King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 5 F.Supp.2d 504
• Decision Date: 11 May 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97-431.
• Parties: Belinda KING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

Page 504

5 F.Supp.2d 504

Belinda KING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-431.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky.

May 11, 1998.

Jeffrey J. Kuebler, Susan C. Sears, Newberry, Hargrove & Rambicure, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiffs.

Robert L. Chenoweth, Chenoweth Law Office, Frankfort, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HOOD, District Judge.

These matters are before the Court upon cross motions for summary judgment [Record Nos. 9 & 11]. Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for consideration.

The following are the pertinent facts. By order dated December 23, 1997, the Court consolidated the following three cases: Belinda King, by her next friend, Scarlet King v. Floyd County Board of Education, Case No. 97-431;¹ Clayton Hall, by his next friend, Darlene Mitchell v. Floyd County Board of Education, Case No. 97-432; and Ronnie Joe Sword, by his next friend, Barbara Sword v. Floyd County Board of Education, Case No. 97-433. Each of the above cases arose from the same factual circumstances and involved the same issues of law under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.

On November 4, 1997, almost nine months after the decisions on the merits of the cases had become final, the plaintiffs brought their claims for attorneys' fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs are suing for attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B), which states that:²

In any action or proceeding brought under this subsection the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.

In all three cases, the defendant concedes that the plaintiffs were the "prevailing parties" as the term is used in the statute. Hence, the only issue surrounding these cases is whether the plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The issue of the applicable statute of limitations for an award of attorneys' fees under § 1415(e)(4)(B) is one of first impression in the Sixth Circuit.³ In fact, only two federal courts of appeals have addressed this issue, and they have disagreed.

In addressing this issue, it should be pointed out that the IDEA statute does not specify a statute of limitations pursuant to which a prevailing party must initiate an action in court for attorneys' fees. Under such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a court should borrow the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484, 486 (6th Cir.1986).

The defendant argues that the analogous statute in Kentucky is KRS 13B.140. This statute states that a party has thirty days upon which to file an appeal of an administrative order. See KRS 13B.140. The defendant also urges the Court to adopt the reasoning in Powers v. Indiana Department of Education, Division of Special Education, 61 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.1995).

In Powers, the Seventh Circuit found that the claim for attorneys' fees was ancillary to the education dispute, and it was part of the underlying administrative action. Id. at 556-58. Hence, the Seventh Circuit held that the most analogous statute was Indiana's thirty-day statute of limitations for an administrative appeal.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue that KRS 413.120(2) is the appropriate statute of limitations. This statute states that an "action upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by the statute creating the liability" shall be commenced within five years. See KRS 413.120(2).

After reviewing both statutes, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs. The claim for attorneys' fees under § 1415(e)(4)(B) is a separate claim and is not part of the underlying administrative action. Therefore, Kentucky's five-year statute of limitations is the most analogous statute.

In reaching its decision, the Court was persuaded by the case of Zipperer v. School Board of Seminole County, Florida, 111 F.3d 847 (11th Cir.1997). In rejecting the Seventh Circuit's approach, the Zipperer Court stated the following:

Most significantly, section 1415(e)(2) provides for the appeal of a substantive administrative decision, whereas section 1415(e)(4) provides for an independent claim for attorneys' fees. Because the district court, rather than the administrative agency, has jurisdiction to award fees, the prevailing party cannot appeal an administrative decision under section 1415(e)(4)(B). Accordingly, we reject the school system's argument that a claim under section 1415(e)(4)(B) is analogous to the appeal of an administrative hearing. Instead, we find that section 1415(e)(4) provides a claim based on a statutory liability and is, thus, more analogous to Fla. Stat. ch. 95.11(3)(f).

Id. at 851.

Along with Zipperer, the Court found the case of Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir.1986), to be highly persuasive. In determining which statute of limitations applied to a substantive appeal under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the Sixth Circuit made the following statement in regard to the proposed sixty day limitation:

Obviously, the sixty-day statute of limitations of section 4-5-322 which applies to appeals from agency rulings is inapplicable because the Janzens had no ruling of any kind from which to appeal. The present situation as argued by the school board is in no way analogous.

Id. at 487.

In the case at bar, because the Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees, not the administrative agency, the plaintiffs did not have any ruling from which to appeal. Hence, based on the reasoning in Janzen, the fact pattern at bar is in no way analogous to an appeal of an administrative decision.

In summary, the Court finds that Kentucky's five-year statute of limitations, KRS 413.120(2), is the most analogous statute. This is reasonable because the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees is based upon statutory liability and is independent of the underlying action.

The next issue to be addressed is whether a five-year statute of limitations is consistent with the policies underlying IDEA. One of the goals of IDEA is to promote parental involvement in the educational decision-making process. See Janzen, 790 F.2d at 487. A five-year statute of limitations serves to promote participation on behalf of parents because they know they will have ample time to recover their attorneys' fees if they are the prevailing parties under the statute. See J.B. v. Essex-Caledonia Supervisory Union, 943 F.Supp. 387, 392 (D.Vt.1996) (noting that a longer statute of limitations is consistent with Congress's intent to encourage and promote the rights of the handicapped in education).

Additionally, the Court agrees with the following excerpt from Zipperer:

We next address whether adoption of a four-year statute of limitations is inconsistent with the policies of the IDEA. We acknowledge that a short period of limitations for claims brought pursuant to section 1415(e)(2) "assures prompt resolution of disputes over education plans for [disabled] children." Nonetheless, the resolution of claims for attorneys' fees is less urgent and, in reality, is more likely to be resolved by the attorneys' interest in prompt payment than by a short period of limitations. A four-year period of limitations, like the award of attorneys' fees to parents who are prevailing parties, is likely to encourage the involvement of parents, as represented by attorneys, in securing appropriate public educations for their children. We conclude that the application of a four-year statute of limitations to claims for attorneys' fees under the IDEA is consistent with the policies of the federal statute. (internal citations omitted).

Based on the above, the Court finds that Kentucky's five-year statute for actions based upon statutory liabilities is consistent with the policies underlying IDEA. Therefore, since the plaintiffs at bar brought their claims for attorneys' fees within 10 months of the final orders, they are not time-barred.

Having determined that the plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees are not time-barred, the next question the Court must address is how much should the plaintiffs receive.⁴ Counsel for the plaintiffs have provided the Court with an itemized list of their expenses, and the defendant has lodged numerous objections to them.

The Sixth Circuit has stated the following in regard to a district court's determination of a fee award:

"[I]t remains important ... for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award." A district court should state with some particularity which of the claimed hours the court is rejecting, which it is accepting, and why. Where a party raises specific objections to a fee award, a district court should state why it is rejecting them. Even if the defendant raises objections in a generalized manner, a district court has an obligation to review the billing statement and eliminate those portions of the fee which are unreasonable on their face.

Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir.1990).

In deciding the attorneys' fees' issue, the first point to be addressed is how much is an appropriate and reasonable hourly rate for the various attorneys. The Sixth Circuit has held that the district court has broad discretion in determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate. See Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir.1994).

In the case at bar, the Court received affidavits from three attorneys for the plaintiffs listing their hourly rates. One of the attorneys, Susan C. Sears, has stated that she charges $100 an hour for her services. Even though Ms. Sears had been practicing less...