 Ga. 814, 816, 50 S.E. 958, 959:

"The test as to the sufficiency of the description of property contained in a deed is whether or not it discloses with sufficient certainty what the intention of the grantor was with respect to the quantity and location of the land therein referred to, so that its identification is practicable."

The maxim, "Certum est quod certum reddi potest," sets forth a rule of logic, as well as of law, in the construction of written instruments.If a deed indicates that a particular tract is intended to be conveyed, its practical identification can be proved by extrinsic evidence, under the authority of this maxim.The maxim, however, has no application to vague descriptions, which do not indicate the grantor's purpose and intention to convey a particular tract or lot of land.A description in a will of "all my land" is good, for the reason that its location may be definitely ascertained by aliunde proof as to the location of the testator's land.Harriss v. Howard,126 Ga. 325, 55 S.E. 59.An executory contract for the sale of land described the property as "my half interest in the property corner of Second and Cherry streets, Macon, Ga.," and it was held that the description indicated the vendor's intention to sell his half interest in the land lot on the corner of Second and Cherry streets, Macon, Ga., and that parol evidence was admissible to show that the vendor was interested in only one tract on the corner of the named streets in Macon, Ga., and certainty in the contract would be supplied.Pearson v. Horne,139 Ga. 453, 77 S.E. 387.In Bush v. Black,142 Ga. 157, 82 S.E. 530, it was held:

"Where a contract for the sale or exchange of land was headed 'Atlanta, Ga., June 7, 1912,' and described the property to be conveyed as 'No. 401 Spring, known as the Cob Home, 50X160, more or less,' such description was not so vague and indefinite as to render a petition for specific performance by the purchaser subject to general demurrer.Prima facie the property mentioned in the contract would be treated as in Atlanta, Ga., in the absence of anything appearing to the contrary; and, while the description was carelessly made, it could be applied to its subject-matter by proper allegation and proof."

In Singleton v. Close,130 Ga. 716, 61 S.E. 722, it was held that a contract for the sale of land, signed by both parties, stating the place where it is dated, and describing the land as "the western portion of lot forty-one (41) Flannery ward, together with all the improvements thereon," and stipulating that the "seller is to occupy residence No. 221 Thirty-Sixth Street West" for a given time after the sale, sufficiently identified the property sold to satisfy the statute of frauds and to allow extrinsic proof to apply the contract to its subject-matter.This description was held to be sufficient to identify a specific lot in a named ward, having improvements thereon, known by a particular street number, and inferentially in the occupancy of the seller.The controlling feature...