King v. Caesar Rodney School District

• Decision Date: 26 June 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4607.
• Citation: 396 F. Supp. 423
• Parties: Dennis P. KING, Plaintiff, v. CAESAR RODNEY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

396 F. Supp. 423

Dennis P. KING, Plaintiff, v. CAESAR RODNEY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4607.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

June 26, 1975.

Sheldon N. Sandler, of Bader, Dorsey & Kreshtool, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Roger P. Sanders, of Prickett, Ward, Burt & Sanders, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER ON ATTORNEYS' FEES

WRIGHT, Senior District Judge.

After trial without a jury, this Court held that defendants dismissed the plaintiff, a tenured public school teacher, at mid-year in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. 380 F.Supp. 1112 (D.C.1974). The Court ordered reinstatement of plaintiff and certain incidental equitable relief. Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorneys' fees. Defendants oppose an award on three distinct grounds: (1) that the eleventh amendment bars such an award against the defendants; (2) that the plaintiff's request does not fall within any of the accepted rationales for the award of attorneys' fees and, as a matter of discretion, is inappropriate; and (3) that in any event, plaintiff can only recover to the extent of his personal obligation to pay his attorneys.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The eleventh amendment culminated the general antagonism to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), that a state was liable to suit by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country.¹ The amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

While the amendment does not by its terms provide immunity for a state from suit brought in federal court by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found such immunity in the amendment by implication. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1973), and cases there cited. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that even though a state is not named as a defendant, where the action "is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). In Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the Court held further that, as a general proposition,² a state is immune under the eleventh amendment from actions to recover accrued monetary damages from its treasury, even though the recovery has some characteristics of equitable restitution. Compare, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

To establish their eleventh amendment claim, therefore, defendants contend first, that the present action is in reality an action against the State of Delaware, and second, that any award of attorneys' fees would be akin to a proscribed retroactive award of monetary damages against the State.

With respect to defendants' first contention, it is settled that a governmental agency can claim a state's immunity under the eleventh amendment only if the state is the "real party in interest" in the proceeding, and the determination is a matter of federal law. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 31 S.Ct. 654, 55 L.Ed. 890 (1911); Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1969); Gordenstein v. University of Delaware, 381 F.Supp. 718 (D.Del.1974); NA-JA Construction Corp. v. Roberts, 259 F.Supp. 895 (D.Del.1966). In determining whether the defendant governmental agency is, in fact, the alter ego of the state, state law defining the relationship between the agency and the state should be considered as well as some or all of the following factors: whether, in the event plaintiff prevails, the judgment will have to be paid out of the state treasury; whether the agency is performing a governmental or proprietary function; whether it has been separately incorporated; whether it has autonomy over its operations; whether it has the power to sue and be sued and to enter into contracts; whether its property is immune from state taxation, and whether the state has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's operations. Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d at 251. Cf., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 41-43 (3rd Cir. 1974), judgment vacated, 421 U.S. 983, 95 S.Ct. 1986, 44 L.Ed.2d 474 (1975).

Under Delaware law, the Caesar Rodney School District is a "clearly defined geographic subdivision of the State organized for the purpose of administering public education in that area." 14 Del.C. § 1002(1). The school board is elected by voters in the district, 14 Del. C. § 1051, and, in accordance with the policies, rules, and regulations of the State Board of Education, determines the educational policies for the district. 14 Del.C. § 1049. The local school board has control, management, and custody of the property and funds of the district. 14 Del.C. § 1056. Although every school district receives substantial state appropriations for capital and operating expenditures, each school district also has the power to levy and collect additional taxes for school purposes following a referendum of the voters in the district.³ 14 Del.C. §§ 1902-03. Moreover, the school district hires teachers and staff without the necessity of prior state approval, 14 Del.C. §§ 1049, 1091 et seq., and the school board is the agency which can terminate the services of a teacher. 14 Del.C. § 1401 et seq. Appeal by a teacher from dismissal is not to any state administrative agency but rather directly to the Superior Court. 14 Del. C. § 1414.

In view of this statutory framework, it is plain that, although the local school board lacks complete autonomy over all of its operations, plaintiff's action for reinstatement and incidental relief was properly addressed to officers of the Caesar Rodney School District and not to the State Board of Education or the State of Delaware. Defendants alone have the power to reinstate the plaintiff, and the present litigation cannot be characterized as a disguised action against the State.⁴ Cf., Gordenstein v. University of Delaware, 381 F. Supp. at 721-22; NA-JA Construction Corp. v. Roberts, 259 F.Supp. at 896-98.

Furthermore, defendants have admitted that any award of attorneys' fees in this case would not be satisfied by the state treasury but by insurance which the school board carries.⁵ In addition, defendants can point to no Delaware case authority⁶ for their claim to sovereign immunity. In short, it cannot fairly be concluded that defendants constitute the alter ego of the State of Delaware, and defendants' claim to eleventh amendment immunity is without merit.⁷

Because the defendants are not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity, their second contention, that an award of attorneys' fees would be legally equivalent to proscribed retroactive damages, need not be resolved here. The Court notes in passing, however, that even if the Edelman holding forecloses the award of attorneys' fees incurred in the recovery of accrued monetary damages, Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d at 42 (dictum), it is questionable that attorneys' fees in an action seeking only reinstatement and other prospective relief could properly be characterized as proscribed "retroactive" damages. Cf., Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557, 561 (E.D.Pa. 1974).⁸

Propriety of an Award

Historically, American courts have ordinarily refused to award attorneys' fees to successful civil litigants.⁹ Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). The two common categories of exceptions to this general rule recognized by federal courts have been cases where recovery of attorneys' fees by the prevailing party is authorized or required by statute,¹⁰ and cases where the award has been deemed proper under the courts' equitable power. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973). Since there is no statutory authorization for the award of counsel fees to prevailing § 1983 plaintiffs, plaintiff bases his request squarely upon this Court's equitable jurisdiction. Until recently, courts using the equitable power to shift attorneys' fees relied upon one or more of the following rationales: bad faith or obdurate behavior by the defendant, creation or preservation of a common fund or common benefit by the plaintiff, and the private attorney general theory. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 549 (3rd Cir. 1974). In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), however, the Supreme Court held that the equitable jurisdiction of federal courts does not encompass authority to award counsel fees to private attorneys general.¹¹ Accordingly, plaintiff may not gain a recovery under the private attorney general theory. The Supreme Court in Alyeska reaffirmed the equitable authority to shift counsel fees under the bad faith and common benefit theories, and plaintiff's arguments on these two grounds deserve attention.

Plaintiff would be entitled to counsel fees if he could establish that the defendants acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . .." F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974). The purpose of fee shifting in such circumstances is deterrent and punitive. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943. There is no basis, however, for an assertion that defendants were guilty of bad faith in dismissing the plaintiff. On the contrary, this Court's opinion on the merits specifically found that the Board attempted to discharge its obligation fairly and in good faith, 380 F.Supp. at 1116, and that the board members violated pl...