King v. Cole's Poultry, LLC
| Decision Date | 29 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 1:14-cv-00088-MPM-DAS |
| Parties | JAMES E. KING, SR., et al. PLAINTIFFS v. COLE'S POULTRY, LLC, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Peco Foods, Inc.'s ("Peco") Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment [185][186]. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion [408], to which Peco filed a reply [413]. Upon review of the parties' submissions, along with relevant case law and evidence, the Court is now prepared to rule.
Cole's Poultry, LLC ("Cole's"), Skeels Poultry, LLC ("Skeels"), and Peco are engaged in broiler chicken operations, utilizing confined chicken facilities in Monroe County, Mississippi, to raise chickens for meat production. Under their arrangement, Peco, an Alabama corporation, supplies the chickens to Cole's and Skeels, who actually operate the Monroe Country facilities. While Cole's and Skeels operate the facilities, Peco maintains an extensive amount of authority over the chicken growing process and the day-to-day operations of the facilities.
This action commenced on July 20, 2011, when fifty-seven1 residents of Monroe County, Mississippi ("Plaintiffs"), filed their complaint against Cole's, Skeels, and Peco. Plaintiffs filed their suit in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Mississippi, alleging that the defendants'confined chicken facilities located in close proximity to Plaintiffs' homes and properties interfere with their ability to use and enjoy their properties. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he foul, noxious, and potentially dangerous odors emanating from these chicken facilities, as well as millions of flies and other potentially harmful emissions have impaired Plaintiffs' ability to use and enjoy their properties and have caused substantial damage to their quality of life."
Thereafter, on August 3, 2012, Cole's and Skeels both filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and subsequently removed this action to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (the "Bankruptcy Court"). Each individual plaintiff filed a proof of claim against Cole's and Skeels in that proceeding. However, on October 16, 2013, Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their claims, stating their intent to pursue claims solely against Peco. On November 15, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss Cole's and Skeels from the adversary proceeding. Then, on November 27, 2013, Peco filed an amended notice of removal, asserting diversity jurisdiction as the basis for this Court's jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Court entered an order abstaining from further action and transferring the case to this Court on January 29, 2014.
Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint against Peco on January 23, 2015. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Peco owned and retained exclusive control over all aspects of Cole's and Skeels' confined chicken facilities, which were located in close proximity to Plaintiffs' homes and properties in Monroe County, Mississippi. As stated above, Plaintiffs assert that "[t]he foul, noxious, and potentially dangerous odors emanating from these chicken facilities, as well as millions of flies and other potentially harmful emissions, have impaired Plaintiffs' ability to use and enjoy their properties and have caused substantial damage to their quality of life." Plaintiffs' complaint includes causes of action for temporary and continuingnuisance, negligence, and negligent entrustment. Regarding the nuisance and negligence actions, Plaintiffs assert that Peco is vicariously liable for the actions of Cole's and Skeels. Plaintiffs also argue that Peco is independently liable for these claims because it should have reasonably anticipated these damages and thus owed an independent duty to them. Along with their request for compensatory damages, Plaintiffs request punitive damages, averring that Peco acted with malice and/or reckless disregard for their safety.
In addition to numerous motions for summary judgment as to multiple individual plaintiffs, Peco filed the present omnibus motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiffs responded in opposition.2 Peco thereafter filed a reply. Upon review of the parties' submissions, along with relevant case law and evidence, the Court finds that Peco's motion is due to be denied in part and granted in part.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the court must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Once the moving party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the nonmoving party "must come forward with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial." Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist., 635F.3d 685, 690 (5th Cir. 2011). "[A] party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or 'only a scintilla of evidence.' " Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). "If the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden, the motion for summary judgment must be granted." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
In its motion, Peco makes multiple arguments in favor of summary judgment. Regarding the negligence and nuisance claims under the vicarious liability theory, it asserts that it should not be held vicariously liable because (1) Cole's and Skeels were independent contractors and (2) Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their claims against Cole's and Skeels extinguished their vicarious liability claims. Regarding the direct nuisance action, Peco argues that it is not liable because Cole's and Skeels were solely responsible for the land that caused the alleged nuisance. Regarding the direct negligence action, Peco argues that it is not liable because it did not owe an independent duty to Plaintiffs. Peco also asserts that the negligence claims should be dismissed because the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims is nuisance. Further, Peco argues that Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient proof that the flies on their property were caused by the operation of the chicken facilities. Peco also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient proof in order to survive summary judgment as to their negligent entrustment claim. Finally, Peco asserts that inasmuch as Plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages are based upon vicarious liability, they should be dismissed because punitive damages are not available on vicarious liability claims under Mississippi law. Regarding the claims not based on vicarious liability, Peco argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the stringent punitive damages burden.
As stated above, the arguments have been fully briefed by the parties. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
One party may be held vicariously liable for another party's torts if there was a master-servant relationship between the parties at the time the tort was committed. Hill v. City of Horn Lake, 160 So.3d 671, 676 (Miss. 2015). However, a party may not be held vicariously liable for another's torts if the relationship was merely one of an independent contractor. Id.; see also Owens v. Thomae, 759 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1999) (citing Miss. Power Co. v. Brooks, 309 So.2d 863, 866 (Miss. 1975)) ("The general rule is that the employer of an independent contractor has no vicarious liability for the torts of the independent contractor or for the torts of the independent contractor's employees in the performance of the contract."). Thus, if the Court finds that Cole's and Skeels were independent contractors—rather than employees, Plaintiffs' vicarious liability claims against Peco must be dismissed. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving Peco's vicarious liability at trial and "accordingly bear the burden [at the summary judgment stage] of producing evidence to demonstrate the existence of a disputed material fact on the issue." Hill, 160 So.3d at 676 (citing Webster v. Miss. Publishers Corp., 571 So.2d 946, 949 (Miss. 1990)).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has defined an independent contractor as "a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Texas Co. v. Mills, 156 So. 866, 869 (Miss. 1934). In contrast, a servant is "a person employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in theperformance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master." Id. Thus, "the difference between a master-servant relationship and an independent-contractor relationship is that an employer in a master-servant relationship has control of, or the right to control, the employee in the details of the work." Hill, 160 So.3d at 676.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the language of the contracts between the parties is not dispositive. McCary v. Wade, 861 So.2d 358, 363 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1994) (...
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