King v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1900
• Citation: 80 Minn. 83,82 N.W. 1113
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: KING v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

80 Minn. 83

82 N.W. 1113

KING

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 31, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Mower county; Nathan Kingsley, Judge.

Action by Vance King against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

Injuries to the person and injuries to the property of the person injured, both resulting from the same tortious act, are separate items of damages, constituting but one cause of action. H. H. Field and Shepherd & Catherwood, for appellant.

Lafayette French and A. W. Wright, for respondent.

LEWIS, J.

Plaintiff, while riding in and driving his wagon across defendant's tracks, was run into by defendant's train. As a result, he was personally injured, and the wagon and horses and harness were damaged. Thereafter plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover for the injuries suffered in his person, and secured a judgment of $1,000. While that action was still pending on appeal in this court (79 N. W. 611) plaintiff commenced the present proceeding to recover the damage sustained by the injury to the horses, wagon, and harness, alleged to be $225. As a defense to this action, defendant pleaded the former judgment as a bar, and, by an amendment later, pleaded its full payment and satisfaction. Upon the trial below, judgment was rendered for the full amount, and defendant appeals.

This brings before us a question new to this court, viz.: Where the person himself and his personal property are injured by the same tortious act, does there arise only one cause of action for damages, or is there one separate and independent cause of action for injuries to the person, and another for damages to the property? It has long since become settled in this state that a single, entire cause of action cannot be split up into several suits, and that one recovery, although it be in part recovery for the entire injury, is effectual as an estoppel. Pierro v. Railway Co., 39 Minn. 451, 40 N. W. 520;Thompson v. Myrick, 24 Minn. 4;Ziebarth v. Nye, 42 Minn. 541, 44 N. W. 1027;O'Brien v. Manwaring (Minn.) 81 N. W. 746. Mr. Dunnell, in his new work, Minnesota Pleading (sections 285, 286), defines a cause of action, and quotes from Pomeroy on Remedies: ‘Every remedial right arises out of an antecedent primary right and corresponding duty, and a delict or breach of such primary right and duty by the person on whom the duty rests. Every judicial action must, therefore, involve the following elements: A primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant, which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant, springing from this delict; and finally the remedy itself. Every action, however complicated or however simple, must contain these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong, combined, constitute the cause of action.’ The learned trial judge, in a carefully written memorandum, based his decision upon the proposition that at the common law every person was possessed of two distinct primary rights,-the right of personal security and the right of private property,-and that a distinct cause of action arose from an infringement of either. And, it is argued, these rights have been carried into our system of jurisprudence, and remedies provided for their preservation; that the constitution guaranties a certain remedy by the law for injuries thereto; that statutes have been enacted with the special purpose of keeping these rights separate and distinct, in order that the remedy for an infringement of each may be enforced without reference to the other, as the statute of limitations (Gen. St. 1894, §§ 5136-5138); also, the statute providing what causes of action survive. Counsel for respondent, taking this distinction of primary rights as a basis, has argued ably that it necessarily follows that the cause of action in this case did not consist of the act of negligence on the part of defendant in injuring the plaintiff and his property, but the cause of action arose from the results of the act;...