King v. Celebrezze

• Decision Date: 17 October 1963
• Docket Number: No. 477.,477.
• Citation: 223 F. Supp. 774
• Parties: Monie KING, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

223 F. Supp. 774

Monie KING, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

No. 477.

United States District Court E. D. Kentucky, Catlettsburg Division.

October 17, 1963.

W. L. Steele, Ashland, Ky., for plaintiff.

B. T. Moynahan, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., for defendant.

SWINFORD, Chief Judge.

This is an action to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare which denies the plaintiff's claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction under section 205 (g) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. 405(g)) and is confined by this section to determining whether the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence.

This case has a long and tortuous history. Plaintiff filed his application for benefits on April 1, 1957. This was turned down by decision of a referee in the Social Security Administration on April 28, 1959. The plaintiff commenced this action to secure review of the referee's decision on August 7, 1959. This Court, on June 17, 1960, affirmed the referee, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support his findings. Plaintiff next appealed and the decision of this Court was reversed. King v. Flemming, 6 Cir., 289 F.2d 808. On the authority of Hall v. Flemming, 6th Cir., 289 F.2d 290 (1961), the mandate required that the case be sent back to the Secretary for additional findings as to what a person with plaintiff's afflictions could do and what employment opportunities there are for a person who can do only what the plaintiff can do. The Secretary has now made these additional findings and it is the duty of this Court to determine whether this phase of the Secretary's adjudication is supported by substantial evidence.

At the outset, it is appropriate to remark that the Appeals Council went beyond the terms of the mandate and took additional medical evidence over the plaintiff's objection. This is justified, according to the Appeals Council, by a desire to confirm the earlier diagnoses and prognoses. The Court cannot see that it either enhances or detracts from the former findings and views it as innocuous beyond its tendency to further burden this voluminous record.

It should next be explained that the outcome of this case is determined entirely by the condition of the plaintiff between September 1945 and April 1947. Plaintiff's "insured status" expired on March 31, 1947 and his situation beyond this time is wholly irrelevant. See 42 U.S.C.A. 416(i) (3). Much of the argument, practice and procedure employed in this case loses sight of this circumstance. Every medical examination conducted beyond this time is without significance unless it is directed at ascertaining what the plaintiff's condition was in 1947 or earlier or, possibly, that the impairments he did have at such early date were of long-continued or indefinite duration. Hilber v. Ribicoff, D.Mont., 196 F.Supp. 460 (1961). Much of the evidence has been introduced without regard to this rule. There is, for example, extensive commentary regarding a neck injury that the plaintiff suffered in an automobile accident that occurred in 1954. The effect of such free-ranging inclusion of evidentiary matter is only to obscure the issues that rightfully pertain to the subject of the plaintiff's claim.

The same reservation applies to the determination presently before the Court, the matter of plaintiff's employment prospects. It must be said in fairness to the parties that they have payed closer heed to the time limitations in this context.

The question before the Secretary related to the employment opportunities available to the plaintiff between 1945 and 1947. The...