King v. Department of Navy
| Decision Date | 24 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-3298,97-3298 |
| Citation | 130 F.3d 1031 |
| Parties | Laura V. KING, Petitioner. v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Laura V. King, of Tracyton, Washington, pro se.
Dorann E. Banks, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. On the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, and Joseph A. Kijewski, Assistant Director.
Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges.
Laura V. King petitions for review of the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, Docket No. SE0752920328-C-1, dismissing her petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement with the United States Department of the Navy. We reverse the decision of the Board and remand for further proceedings.
Before the Board, and in the briefs on appeal, Petitioner describes the circumstances leading to the settlement agreement as follows: She began her employment with the Navy in 1980 as a temporary GS-2 Clerk Typist and rose to the position of Security Specialist, GS-11, also earning the M.S. degree in systems management from the University of Southern California. Her difficulties began when she complained about pictures of scantily clad women and sexually offensive cartoons posted in her work environment. Petitioner states that the Navy did not correct the situation, despite some efforts in that direction, and retaliated against her when her complaints were repeated and she filed EEOC complaints. The Navy reduced her duties and responsibilities, and threatened to transfer her. Eventually these tensions were accompanied by physical illness and, on the advice of her physician, Petitioner did not come to work. The Navy denied Petitioner's requests to use her accumulated annual and sick leave, revoked her security clearance, and placed her on absent without leave status. Petitioner applied for worker's compensation, which the Navy opposed. The Navy removed After Petitioner appealed to the Board, she and the Navy entered into a settlement agreement. The Navy agreed to "cancel the removal action of the appellant ... and remove all reference to the removal action from her Official Personnel File." The Navy agreed to treat her time lost due to illness as authorized leave, to change its records accordingly, and to pay her reasonable attorney fees up to $1200. Petitioner agreed to submit and the Navy agreed to process her voluntary resignation. The agreement was entered into the appeal record before the Board, and the appeal was dismissed.
her from employment in June, 1992, on the ground of being absent without leave.
Through a Freedom of Information Act inquiry, Petitioner learned that records with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) contain references to the removal action. Petitioner brought an action to enforce the settlement agreement. The Board accepted the government's position that the reference in the settlement agreement to Petitioner's "official personnel file" means only the personnel file in the possession of the Navy, and does not include the personnel files of OPM and DFAS. Thus the Board denied the Petition for Enforcement. This appeal followed.
The Board's decision shall be sustained unless it is 1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been followed; or 3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
The interpretation of a settlement agreement is an issue of law. See Mays v. United States Postal Serv., 995 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed.Cir.1993) (); Greco v. Department of the Army, 852 F.2d 558, 560 (Fed.Cir.1988). We review the Board's determinations of law for correctness, without deference to the Board's decision. See Perry v. Department of the Army, 992 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1993) ()
In interpreting a written agreement, we first ascertain whether the written understanding is clearly stated and was clearly understood by the parties. If ambiguity is found, or if ambiguity has arisen during performance of the agreement, the judicial role is to implement the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made. In so doing the words used by the parties to express their agreement are given their ordinary meaning, unless it is established that the parties mutually intended and agreed to some alternative meaning. Perry, 992 F.2d at 1579; Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct.Cl. 384, ...
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