King v. Cal. Dep't of Water Res.
| Decision Date | 16 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-01257-JDP (PS) |
| Citation | 561 F.Supp.3d 906 |
| Parties | Elise KING, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Elise King, Sacramento, CA, Pro Se.
Jennifer Stoecklein, California Department Of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This case requires the court to decide whether a plaintiff is precluded from litigating in federal court the issue of disability under the Rehabilitation Act when the State Personnel Board has previously determined that the plaintiff is not disabled under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. Although several courts outside this circuit have addressed the availability of issue preclusion under the Rehabilitation Act, the issue has not been addressed by this court. If issue preclusion is generally available under the Rehabilitation Act, the court must consider whether a decision of the State Personnel Board would be entitled to preclusive effect in state court—and, if so, whether issue preclusion should apply in this case.
Plaintiff Elise King, a former employee of defendant California Department of Water Resources who is proceeding without counsel, claims that defendant violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by refusing to accommodate her asserted disability, which involves a claimed inability to work under particular supervisors. See ECF Nos. 14, 16. Ms. King previously filed a complaint with the State Personnel Board, claiming that defendant had denied her reasonable accommodation, such as reassignment to different supervisors. The Board held an evidentiary hearing and then denied her claim, finding that she did not have a disability under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq. Plaintiff did not appeal. Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 33, arguing that the Board's determination of the issue of disability precludes reconsideration here.1 Plaintiff argues that issue preclusion is inappropriate because the administrative proceedings did not comply with certain procedural rules used in federal court; she urges the court to make its own determination of disability after an opportunity for discovery and a review of all evidence. ECF No. 35.
Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is proper when, even if all material facts in the complaint are taken as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys. , 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011). The court applies the same standard as would govern a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).2 Id. at 1054 n.4. "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, "courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine, ... in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007).
Defendant asks that the court take judicial notice of three decisional documents from plaintiff's state administrative proceeding, and of the fact that plaintiff did not appeal the final administrative decision. ECF No. 33-2. Plaintiff argues that the specified documents are not appropriate for judicial notice; her arguments focus on the underlying truth of the contents of the documents. See ECF No. 35 at 2-3.
Under Rule 201, administrative agency records, including decisional documents, are subject to judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). Judicial notice establishes only that these documents are as they are; it does not establish the correctness of any determinations therein. See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. , 981 F.2d 429, 435 (9th Cir. 1992) (); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) . I will grant defendant's request that the court take judicial notice of the agency records attached to the request and of the fact that plaintiff did not appeal the final administrative decision. ECF No. 33-2.
"[T]he determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit." Cromwell v. County of Sac , 94 U.S. 351, 354, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877). "[S]ubject to certain well-known exceptions, the general rule [for issue preclusion] is that ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.’ " B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus. , 575 U.S. 138, 148, 135 S.Ct. 1293, 191 L.Ed.2d 222 (2015) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1980) ). Preclusion embodies the idea that "a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino , 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991).
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is not limited to instances in which a federal court has decided an issue. It can also apply when "a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency" and the administrative agency is the first entity to consider the issue. B&B Hardware , 575 U.S. at 148, 135 S.Ct. 1293. In University of Tennessee v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986), the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry to determine whether a decision by a state administrative body should preclude litigation in federal court. Under that framework, a court considering whether issue preclusion applies first asks "whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress’ intent." Elliott , 478 U.S. at 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220. If so, the court then asks whether the agency decision would be entitled to preclusive effect in the courts of that state. Id. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220 .
Applying Elliott , I first consider whether common-law preclusion would be consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the Rehabilitation Act. Since Congress legislates against the backdrop of the common law, of which issue preclusion is a part, preclusion will operate unless a contrary intent can be inferred from the statute.
In Elliott , the Supreme Court inferred that Congress did not intend for issue preclusion to operate because Title VII referred to state proceedings in a manner abrogating common law. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) required the EEOC to give "substantial weight" to state findings and orders. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795-96, 106 S.Ct. 3220. That provision "would make little sense ... if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court" because substantial weight is a lesser level of deference than preclusion. Id. at 795, 106 S.Ct. 3220.
In Astoria , the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), holding that Congress did not intend unreviewed state agency findings to preclude claims brought under the that law. The Supreme Court noted that the statute requires plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies and uses the termination of state proceedings to set filing deadlines. Astoria , 501 U.S. at 110-11, 111 S.Ct. 2166. These provisions "plainly assume the possibility of federal consideration after state agencies have finished theirs"; "federal proceedings would be strictly pro forma if state administrative findings were given preclusive effect." Id. at 111, 111 S.Ct. 2166. The Court also found that the ADEA's enforcement provisions showed that Congress did not intend to preclude federal consideration; the statutory language did not provide for deference even to federal administrative findings, implying that state findings would similarly receive no deference. Id. at 112, 111 S.Ct. 2166. As the Supreme Court put it, "[a]dministrative findings with respect to the age-discrimination claims of federal employees enjoy no preclusive effect in subsequent judicial litigation, and since there is no reason to believe federal enforcement agencies are any less competent than their state counterparts, it would be anomalous to afford more deference to one than the other." Id. at 112-13, 111 S.Ct. 2166 (internal citations omitted). Turning back to Elliott , the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion...
To continue reading
Request your trial